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Executive Summary 
 
This dissertation comprises three distinct chapters. The first chapter examines market 
reactions towards changing the information location of own credit risk (OCR) gains and 
losses on financial liabilities designated at fair value (FVOL) from net income to other 
comprehensive income (OCI), as part of replacing IAS 39 by IFRS 9. Using event study 
methodology, I find that banks that have accumulated an OCR net gain (loss) since 2006 
exhibit significantly lower (higher) abnormal returns. This result suggests that investors 
overvalued banks that accumulated an OCR net gain relative to banks that accumulated an 
OCR net loss prior to the events. Further analysis shows that the effect is solely present in low 
information environments, consistent with low information environments decreasing the 
effect of OCR gains and losses on firm valuations.  
The second chapter examines the return relevance, value relevance, and risk relevance of 
OCR gains and losses on FVOL. Using a global sample of IFRS banks from 2006 to 2015, we 
find that recognized OCR gains and losses are negatively related to stock returns and stock 
prices, respectively, indicating that the market perceives OCR gains (losses) as a negative 
(positive) signal for the bank’s economic performance. In addition, OCR gains and losses are 
risk relevant, as indicated by the positive correlation between the volatility in OCR gains and 
losses and the volatility in stock returns. Taken together, our findings suggest that recognized 
OCR gains and losses reflect changes in the entity-wide credit risk, i.e., the asset-side effect 
of credit risk changes dominates the liability-side effect. 
The third chapter examines the capital market effects of standardized voluntary disclosure 
of industry-specific information in an ex-ante strong information environment, which is the 
European real estate sector. We compute three proxies measuring the degree of firm 
compliance with the best practice recommendations (BPR) issued by the European Public 
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Real Estate Association (EPRA). Our results show that EPRA NAV and EPRA NNNAV are 
both relatively and incrementally value relevant. Further, our results show that firms’ 
increased (decreased) EPRA BPR disclosures are positively (negatively) associated with 
liquidity and analyst coverage and negatively (positively) associated with cost of capital. 
Lastly, we find that debt offering plans are positively associated with first-time adoption of 
EPRA BPR and subsequently the degree of compliance with EPRA BPR. Overall, our results 
indicate that investors and analysts deem complementary disclosures in accordance with 
EPRA BPR useful.   
 
Keywords: Own credit risk (OCR), debt valuation adjustments (DVA), IFRS 9, IAS 39, 
fair value accounting, EPRA, best practice recommendations, standardized voluntary 
disclosure, banks and real estate firms, information asymmetry. 
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Résumé 
 
Cette thèse consiste en trois chapitres distincts. Le premier chapitre examine les réactions 
du marché visant à modifier l'emplacement de l'information des profits et des pertes de risque 
de crédit propre (OCR) sur les passifs financiers désignés à la juste valeur (FVOL) du résultat 
net aux autres éléments du résultat étendu (OCI), dans le cadre du remplacement de l’IAS 39 
par l’IFRS 9. À l'aide de la méthodologie de l'étude d’événements, je décèle que les banques 
qui ont accumulé un profit net (une perte nette) d’OCR depuis 2006 affichent des rendements 
anormaux nettement inférieurs (supérieurs). Ce résultat suggère que les investisseurs ont 
surévalué les banques ayant accumulé un profit net d'OCR relatif aux banques ayant accumulé 
une perte nette d'OCR avant les événements. Une analyse plus approfondie montre que l'effet 
est uniquement présent dans des environnements d'information inférieurs, consistent avec des 
environnements d'information inférieurs réduisant l'effet des profits et des pertes d'OCR sur 
les évaluations fermes. 
Le deuxième chapitre examine la pertinence du rendement, de la valeur et du risque 
relative aux profits et aux pertes d'OCR sur FVOL. À l'aide d'un échantillon global de 
banques IFRS de 2006 à 2015, nous constatons que les profits et pertes d’OCR sont 
négativement associées aux rendements et aux prix du marché, ce qui indique que le marché 
perçoit les profits (pertes) d'OCR comme un signal négatif (positif) pour la performance 
économique de la banque. En outre, les profits et les pertes d’OCR sont pertinents pour le 
risque, comme la corrélation positive entre la volatilité des profits et des pertes de l'OCR et la 
volatilité des rendements des stocks l'indique. Pris ensemble, nos résultats suggèrent que les 
profits et les pertes d’OCR reflètent les changements dans le risque de crédit à l'échelle de 
l'entité, c'est-à-dire que l'effet sur l'actif des changements de risque de crédit domine l'effet du 
passif. 
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Le troisième chapitre examine les effets sur le marché des capitaux de la divulgation 
volontaire normalisée d'informations spécifiques à l'industrie dans un environnement 
d'information ex ante solide, qu’est le secteur immobilier européen. Nous calculons trois 
mesures approximatives capturant le degré de conformité des entreprises aux 
recommandations de bonnes pratiques (BPR) émises par l'European Public Real Estate 
Association (EPRA). Nos résultats montrent qu’EPRA NAV et EPRA NNNAV sont 
relativement et progressivement pertinents pour le prix du marché. En outre, nos résultats 
montrent que les divulgations EPRA BPR sont positivement (négativement) associées à la 
couverture de liquidité et aux analystes et négativement (positivement) associées au coût du 
capital. Enfin, nous constatons que les plans d'offre de créances sont positivement associés à 
la première adoption d'EPRA BPR et, par la suite, au degré de conformité avec EPRA BPR. 
Dans l'ensemble, nos résultats indiquent que les investisseurs et les analystes considèrent que 
les divulgations EPRA BPR sont pertinentes. 
 
Mots clés : risque de crédit propre (OCR), ajustements d'évaluation de la dette (DVA), 
IFRS 9, IAS 39, comptabilité de la juste valeur, EPRA, recommandations de bonnes 
pratiques, divulgation volontaire normalisée, banques et sociétés immobilières, asymétrie de 
l'information. 
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1 
Introduction 
Accounting research is a very wide area of research that typically examines reportable 
information and its association with economic outcomes. Those economic outcomes can 
include but are not limited to capital market outcomes, stakeholder behavior, taxation, labor 
migration, regulatory changes, and the environment. To investigate the associations between 
reportable information and economic outcomes, academic accounting research focuses on 
three broad scientific methodologies, i.e., empirical research, experimental research, and 
analytical research.  
This dissertation focuses on capital market outcomes of accounting information using 
empirical research methodologies. This stream of literature goes back to Ball and Brown 
(1968) and Beaver (1968) who adopt event-study methodology for accounting research 
purposes. Event studies infer whether certain events convey new information to market 
participants, which in turn leads to changes in level or variability of stock prices or trading 
volume over a certain period (Kothari, 2001). The two studies provide compelling evidence 
that earnings announcements convey new information to market participants. In addition, Ball 
and Brown (1968) is also one of the pioneering association studies in accounting. Association 
studies in market-based research test for significant correlation between reportable 
information and capital market outcomes. Ball and Brown (1968) find a positive correlation 
between accounting-based income numbers and stock returns. 
Since then, empirical studies (e.g. association studies, causality studies, and path analysis 
studies) on the relation between accounting information and capital market outcomes have 
grown exponentially over time. These studies have helped us become more comfortable with 
the idea that there are certain interactions between accounting information and capital market 
outcomes. Nowadays, there is little disagreement that accounting information in general, and 
financial reports in particular, are a crucial primary source when investigating a company’s 
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performance. The increased reliance on accounting information and the increased complexity 
of today’s economy have led to more complex and exhaustive financial reports; a trend that 
shows no sign of abating. However, it is still under research whether lengthier and more 
complex disclosures generally alleviate information asymmetries or when additional 
disclosures alleviate information asymmetries.  
A more traditional view proposes that investors have unlimited processing capacity. This 
means that lengthy and complex disclosure is potentially beneficial because investors can 
efficiently process all information and, thus, can ignore irrelevant information. In this case, 
additional disclosure is never harmful. On the contrary, an alternative view proposes that 
lengthy and complex disclosure is costly to process and as such less likely to be informative 
as investors do not have unlimited processing power. Hence the ongoing proliferation of 
mandated disclosures that accompany financial reports make it difficult for investors to 
separate relevant information from boilerplate language, immaterial information, or 
repetitions to decipher a company’s performance (Dyer, Lang, and Stice-Lawrence, 2016). In 
this view, disclosure overload can aggravate information asymmetries.  
Some researchers argue (e.g. Cazier and Pfeiffer, 2015; Dyer, Lang, and Stice-Lawrence, 
2016; and Guay, Samuels, and Taylor, 2016) that the increase in complexity and length of 
annual reports are primarily driven by complex fundamentals and increased mandated 
disclosures, two factors that are outside the control of the firm. Nevertheless, a company’s 
management has at least some discretion over the complexity and length of financial 
statements. Management may decide to increase the complexity and length of financial 
statements for two opposing reasons: to obfuscate important information—such as poor 
performance (e.g. Li, 2008; Miller, 2010; Lawrence 2013; and Loughran and McDonald, 
2014)—or to improve a complex information environment (e.g. Guay, Samuels, and Taylor, 
2016).   
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My first two dissertation projects relate to the ongoing research on the complexity and 
length of disclosure by investigating own credit risk (OCR) gains and losses—an accounting 
topic that seems to be counter-intuitive and particularly difficult to understand even for 
knowledgeable financial statement users (Gaynor, McDaniel, and Yohn, 2011; Lachmann, 
Wöhrmann, and Wömpener, 2011; and Lachmann, Stefani, and Wöhrmann, 2015). OCR 
gains and losses arise because of value changes in financial liabilities designated at fair value 
due to changes in an entity’s own credit risk. As such, an increase (decrease) in an entity’s 
credit risk affects ceteris paribus the value of the financial liability in a negative (positive) and 
the value of comprehensive income in a positive (negative) manner.  
The first chapter is motivated by the question whether information location matters. 
Therefore, I examine market reactions to IFRS 9 pronouncements for financial liabilities. 
Specifically, I investigate whether markets reacted to issuance of new information regarding 
the overhaul of IFRS for financial liabilities designated at fair value. Eventually, the IASB 
decided—to avoid causing undue disruption to current accounting practices—to keep the 
accounting treatment for financial liabilities essentially unchanged except for the presentation 
movement of OCR gains and losses from net income to other comprehensive income. In 
cross-sectional tests, I observe that banks that accumulated an OCR net gain (loss) showed 
significantly lower (higher) abnormal returns. This finding suggests that investors perceived 
banks that accumulated an OCR net gain as overpriced relative to banks that accumulated an 
OCR net loss. Further analysis shows that—splitting the sample into above- and below-
median information environments—the association between the sign of the accumulated OCR 
net results remains strong for low information environments but vanishes for high information 
environments. The results are consistent with low information environments decreasing the 
effect of OCR gains and losses on firm valuations. 
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The results in the first chapter raise concerns whether investors not only struggle with the 
processing of OCR gains and losses but systematically misinterpret OCR gains (losses) as a 
signal that an entity’s credit risk is improving (deteriorating). This concern has already been 
raised by prior experimental studies that show that knowledgeable financial statement users 
struggle with the interpretation of OCR gains and losses (Gaynor, McDaniel, and Yohn, 2011; 
Lachmann, Wöhrmann, and Wömpener, 2011; and Lachmann, Stefani, and Wöhrmann, 
2015). In addition, critics of the recognition of OCR gains and losses claim that equity 
analysts and investors ignore OCR gains and losses, because they do not reflect economic 
performance (e.g. JP Morgan Chase, 2009). However, whether OCR gains and losses indeed 
do not convey useful information to investors remains an open question.  
To tackle this question, Peter Fiechter (co-author) and I apply return-, value- and risk-
relevance methodology in chapter two. Our empirical evidence suggests that—contrary to 
various claims that OCR should be ignored—OCR gains (losses) signal negative (positive) 
economic performance, i.e., are negatively related to stock returns and stock prices, 
respectively. The negative association between OCR gains and losses and stock returns and 
stock prices, respectively, also indicates that the asset-side effect of changes in credit risk 
dominates the liability-side effect. We also find that volatility in OCR gains and losses are 
positively related to stock volatility, i.e., are risk relevant. Taken together, the results suggest 
that OCR gains and losses yield—despite their complexity—useful information to investors. 
Additional tests corroborate our notion that investors do not systematically misinterpret OCR 
gains (losses) as a signal for positive (negative) future performance.  
The third chapter relates to the ongoing research on the complexity and length of 
disclosures by investigating whether real-estate-specific voluntary disclosures beyond IFRS 
trigger capital market outcomes. Therefore, Jérôme Halberkann (co-author) and I focus on 
voluntary standardized disclosures in accordance with the European Public Real Estate 
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Association (EPRA) Best Practice Recommendations (BPR). EPRA BPR provide European 
real estate companies with guidance on (1) what information investors need—beyond IFRS 
financial statements—(2) how the information should be generated, and (3) how the 
information should be presented. The high level of detail in these recommendations is 
intended to decrease information processing costs in an arguably ex-ante rich information 
environment to further increase transparency and comparability among real estate firms. In 
this setting, we seek to examine the usefulness, the economic effects, and the determinants of 
EPRA BPR disclosures. More specifically, we investigate whether EPRA BPR disclosures 
convey useful information that is incorporated into stock prices; whether EPRA BPR 
disclosures can be associated with positive capital market effects such as higher liquidity, 
lower cost of capital, and higher analyst following that go beyond the effects of applying 
IFRS; and whether certain factors favor an EPRA BPR adoption. Using value-relevance 
methodology, we find that EPRA net asset value (NAV) and EPRA triple net asset value 
(NNNAV) are relatively and incrementally value relevant, whereas EPRA earnings per share 
(EPS) are neither relatively nor incrementally value relevant. In terms of capital market 
outcomes, firms committing to EPRA BPR are associated with increased liquidity, lower 
refinancing costs, and greater analyst coverage. In addition, we find that an upcoming debt 
offering provides an incentive for real estate firms to adopt EPRA BPR. Also, firms with 
weaker stock price performance, firms with upcoming debt offerings, and firms in countries 
with better legal quality tend to more strongly comply with EPRA BPR. 
The results in the third chapter add to the literature by providing rationale for the 
widespread use of voluntary disclosures to alleviate information asymmetries. Understanding 
the economic effects of accounting disclosures is arguably of first-order importance, because 
it sheds light on the economic effects of disclosures in other areas such as product quality, 
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consumer protection, conflicts of interests, environmental policy, health care etc. (Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2016).   
Although there is already a vast amount of literature investigating the effect of voluntary 
disclosure in accounting, studies that allow for causal interpretations and studies that include 
path analysis remains rare due to their nature that these studies face a self-selection problem. 
Hence it remains an open question whether, for example, voluntary disclosure directly drives 
capital market outcomes; whether voluntary disclosure and capital market outcomes are a 
result of omitted variables; or whether voluntary disclosure affects omitted variables, which in 
turn trigger capital market outcomes. A recent path analysis study by Guay, Samuels, and 
Taylor (2016) suggest that voluntary disclosure in form of management forecasts may help 
mitigate the negative effects of complex financial statements. Still, how voluntary disclosures, 
capital market outcomes, and analyst coverage are interrelated remains an open question.    
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Chapter 1: Market Reactions towards IFRS 9 Pronouncements 
 
1.1. Introduction 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) published the final version of 
International Financial Reporting Standard 9 (IFRS 9) in July 2014 as a reaction to the 
increasing criticism of the timeliness of recognition of expected credit losses, the complexity 
of multiple impairment models, and own credit risk (OCR) recognition for financial liabilities 
designated at fair value (FVOL) (IASB, 2014c). Related to OCR, the practice of recognizing 
changes in OCR has been criticized because an entity reports a gain (loss) from a decline 
(increase) in credit quality, through a decrease (increase) in FVOL (IASB, 2009). To avoid 
causing undue disruption to accounting practices, the IASB decided to keep the accounting 
treatment of FVOL essentially unchanged except for the presentation location of OCR gains 
and losses. Whereas prior International Accounting Standard 39 (IAS 39) stipulates 
recognition of OCR gains and losses through profit or loss, IFRS 9 generally stipulates 
recognition through other comprehensive income (OCI). The IASB believes that the new 
presentation location helps investors process OCR gains and losses without losing useful 
information about the implications of the changes in credit risk (IASB, 2010).  
In this paper, I examine market reactions to IFRS 9 pronouncements regarding the 
treatment of FVOL. Specifically, I investigate whether markets reacted to the events when the 
IASB released new information (e.g. discussion papers, exposure drafts, final standards) 
regarding the standard overhaul process affecting the accounting treatment of FVOL. In a 
perfectly efficient market, where all information is processed by investors and reflected in 
stock prices, I should be unable to detect any significant market reaction because the change 
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in presentation location is unlikely to change the underlying economics of an entity.1 
However, prior experimental studies find that investors’ view about the association between 
OCR gains and losses and firm performance can be biased (Gaynor, McDaniel, and Yohn, 
2011; Lachmann, Wöhrmann, and Wömpener, 2011; and Lachmann, Stefani, and Wöhrmann, 
2015). In addition, studies show that the quality of processing OCR gains and losses may 
depend on the information location and that information presented in a salient, easily 
processable form can better be absorbed by investors (Lachmann, Stefani, and Wöhrmann, 
2015). The increased public information and the heated debate during the standard overhaul 
process on the accounting treatment of FVOL and the recognition of OCR gains and losses 
may have influenced investors’ assessment of how to incorporate OCR gains and losses in 
firm valuations. Such adjustments can induce market reactions. Focusing on banks, I 
conjecture that market reactions are likely to depend on whether banks accumulated an OCR 
net gain or a net loss since the fair value option for financial liabilities became first effective 
in 2006. Investors may have overvalued banks that accumulated an OCR net gain relative to 
banks that accumulated an OCR net loss because of the widespread misconception that OCR 
gains (losses) signal a credit risk improvement (deterioration). I further conjecture that such 
misconceptions are likely to be more pronounced in weaker information environments.2 
Specifically, country-specific variation in information environments (e.g. stock market 
development) and bank-specific variation in information environments (e.g. analysts 
following) may affect the market reactions.  
To investigate whether the new regulations for FVOL under IFRS 9 induced market 
reactions, I structure my research design as follows: First, I examine overall stock market 
reactions towards the new regulations. I market-adjust the raw returns around the four major 
                                                          
1 Bank-specific regulatory requirements such as Basel III stipulate exclusion of OCR gains and losses from the 
calculation of Common Equity Tier 1. This exclusion is not affected by IFRS 9.   
2 Maffett (2012), for example, shows that there is considerable variation in information environments across 
countries. 
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steps towards the final standards using a one-factor market model to mitigate the effect of 
potential confounding events. Because I use stock return data with common event dates across 
banks—raising concerns about cross-sectional correlation—I build an equally-weighted 
portfolio of 144 IFRS-banks and run the tests on a portfolio level (Sefcik and Thompson, 
1986). I compute abnormal returns relative to both the STOXX Global 1800 ex North 
America index and the STOXX Global 3000 Bank index to mitigate concerns that the results 
are driven by the choice of a certain market index.  
Second, I assess whether abnormal returns are associated with the sign of the 
accumulated OCR net gains or losses using cross-sectional variation in accumulated OCR 
gains and losses. I define a dichotomous variable that differentiates between two subgroups of 
banks: (1) IFRS-banks with FVOL that have accumulated an OCR net gain since 2006 and (2) 
IFRS-banks with FVOL that have accumulated an OCR net loss since 2006. I control for bank 
characteristics, stock characteristics, environment characteristics, country-fixed effects, and 
event-fixed effects to control for (un-)observable differences that may influence the relation 
between accumulated OCR net gains and losses and abnormal returns. I further investigate 
whether the association between accumulated OCR net gains and losses and abnormal returns 
are linked to the information environment. I perform two additional tests where I exploit 
country-specific and bank-specific variation in information environments. Following Beck 
and Levine (2002) and Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2017), I classify countries into market-
based and bank-based economies and repeat the previous regression for the two subsamples. 
In addition, I classify banks into high-analyst (low-analyst) following based on whether the 
average number of analysts following is above (below) the sample-median and, again, repeat 
the previous regressions for the two subsamples.  
Third, because my findings are premised to the notion that daily stock returns are 
generally unrelated to OCR net gains and losses, I re-examine the association between OCR 
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net gains and losses and abnormal returns during non-event days. I randomly select four non-
overlapping three-day event windows between 2008 and 2010 and re-estimate the main 
regressions on non-event days. I repeat this procedure one thousand times and test whether 
the means of the non-event coefficients are significantly different from the coefficients in the 
event regressions.  
Empirical results show that the portfolio overall market reaction tends to be slightly 
negative. However, the findings turn out significantly negative only when using the STOXX 
Global 3000 Bank index and an event window t=(0) or t=(-1,0,+1). Using the STOXX Global 
1800 ex North America index or a wider event window t=(-4,-3,-2,-1,0,+1) does not exhibit 
any significant portfolio overall market reactions. This result is in line with investors viewing 
banks that accumulated an OCR net gain as overvalued at the time of the events, as the mean 
of OCR net gains and losses in the sample is positive.  
In the cross-sectional analysis, I observe strong results that banks that accumulated an 
OCR net gain (loss) show significantly lower (higher) abnormal returns. This finding 
underpins the notion that investors viewed banks that accumulated an OCR net gain as 
overvalued at the time of the events relative to banks that accumulated an OCR net loss. 
When I split the sample into above-median and below-median information environments, I 
observe that the association between the sign of the accumulated OCR net gains or losses and 
the abnormal returns is strong for low information environments only. The results are 
consistent with low information environments decreasing the effect of OCR gains and losses 
on firm valuations.  
Simulation results corroborate that the effect is unique to the event days and, therefore, is 
likely to be driven by IFRS 9 pronouncements rather than misspecification such as omitted 
variable bias.  
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To further bolster my results, I examine whether not only the sign but also the magnitude 
of the accumulated OCR net gains and losses is associated with the abnormal returns by 
exchanging the dichotomous OCR variable by a continuous measure. I find a weaker negative 
association between the magnitude of the OCR net gains and losses and the abnormal returns. 
Still, four out of eight model specifications show significantly negative OCR coefficients and 
all model specifications exhibit the expected negative sign. To further mitigate concerns that 
my results are driven by country-specific effects that are unrelated to IFRS 9 pronouncements, 
I perform the main regressions on a subsample of four countries within Europe, which 
provide the most OCR-gains-and-losses data for my analyses.3 The small sample regressions 
show results that remain fully in line with previous results, suggesting that it is unlikely that 
the results are driven by effects that are specific to countries where OCR data is sparse.  
Collectively, I find robust evidence on a negative relation between the sign of the 
accumulated OCR net gains or losses and abnormal returns towards new regulations for 
FVOL under IFRS 9. However, the findings include an important caveat—they rely heavily 
on a correct event identification where the time of relevant new information issuance lies 
within the event windows and major confounding events are excluded from the estimation.  
Understanding the effect of the change in presentation location of OCR gains and losses 
on stock prices is important for several reasons: First, although banks that apply the fair value 
option designate, on average, only between 9.69% (2006) and 6.75% (2012) of their financial 
liabilities at fair value, OCR gains and losses can be substantial. From 2006 to 2012, OCR 
gains and losses ranged from gains of USD 6.6 billion to losses of USD 7.5 billion. Hence 
misinterpreting OCR gains and losses may materially distort investors' assessment of an 
entity’s value. Second, credit risk is arguably banks single-most important risk factor. Their 
exposure to credit risk due to their underlying business model translates directly into bank’s 
                                                          
3 66.1% of the data on OCR gains and losses comes from banks that are located either in Germany, Italy, 
Switzerland, or the UK. 
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OCR. Hence understanding the implication of changes in credit risk on assets, liabilities, and 
comprehensive income should be a major concern.  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 provides background information, a literature 
review and the hypotheses development. Section 1.3 outlines the sample selection and 
descriptive statistics. Section 1.4 describes the research design. Section 1.5 presents the 
empirical results. Section 1.6 discusses additional analyses. Section 1.7 concludes. 
 
 
1.2. Background 
1.2.1. International Financial Reporting Standards for Financial Liabilities 
Currently, IFRS require that financial liabilities are initially recognized at fair value plus 
transaction costs and subsequently recognized at amortized cost using the effective interest 
method. The effective interest method is based around the effective interest rate, the rate that 
discounts all contractual fees and points paid or received between parties through the expected 
life to the net carrying amount. Thus, the effective interest rate incorporates debt's market rate 
and, in turn, the borrower's credit risk, collateral, and guarantees. Interest expenses are 
calculated using the effective interest and are allocated over the periods until maturity.  
As an alternative to amortized cost measurement, firms may irrevocably designate at 
initial recognition to measure financial liabilities at fair value through profit or loss. Those 
FVOL are initially recognized at fair value without incorporating transaction costs. 
Subsequently, FVOL are measured at fair value with gains and losses recognized in profit or 
loss (IASB, 2013).  
Generally, making use of the fair value option for financial liabilities is not a widespread 
occurrence amongst banks that prepare their financial statements in accordance with IFRS. In 
my sample, only 8.9% of total debt is, on average, classified as FVOL. Beside the fair value 
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option, IAS 39 further requires fair value accounting for derivatives unless they are linked to 
and must be settled by delivery of an unquoted equity instrument whose fair value cannot be 
reliably measured. 
Many financial statement preparers, users, and auditors have criticized IAS 39 for being 
too complex. They urged the IASB and the FASB to develop new standards on financial 
instruments that are principle-based and less complex (IASB, 2008). Meanwhile, the 
controversial debate over whether measurement of financial liabilities should reflect changes 
in a company's OCR through profit or loss flared up again. Some argue that incorporating 
credit risks into profit or loss is consistent with the initial measurement of financial 
liabilities—including the effects of the borrower's credit risk—and that it better represents the 
wealth transfer between equityholders and debtholders. As debtholders have a fixed claim, 
equityholders receive all the upside gains but share the downside losses with debtholder. An 
unexpected deterioration of credit quality increases the likelihood that debtholders lose (part 
of) their investment. The result is a wealth transfer from debtholders to equityholders. Others 
argue that it is counterintuitive if an entity reports a gain from a decline in credit quality and 
that financial liabilities should be measured at amortized cost because liabilities are seldom 
transferred, i.e., firms seldom realize value changes in FVOL (IASB, 2009). 
In March 2008, the IASB published a discussion paper Reducing Complexity in 
Reporting Financial Instruments that marked the beginning of the standard overhaul process 
for financial instruments. First, the IASB considered examining the issue of credit risk in 
liability measurement as an independent project. In October 2009, the IASB decided to stop 
working on credit risk as a free-standing work stream and to integrate the topic in the project 
on the classification and measurement of financial instruments. In February 2014, the IASB 
finalized deliberations on the limited amendments to classification and measurement of 
financial instruments. 
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IFRS 9—which supersedes IAS 39—retains the requirement to measure financial 
liabilities initially at fair value and subsequently at amortized cost using the effective interest 
method. The option to irrevocably designate financial liabilities at fair value remains eligible 
if the information leads to more relevant information. Generally, IFRS 9 mandates that 
changes in the fair value of financial liabilities attributable to changes in OCR need to be 
presented in OCI. Only in cases where OCR gains and losses through OCI creates or enlarges 
an accounting mismatch, should a firm continue to show OCR gains and losses in profit or 
loss. An accounting mismatch arises when the effects of changes in a liability's credit risk are 
expected to be offset by changes in the fair value of other financial instruments. An 
assessment of an accounting mismatch is required at initial recognition and is not reassessed 
(IASB, 2014b). IFRS 7 requires qualitative disclosure in the financial statements notes of the 
methodology of assessing whether there is an accounting mismatch (IASB, 2014a).  The 
amount of change in the fair value of a financial liability attributable to changes in OCR 
should be determined either as the amount not attributable to market risk or using an 
alternative method that directly estimates the amount attributable to credit risk. Changes in 
market risk can be measured by means of a benchmark interest rate, the price of a firm's 
financial instruments, a commodity price, a foreign exchange rate, or an index of prices or 
rates. Changes in fair value of financial liabilities attributable to market risk need to be 
presented in profit or loss (IASB, 2014b).  
Initially, the IASB set January 1, 2013 as the mandatory effective date for application of 
IFRS 9. However, the effective date was first postponed to January 1, 2015. With the release 
of the final standard, the effective date was further postponed to January 1, 2018. 
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1.2.2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
One research stream relating to OCR gains and losses examines how changes in credit 
risk affect the value of equity and debt. Strong (1990) presents a disaggregated approach to 
measuring market value of debt. He separates debt-holding gains and losses into changes in 
credit risk and unanticipated inflation. The findings show that the effects of changes in credit 
risk and unanticipated inflation on bond value and stock value are both material and 
statistically significant. The disentangling of the two effects shows that increases in credit risk 
are negatively correlated with both equity and debt values and that there is a wealth transfer 
between bondholders and stockholders. Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) and Goh and 
Ederington (1993) investigate the effect of credit rating changes on stock returns. They find 
that unanticipated downgrades, i.e., credit risk increases, are associated with negative 
abnormal returns around the events. Barth, Hodder, and Stubben (2008) test whether equity 
value changes associated with credit risk changes are attenuated by debt value changes. They 
find that the relation between credit risk changes and equity returns is significantly less 
negative for firms with more debt. Controlling for asset value changes, credit risk increases 
(decreases) are associated with equity value increases (decreases) through decreases 
(increases) in debt value. However, for a substantial majority of downgrade firms they find 
that recognized asset write-downs exceed unrecognized gains from debt value decreases. Lipe 
(2002) demonstrates that financial ratios can produce unwarranted positive signals when 
measuring financial liabilities at fair value through profit or loss for firms that experience 
severe credit deteriorations. Lipe (2002) acknowledges that his results are primarily driven by 
poor and incomplete accounting choices for asset valuation and that if the accounting for all 
items was perfect, then any positive signal from writing down financial liabilities would likely 
be outweighed by other negative signals. Lipe (2002) concludes that if standard setters 
ultimately determine that fair value is the best measure for the statement of financial 
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positions, some of the misleading signals could be avoided by placing gains and losses 
attributable to changes in credit quality in OCI.  
Another more recent research stream—relating to the interpretation of OCR gains and 
losses—shows that financial statement users have difficulties identifying and processing OCR 
gains and losses. Gaynor, McDaniel, and Yohn (2011) conduct an experimental study with 
CPAs where they find that over 70% of participants misinterpret a gain (loss) due to changes 
in firm's OCR as credit risk improving (deteriorating). Even if CPAs are given disclosure that 
explicitly specifies the relation between a credit risk change and net income—neither 
mandated by IAS 39 nor IFRS 9—misinterpretation of the OCR gains and losses continue to 
be around 50%. They conclude that additional disclosure can reduce misinterpretation only 
partially and that standard setter should, therefore, consider relegating credit risk gains and 
losses from net income to OCI. Lachmann, Wöhrmann, and Wömpener (2011) confirm the 
previous result that OCR gains and losses are counterintuitive for knowledgeable financial 
statement users. In addition, they find that changes in credit risk are more likely to remain 
unnoticed if they are not recognized but only disclosed. Lachmann, Stefani, and Wöhrmann 
(2015) conduct an experiment with auditors and find that participants are more likely to 
identify the information on changes in credit risk if the information is included in OCI rather 
than net income. They argue that items presented in net income usually outnumber those in 
OCI and, as a result, it is more difficult for participants to extract the relevant information 
from net income than from OCI. However, the risk of misinterpreting the directional relation 
between credit risk and the comprehensive income is unaffected by the information location. 
The study is consistent with the notion that information presented in a salient and easily 
processable form is absorbed more easily by auditors (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003). 
I argue that—based on the aforementioned studies—market inefficiencies are likely to 
exist in the form of imperfect OCR information processing. More specifically, difficulties in 
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identifying relevant OCR information and assessing the ramifications of OCR gains and 
losses on entity’s performance may have biased investors' assessment of firm valuation. For 
firms that accumulated an OCR net gain since 2006, firm value was likely overpriced relative 
to firms that accumulated an OCR net loss because of two reasons: First, if investors do not 
find OCR gains or losses in an income statement, they are likely to use OCR gains and losses 
fully for firm valuation through the inclusion of trading income and trading expenses. Second, 
if investors are able to identify OCR gains and losses but misinterpret the directional relation 
on firm's performance, they are likely to overprice firms that accumulated an OCR net gain. 
Correcting those misinterpretations should induce negative market reactions for firms that 
accumulated an OCR net gain relative to firms that accumulated an OCR net loss.  
Investors’ ability to process information may depend on the sophistication of the 
information environment. Maffett (2012) shows that investor sophistication varies 
substantially across countries. To investigate differences in market sophistication, Beck and 
Levine (2002) and Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2017) classify countries into market-based 
and bank-based countries. The institutional features of market-based economies exhibit higher 
stock market development, higher disclosure standards, and stronger information 
environment. Hence market-based countries are more likely to process OCR gains and losses 
correctly (Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas, 2017). In addition, firm-specific information 
environment may also influence the processing of OCR gains and losses and, therefore, the 
market reactions. 
 
1.2.3. Event Identification 
Although the shift of OCR gains and losses from profit or loss to OCI was a continuous 
process with considerable discussions, I identify four major steps towards the finalization of 
the new regulations for FVOL under IFRS 9. Events are identified by, first, going through all 
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project stages towards IFRS 9, starting with the discussion paper Reducing Complexity in 
Reporting Financial Instruments to the finalization of IFRS 9 Classification and 
Measurement. Second, I screen the IASB and FASB meeting summaries to identify the major 
steps towards finalizing IFRS 9. FASB meeting summaries are considered because FASB’s 
decisions are likely to have an impact on the IASB’s discussions and vice versa. Third, I 
examine available listings of documents publicly released by the IASB, the European 
Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG), the Standard Advice Review Group (SARG), 
the Accounting Regulatory Committee (ARC), the European Parliament, the Council of the 
European Union, and the European Commission (EC). Fourth, I search the Factiva database 
by Dow Jones & Company Inc. and the Thomson Reuters Eikon database for potential 
confounding events.4  
Eventually, I consider major steps to be events when the IASB issues new publications to 
the public, such as discussion papers, exposure drafts, and final standards. Those publications 
are stronger signals how the final IFRS 9 might look like than meeting summaries. Also, 
IASB publications seem to be timelier than press releases as press releases often provide 
delayed summaries of the IASB publications. This way, I only consider events that provided 
new information to the market and I do not consider events that simply process information 
for another audience. In addition, I do not identify any pattern of good or bad news that 
systematically affects the stock returns during my events. Further, I focus on publications that 
are not only related to IFRS 9 but more specifically to FVOL because IFRS 9 does not only 
stipulate standards for the measurement of FVOL but also for the measurement of other 
financial instruments, for the impairment of financial instruments, and for hedge accounting. I 
focus on a small number of events that are most likely to have a significant influence on stock 
prices. This approach is more likely to isolate the effect of the change in information location 
                                                          
4 Factiva had initially been founded under the name Dow Jones Reuters Business Interactive but changed its 
name six months later in May 2009 to Factiva. 
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of OCR gains and losses from other concurrent events. Further, focusing on a small number 
of events should produce less noise and exhibit more accurate regression results. However, if 
stock returns were influenced by concurrent events, results can be biased. To mitigate this 
issue, I drop abnormal returns from the sample if event dates coincided with earning releases 
and shareholder meetings.  
On (1) March 19, 2008 the IASB issued the discussion paper Reducing Complexity in 
Reporting Financial Instruments to initiate the process of developing new regulations for 
financial instruments. Many preparers had urged the IASB and FASB to amend IAS 39 to 
become more principle-based and less complex. The IASB proposed the following approach 
to mitigate those concerns: 
Unrealized gains and losses on interest-bearing financial liabilities attributable to 
changes in the entity's own credit risk must be recognized in other comprehensive 
income. An entity could also choose to report a specific percentage of gains or losses 
on these financial instruments in earnings and the remainder in other comprehensive 
income (IASB, 2008, 2.49(c)). 
However, the discussion paper did not ask readers to express their opinion on the 
proposed approach.  
On (2) June 18, 2009 the IASB issued the discussion paper Credit Risk in Liability 
Measurement together with the corresponding staff paper.5 Both papers invited readers to 
comment on predefined questions by September 1, 2009 without disclosing any new 
information on the standard overhaul process. The discussion paper sought comments on 
three possible approaches on liability measurement set out in the staff paper. Those 
                                                          
5 The accompanying staff paper provides additional information, illustrations, and a variety of arguments to 
readers to better be able to respond to the questions asked. 
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approaches identified possible ways to measure liabilities while always excluding OCR gains 
and losses from profit or loss.6,7  
On (3) May 11, 2010 the IASB issued the exposure draft Fair Value Option for Financial 
Liabilities. On the basis of the feedback received from its Financial Instruments Working 
Group and from 123 comment letters, the IASB decided that none of the three approaches 
suggested in the second discussion paper would be any less complex or would result in more 
useful information than the requirements in IAS 39. The IASB proposed that OCR gains and 
losses on FVOL should be presented in OCI unless such treatment would create a mismatch 
in profit and loss. The IASB received 138 comment letters as a result of the exposure draft 
Fair Value Option for Financial Liabilities. Those were carefully studied and incorporated 
into the development of IFRS 9. However, measurement of OCR gains and losses remained 
unchanged.  
On (4) September 28, 2010 the IASB published the standards relating to the classification 
and measurement of financial liabilities and financial assets. Those standards amended the 
measurement of FVOL such that OCR gains and losses should no longer be presented in net 
income but in OCI, unless such treatment would create or enlarge an accounting mismatch in 
profit and loss. The remaining amount of the change in the FVOL should remain in profit or 
loss. Table 1.1 summarizes the four event windows. 
 
 
                                                          
6 Between the issuance of the discussion paper Credit Risk in Liability Measurement and the comment letters 
hand-in deadline, on July 14, 2009, the IASB issued the exposure draft Financial Instruments: Classification 
and Measurement. The publication of the exposure draft is not included as an additional event because it does 
not provide any information on financial liabilities. 
7 On October 21, 2009, the IASB stopped working on credit risk as a free-standing work stream and decided to 
incorporate the topic in the conceptual framework measurement project. Further, the board decided not to 
change the role of credit/performance risk in the definition of fair value as a result of the responses to the 
discussion paper. 
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1.3. Sample and Summary Statistics 
1.3.1. Sample Selection Process 
I examine investors' perception of the major steps towards new regulations for FVOL 
under IFRS 9 by focusing on banks' abnormal returns during four events. My tests require 
data on daily stock returns, firm characteristics, stock characteristics, and information 
environment characteristics. I draw my sample of IFRS-banks from Bankscope; financial data 
from Thomson Reuters Eikon; analyst data from I/B/E/S; data on U.S. cross listings from 
Bankscope; data on the regulatory quality of each country from the index by Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009); and data on country-specific information quality from Fiechter 
and Novotny-Farkas (2017). Data on FVOL, including OCR gains and losses in accordance 
with IAS 39, is hand-collected from annual reports. The overall sample period spans from 
2008 to 2010 except for daily stock returns that cover a period from 2007 to 2010—to 
estimate abnormal returns—and cumulative OCR gains and losses that cover a period from 
2006 to 2010—to calculate the accumulated OCR gains and losses since the introduction of 
the fair value option in 2006. I focus on the banking sector because banks’ balance sheets 
consist primarily of financial instruments.  
I start with an initial IFRS-bank sample of 5,109 banks. First, I exclude inactive banks (-
1,174 banks) from the sample because they are not impacted by the new accounting standards 
for financial instruments. I focus on commercial banks and saving banks (-2,021 banks); 
ultimate owners (-1,566 banks) to examine data on the holding companies only; and banks 
that are located outside of North America and South America (-13 banks) to reduce continent-
specific variation.8 The sample before any further data collection consists of 335 IFRS-
banks.9 I drop banks from the sample if they have not been quoted on any stock exchange (-
126 banks); if share prices do not move on more than 20% of trading days (-39 banks); and if 
                                                          
8 None of the 13 IFRS-banks in America used the fair value option for financial liabilities. 
9 I loosely use the word banks as an acronym for bank holding companies. 
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banks show no movements in share prices during any of the four event windows (-8 banks). 
The sample for the event study consists of 162 IFRS-banks and 648 observations. 
Observations with missing data on any of the explanatory variable were dropped (-108 
observations) and if event dates coincide with earnings releases or annual meetings (-34 
observations). The sample available for empirical tests comprises 506 observations from 151 
banks and 35 countries. Of those observations, 196 observations from 63 banks can be 
observed in 12 countries where OCR recognizers are present. The sample of OCR recognizers 
comprises 109 observations from 35 banks in 12 different countries. Table 1.2 outlines the 
sample selection process.  
 
1.3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in this paper. Table 1.3, 
Panel A reveals that the mean of the abnormal returns using the STOXX Global 1800 ex 
North America index (ar_exna_3) and the STOXX Global 3000 Banks index (ar_banks_3) 
for the full sample are close to zero (-0.003 and -0.007, respectively) and close to the median 
(-0.004 and -0.005, respectively). I find that 35.2% of the firm-events use FVOL, 21.5% of 
the firm-events disclose OCR gains and losses, and 12.1% of firm-events have accumulated 
an OCR net gain since 2006. FVOL users tend to be larger banks (size), with higher leverage 
ratios (lev), lower tier-1 ratios (TIER 1), lower proportion of closely held shares (chs), more 
cross-listed stock (CL), and are more likely to found in countries with higher regulatory 
quality (regulatory quality). 
Table 1.3, Panel B reports firms (Unique firms) and firm-events (Firm-events) by 
country. Firm-events are separated into three subsamples include (1) observations with zero 
FVOL (Non-FVOL users), (2) observations with positive amounts of FVOL (FVOL users), 
and (3) observations with disclosure of OCR gains and losses (OCR recognizers), which is a 
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subsample of FVOL users. Further, I tabulate mean abnormal returns calculated using both 
the STOXX Global 1800 ex North America index (ar_exna_3) and the STOXX Global 3000 
Banks index (ar_banks_3). I also provide continuous data on the financial market structure 
(Information environment) as measured in Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2017). Countries 
with at least one bank that discloses OCR gains and losses are classified as market-based 
(bank-based) if Information environment is above (below) median. Untabulated statistics 
reveal that abnormal returns are similar for market-based and bank-based economies. Lastly, I 
provide data on the regulatory quality (Regulatory quality) as measured by Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi (2009) for the year 2008. Table 1.3, Panel B highlights that disclosure of OCR 
gains and losses are most concentrated amongst Italy (24.8%), the United Kingdom (19.3%), 
Germany (11.0%), and Switzerland (11.0%). 
Table 1.3, Panel C provides descriptive Pearson’s correlation below the diagonal and 
Spearman’s rank correlations above the diagonal for the variables used in the cross-sectional 
analysis. Those correlations provide first descriptive evidence that abnormal returns 
(ar_exna_3 and ar_banks_3, respectively) tend to be negatively correlated with the 
dichotomous variable equal to one if a bank has accumulated on OCR net gain and zero 
otherwise (POS CUM OCR) and the magnitude of accumulated OCR gains and losses (cum 
ocr), respectively.  
 
 
1.4. Research Design 
1.4.1. Overall Market Reactions 
Following the extensive literature on event-studies, I market-adjust raw event returns 
using a simple one-factor market model to mitigate the effect of potential confounding events 
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(e.g. MacKinlay, 1997).10 The market model parameters are estimated over the period from 
11 to 250 days before the first event on March 19, 2008. Because I use a sample comprising 
only of banks that are located outside of America, choosing an appropriate market index is not 
obvious. I market-adjust raw returns for the three-day event-window t=(-1,0,+1) using the 
STOXX Global 1800 ex North America index and the STOXX Global 3000 Banks index.11 
The STOXX Global 1800 ex North America includes firms from all industry sectors that are 
located outside of North America. The STOXX Global 3000 Banks index includes banks 
from around the world. I do not use a broader index because that would raise concerns about 
adding unrelated variation, which can bias my results. I also do not use a narrower index like 
the STOXX Global 1800 ex North America Banks index because the index is very similar to 
my sample composition.  
I start to examine market reactions towards the development of new regulations for 
FVOL under IFRS 9 by examining abnormal returns on days that lie within the event 
windows. For each firm-day within the event windows, I compute abnormal returns relative to 
the STOXX Global 1800 ex North America index and the STOXX Global 3000 Bank index. I 
compute cumulative abnormal returns for three different time windows, i.e., 1-day window 
t=(0), 3-day window t=(-1,0,+1), and 6-day window t=(-4,-3,-2,-1,0,+1). I present cumulative 
abnormal returns for each of the four events (CAR) and aggregated over all events (CCAR). 
Because I use stock return data with common event dates across banks, I am likely to find 
cross-sectional correlation. To remedy this concern, I base my test statistics on equally-
weighted portfolio returns. Portfolio returns are not affected by potential cross-sectional 
correlation (Sefcik and Thompson, 1986) and are assumed to be uncorrelated across different 
                                                          
10 Employing a multi-factor model for short-term event studies has been shown to have limited explanatory 
power over a one-factor model (e.g. MacKinlay,1997). Hence I focus on using a one-factor model. 
11 For descriptive purposes I also present abnormal returns for the one-day t=(0) and the six-day t=(-4,-3,-2,-
1,0,+1) event windows. 
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time windows. However, a portfolio approach is not applicable in cross-sectional analyses, 
because all firm-specific abnormal return variation would be lost.  
 
1.4.2. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
My main inferences are based on the cross-sectional variation in market reaction to the 
new regulations for FVOL under IFRS 9. In particular, I assess whether abnormal returns are 
associated with the sign of the accumulated OCR net gain or loss over time. To measure this 
effect, I introduce a dichotomous variable POS CUM OCR equal to one if the bank 
accumulated an OCR net gain since 2006, and zero if the bank accumulated an OCR net loss. 
To obtain my inferences, I estimate the following model: 
  
ari,e = β0 + β1 POS CUM OCRi,e + ∑𝑗𝑗=1
𝐽𝐽  γj Controlsj,i,e +  ∑𝑓𝑓=1𝐹𝐹  δf Fixed Effectsf,i,e + εi,e      (1) 
 
where ar is the cumulative abnormal return for bank i during event e relative to the 
STOXX Global 1800 ex North America index and the STOXX Global 3000 Banks index, 
respectively. Controls is a vector of control variables including size, roa, p/b, TIER 1, std, lev, 
chs, CL, spread, and regulatory quality. Fixed Effects is a vector of country-fixed effects and 
event-fixed effects. 
size is the natural logarithm of total assets. roa is the return on asset calculated as income 
after tax divided by total assets. p/b is the price-to-book ratio calculated as market 
capitalization divided by total book value of equity. lev is the leverage ratio calculated as total 
liabilities divided by total book value of equity. TIER 1 is a dichotomous variable equal to one 
if the core equity capital divided by total risk-weighted assets is above the sample median and 
zero otherwise. chs is the percentage of closely held shares calculated as one minus free 
floating shares divided by total shares outstanding. CL is a dichotomous variable equal to one 
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if the company has stock that is cross listed on a U.S stock exchange and zero otherwise. std 
is the standard deviation of a bank’s stock returns during a calendar year. spread is the yearly 
median bid-ask spread calculated as the difference between the bid and ask price divided by 
the mid-point measured at the end of each trading day. regulatory quality is the regulatory 
quality in accordance with the index by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009) for the year 
2008. Generally, dichotomous variables are labeled in capital letters. T-statistics are 
calculated using White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors controlling for 
event-fixed effects and country-fixed effects (Petersen, 2009; Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor, 
2010; and Gormley and Matsa, 2014). 
To further investigate whether variation in market reactions are associated with the 
information environment, I perform two additional tests. First, following Beck and Levine 
(2002) and Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2017), I calculated for each country the first 
principal component of two variables that measure the comparative activity and size of stock 
markets relative to the number of banks in this country. I focus on countries with at least one 
bank disclosing OCR gains and losses in the annual statement. Countries with above (below) 
median are defined market-based (bank-based) economies. Second, I exploit variation in the 
information environment on a firm-level based on the number of analysts following. I classify 
banks as high Analysts (low Analysts) if the number of analysts following is above (below) 
median. The median is calculated using only banks that accumulated OCR gains and losses, 
i.e. OCR recognizers. Then I re-estimate the main model separately for market-based and 
bank-based countries and for high-analyst and low-analyst banks.   
 
1.4.3. Monte Carlo Simulation 
My cross-sectional findings are premised to the notion that daily stock returns are 
generally unrelated to OCR gains and losses on non-event days. In other words, I assume that 
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absent the development of new regulations for financial liabilities, POS CUM OCR is zero. 
However, one important alternative is that misspecification or omitted variables, correlated 
with the new regulations, drives the relation between the two (e.g. Cremers and Nair, 2005; 
Core, Guay, and Rusticus, 2006; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009; Armstrong, Barth, 
Jagolinzer, and Riedl, 2010; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2010; and Larcker, Ormazabal, and 
Taylor, 2011). If this is the case, I expect POS CUM OCR to be related with abnormal returns 
even in the absence of regulatory action, i.e., on non-event days.  
To address this concern, I perform a simulation procedure to re-examine my results by 
estimating Equation (1.1) on non-event days. I randomly select four three-day event windows 
between 2008 and 2010 that are not overlapping, calculate the cumulative abnormal returns, 
and estimate the coefficients. I repeat this procedure one thousand times and retain the 
coefficients from each iteration. I test whether the non-event coefficients are significantly 
different from the event coefficients, using the distribution of the one thousand non-event 
coefficients. This procedure enables me to confirm whether the effects on abnormal returns 
are specific to the events. For my results to be unbiased, I expect that POS CUM OCR on non-
event days is significantly different from POS CUM OCR on event days. 
 
 
1.5. Empirical Results 
1.5.1. Overall Market Reactions 
In my first set of tests, I establish the overall market reactions during the major steps 
towards the new regulations for FVOL under IFRS 9. Table 1.4 presents descriptive portfolio 
raw returns and abnormal returns by event and aggregated for three different event-windows.  
The first column for each event-window (Raw returns) reports unadjusted raw returns 
from the equally-weighted portfolio of IFRS-banks. The portfolio raw returns by event do not 
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show a clear trend towards a positive or negative market reaction as six portfolio returns are 
positive and six returns are negative. On an aggregate level, I find one raw return to be below 
zero (-1.1%) and two being above zero (5.9% and 3.9%, respectively).  
Using the STOXX GLOBAL 3000 Banks (sg3000b) and the STOXX Global 1800 ex 
North America index (sg1800exna) to market adjust raw returns, portfolio returns during 
Event #1 tend more towards a negative market reaction with two out of six CARs being 
significantly negative and all six CARs showing a negative sign. During Event #2, Event #3, 
and Event #4, CARs do not show a clear trend of either a positive or negative market reaction. 
On an aggregate level, two CCARs show significantly negative market reaction (-1.5% and -
3.8%). In addition, five CCARs out of six exhibit a negative sign.  
The results suggest that the issuance of the discussion paper (Event #1) led investors to 
generally adjust the value of the sample banks downwards. On an aggregate level, the market 
reactions tend to be slightly negative. Negative market reactions are in line with investors 
viewing banks that accumulated an OCR net gain as overvalued at the time of the events, as 
the mean of OCR net gains and losses in the sample is positive. 
 
1.5.2. Descriptive Abnormal Returns 
I reduce the sample to observations from countries in which at least one bank discloses 
OCR gains and losses in the financial statement notes (12 countries). In these countries, I 
focus on bank-observations that make use of the fair value option for financial liabilities. This 
approach produces 116 bank-event observations. I separately calculate the mean abnormal 
returns for banks that do not disclose OCR gains and losses (Non-Disclosure), banks that 
accumulated an OCR net gain since 2006 (Pos Cum OCR), and banks that accumulated an 
OCR net loss since 2006 (Neg Cum OCR). Then I calculate the difference in mean abnormal 
returns between Pos Cum OCR and Neg Cum OCR. The comparison of the mean abnormal 
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returns is conducted for both the STOXX Global 1800 ex North America index and STOXX 
GLOBAL 3000 Banks index.  
The nature of the results in Table 1.5 are descriptive and suggest that abnormal returns are 
larger for banks that accumulated an OCR net loss compared to banks that accumulated an 
OCR net gain (-0.8% and -1.5%, respectively). However, only the difference using the 
STOXX GLOBAL 3000 Banks index is significantly different from zero (-1.5%). In addition, 
firms that do not disclose OCR gains and losses exhibit the lowest abnormal returns of the 
three groups suggesting that these banks were perceived by investors as most overvalued prior 
to the events. 
 
1.5.3. Cross-Sectional Analysis 
The cross-sectional analysis is conducted using the multivariate regression model in 
Equation (1.1) and a sample consisting of OCR recognizers. Table 1.6 presents the coefficient 
estimates including control variables and fixed effects using different model specifications. 
Model (1a) – (1d) use the STOXX Global 1800 ex North America index as benchmark and 
Model (2a) – (2d) use the STOXX GLOBAL 3000 Banks index. All t-statistics are calculated 
using White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors except for Model (1b) and 
(2b), which use country-clustered heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.  
The negative relation between abnormal returns and the dichotomous variable POS CUM 
OCR is significant for all model specifications at the 10% level (two-sided) or above. The 
results suggest that banks that accumulated an OCR net gain reacted significantly more 
negative to the events than banks that accumulated an OCR net loss. The marginal effect of 
POS CUM OCR ranges from -1.5% to -2.0%. Untabulated results show that the coefficient 
estimate remains significantly negative even after winsorizing the sample at the top and 
bottom 5% of abnormal returns. Adjusted R2 range from 35% to 44%, which suggests a good 
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model fit. The model fit is in line with other research that use similar methodology and 
sample size (e.g. Hitz and Müller-Bloch, 2015). Such high adjusted R2 are obtained in large 
part from the substantial variation in event-specific abnormal returns captured by the event-
fixed effects.  
Control variables that turn out significant are p/b, TIER 1, and std. The coefficients 
indicate that banks with higher price-to-book ratios, below-median tier 1 capital ratios, and 
banks with higher stock return volatility react more positively to the events. Interpreting those 
control variables is difficult because there is no obvious argumentation that would explain the 
association between the events and the variables. However, they might control for 
confounding events or capture some sort of underlying trend unrelated to IFRS 9. 
Further tests are conducted exploiting variation in the information environments. First, I 
focus on country-specific variation in the information environments by conducting the 
regression separately for market-based and bank-based information environment. Second, I 
focus on company-specific variation in information environments where I differentiate 
between above-median analysts following (high analysts) and below-median analysts 
following (low analysts) following. Table 1.7 presents the regression results.  
The results suggest that the negative association between banks that accumulated an OCR 
net gain and abnormal returns is only present in low information environments. In market-
based economies the magnitude of POS CUM OCR is very close to zero (-0.1% and 0.1%, 
respectively) whereas the magnitude in bank-based economies is larger (-3.1% and -3.2%, 
respectively) and statistically significant. Differentiating between information environments 
on a company level, I find that the magnitude of the effect is similar for high-analyst (-2.0% 
and -1.5%, respectively) and low-analyst banks (-2.4% and -2.3%, respectively). However, 
the coefficients are only significant for low-analyst banks.  
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Overall, the results are in line with the notion that market inefficiencies are more 
pronounced in low information environments. More specifically, investors assessed that banks 
that accumulated an OCR net gain are overpriced relative to banks that accumulated an OCR 
net loss. This led to more negative market reactions for banks that accumulated an OCR net 
gain relative to banks that accumulated an OCR net loss. 
 
1.5.4. Monte Carlo Simulation 
The results of the Monte Carlo simulations appear in Table 1.8. I present estimation 
coefficients from Table 1.6 Model (1c) and (2c) under β and the average coefficients resulting 
from the same regression on four randomly selected three-days non-event windows repeated 
one thousand times under E[β]. Then I test whether the average simulated coefficients E[β] 
are significantly different from the cross-sectional estimated coefficients β. The results show 
that the coefficients on POS CUM OCR (-1.6%) are significantly different from the simulated 
coefficients on non-event days (0.3%) at the 1% level.  
In addition, the significant coefficients for the control variables p/b and std are 
significantly different from the simulated coefficients. However, the simulated coefficients for 
TIER 1 are not significantly different from the estimated coefficients, which might point to an 
underlying trend. That trend might be related to the financial crisis, which occurred around 
the time of my events, which decreased stock prices drastically. With the decrease in stock 
prices, banks became much more vulnerable to economic shocks. However, I can rule out a 
mechanical relation between TIER 1 and POS CUM OCR, that might have influenced the 
association between abnormal returns and POS CUM OCR. BIS (2005) mandates that OCR 
gains and losses should be excluded from regulatory capital. Untabulated statistics exhibit that 
all simulated non-event coefficients are not significantly different from zero. This alleviates 
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the issue of an underlying trend by suggesting that the trend between abnormal returns and 
TIER 1 is weak.  
Overall, the result in Table 1.8 suggest that the variation in abnormal returns that is 
explained by the variation in POS CUM OCR is unique to the event days and, therefore, is 
likely be driven by the new regulations for FVOL under IFRS 9 rather than misspecification 
or omitted variables of the cross-sectional abnormal returns. 
 
 
1.6. Additional Analysis 
1.6.1. Continuous Measurement 
I continue to examine whether the magnitude of the OCR net gain or loss is associated 
with the market reactions. Table 1.9 reports coefficient estimates from Equation (1.1) 
replacing the dichotomous variable POS CUM OCR by a continuous measure cum ocr, 
defined as the accumulated OCR net gain or loss divided by the average total liabilities 
summed over the periods from 2006 to the year of the event date.  
The coefficient estimates are very close to the full-sample results. Four coefficients, cum 
ocr, p/b, TIER 1, and std are significantly different from zero in at least one model 
specification. The coefficient estimates for cum ocr remain negative in all eight models but 
become weaker and fall below the 10% significance level in Model (2a), (2c), and (2d).  
The results confirm previous results that show that there is a negative association between 
abnormal returns and the sign of the accumulated OCR net gain or loss. However, the 
association is weaker for the continuous measure than for the dichotomous variable, which is 
at least partly driven by the limited sample size.  
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1.6.2. Small Sample Regression 
Lastly, I perform the main regressions on a subsample comprising only of banks from 
Germany, Italy, Switzerland, or the UK. I focus on these countries to minimize country-
specific variation that are unrelated to the new regulations for FVOL under IFRS 9. Because 
66.1% of the data on disclosure of OCR gains and losses stem from banks located in 
Germany, Italy, Switzerland, or the UK, 72 observations remain for the subsample analysis. 
Table 1.10 reports coefficient estimates from Equation (1.1) using observations from the 
subsample. The results are almost identical to those in the full sample. The coefficients for 
POS CUM OCR remain significant in six out of eight models and all having the expected 
sign. All other coefficients show the same sign as in the full sample except for regulatory 
quality. However, the coefficients for regulatory quality are not significantly different from 
zero both in the full-sample and in the subsample analysis.  
The results suggest that banks that accumulated an OCR net gain since 2006 reacted with 
abnormal returns that are 1.8% to 2.2% lower than abnormal returns for banks that 
accumulated an OCR net loss, which is very similar to the findings in the full sample. These 
results should mitigate concerns that results are somehow driven by effects that are specific to 
countries where OCR data is sparse. 
 
 
1.7. Conclusion 
This study investigates market reactions to the new regulations for FVOL under IFRS 9. 
Previous research has shown that accounting stakeholders find it difficult to identify OCR 
gains and losses in financial statements and to interpret those results properly. I argue that 
difficulties in processing OCR information have influenced investors' assessment of firm 
value before the development of new standards on financial liabilities started. Due to the 
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increased information flow from the IASB to the public during the development of IFRS 9, 
investors were reminded about those underlying difficulties and were able to react and 
reassess their valuations of banks with disclosed OCR gains and losses. These adjustments 
should induce market reactions during the issuance of the IFRS 9 pronouncements regarding 
the accounting treatment of FVOL. I further argue that market reactions are likely to depend 
on the information environment surrounding the banks. 
In my cross-sectional regressions, I observe that banks that accumulated an OCR net gain 
showed significantly lower abnormal returns than banks that accumulated an OCR net loss. 
These findings are consistent with the notion that investors believed that firms that 
accumulated an OCR net gain (loss) since 2006 were relatively overpriced (underpriced). The 
findings on the association between the sign of the accumulated OCR net gain or loss and 
abnormal returns are limited to low information environments and cannot be extended to high 
information environments. Further analysis corroborates my findings by showing that the 
association is not driven by country-specific effects or underlying trends that go beyond my 
event dates. When I introduce a continuous variable to measure the accumulated OCR net 
gains and losses, the regression results become weaker but remain consistent with my 
previous findings.  
Overall, my results suggest that (1) investors follow the standard-development process 
and (2) differences in information environment can influence the processing of complex 
information in financial statements. The results are pertinent to the broader question whether 
market characteristics drive information processing.  
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Tables 
Table 1.1: Timing and Description of Events 
   
Event number Event date Form Description
1 MAR 19, 2008 Discussion Paper:
Reducing Complexity in Reporting Financial
Instruments
Initiate the process of developing new standards for 
financial instruments. Propose that OCR gains and losses 
can be presented in net income, OCI, or split between the 
two.
2 JUN 18, 2009 Discussion Paper:
Credit Risk in Liability Measurement
Seeking comments on three possible approaches to 
FVOL measurement. All approaches excluded OCR gains 
and losses from net income.
3 MAY 11, 2010 Exposure draft:
Fair Value Option for financial liabilities
All three approaches were abandoned for a less
complex approach that puts all OCR gains and losses in 
OCI unless such treatment would create or enlarge an 
accounting mismatch in profit and loss.
4 SEPT 28, 2010 IFRS 9:
Financial Instruments
Finalization of IFRS 9 relating to the classification and 
measurement of financial instruments.
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Table 1.2: Sample Selection Process 
No of banks No of obs. No of banks No of banks No of banks No of banks
Sample selection Process total total event 1 event 2 event 3 event 4
= Global IFRS banks (Bankscope) 5,109
- Inactive (1,174)
- Non-commercial and non-saving banks (2,021)
- Non-ultimate owners (1,566)
- Located in North or South America (13)
= Sample before data collection 335
- Not listed (126)
- No share price movements during more than 20% of trading days (39)
- No share price movement during any of the events (8)
= Sample for event study 162 648 162 162 162 162
- Missing data on the explanatory variables (11) (108) (41) (23) (22) (22)
- Confounding events (0) (34) (5) (2) (24) (3)
= Global sample 151 506 116 137 116 137
- Observations in non-OCR-recognizer countries (88) (310) (70) (78) (78) (84)
= Sample in OCR-recognizer countries 63 196 46 59 38 53
- Non-OCR recognizers (28) (87) (22) (27) (15) (23)
= Sample of OCR recognizers 35 109 24 32 23 30
Observations by eventTotal
This table outlines the sample selection process. The initial IFRS sample, consisting of 5,109 banks, is extracted from Bankscope.  I eliminate all inactive banks (-1,174), 
non-commercial banks and non-saving banks (-2,021), banks that are controlled by another company (-1,566), and banks located in North or South America (-13). For this 
sample, I collected data on stock returns and further eliminate companies from the sample that are not listed (-126), companies with no share price movements during more 
than 20% of all trading days between 2007 and 2010 (-39), and companies with missing share prices during all event windows (-8). This procedure yields an international 
sample of 162 banks, each having 4 event windows. I drop observations because of missing data in Thomson Reuters Eikon (-108) and because of confounding earnings 
releases or annual meetings (-34). The sample available for empirical tests comprises of 506 observations from 151 banks in 35 countries. Of those observations, 196 
observations from 63 banks can be observed in 12 countries where OCR-recognizers are present. The sample of OCR-recognizers comprises of 109 observations from 35 
banks in 12 countries.  
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Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Distributional statistics
Variable Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Mean Median Std
Abnormal returns:
 ar_exna_3 0.004 -0.003 0.042 -0.006 -0.004 0.038 -0.003 -0.004 0.040
 ar_banks_3 -0.005 -0.007 0.041 -0.008 -0.004 0.039 -0.007 -0.005 0.040
Fair value option:
 FVOL                      1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.352 0.000 0.478
 OCR                       0.612 1.000 0.489 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.215 0.000 0.412
 POS CUM OCR       0.343 0.000 0.476 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.326
 cum ocr           0.710 0.000 2.800 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.000 1.692
Firm characteristics:
size 25.919 26.152 1.974 23.069 23.171 1.728 24.072 23.807 2.270
roa 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.016 0.007 0.006 0.014
 p/b 1.001 0.834 0.646 1.383 1.161 0.999 1.248 1.051 0.909
 lev 18.324 15.675 9.726 10.713 8.157 7.840 13.391 11.648 9.284
 TIER 1 10.892 10.020 3.572 14.747 13.200 7.031 13.391 11.800 6.315
Stock characteristics:
 chs 0.248 0.186 0.273 0.411 0.430 0.361 0.354 0.290 0.311
 CL 0.607 1.000 0.490 0.073 0.000 0.261 0.261 0.000 0.440
 std 0.030 0.027 0.013 0.028 0.023 0.042 0.029 0.024 0.035
 spread 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.006
Environment characteristics:
 regulatory quality 1.253 1.340 0.553 0.702 0.660 0.716 0.896 0.950 0.713
FVOL users
(n=178)
Non-FVOL users
(n=328)
Combined
(n=506)
Panel B: Country composition
Country Unique Firm- Non-FVOL FVOL OCR ar_exna_3 ar_banks_3 Information Financial Regulatory
firms events users users recognizers environment structure quality
Australia   1 4 0 4 0 0.018 0.014 1.06        1.78
Austria     2 4 0 4 3 -0.005 -0.017 -1.06  Bank-based 1.64
Belgium     2 4 0 4 4 -0.030 -0.025 0.35  Bank-based 1.48
China               4 12 3 9 0 -0.015 -0.021 NA        -0.22
Croatia     2 8 8 0 0 -0.018 -0.020 -0.88        0.50
Cyprus              2 6 6 0 0 -0.014 -0.014 -0.76        1.25
Denmark     10 39 28 11 0 -0.006 -0.007 0.67        1.86
Egypt               1 3 3 0 0 -0.009 -0.008 0.00        -0.17
Finland     2 8 4 4 4 0.019 0.014 1.53  Market-based 1.58
France              4 8 2 6 6 0.011 0.010 0.72  Market-based 1.25
Germany     11 32 20 12 12 -0.011 -0.020 0.17  Bank-based 1.46
Greece              5 15 12 3 0 -0.011 -0.011 0.79        0.81
Hungary     2 4 4 0 0 -0.033 -0.050 0.50        1.26
Ireland     2 6 4 2 2 0.046 0.028 0.38  Bank-based 1.91
Italy               20 67 38 29 27 -0.007 -0.012 0.46  Bank-based 0.95
Jordan              8 31 31 0 0 -0.010 -0.009 0.54        0.34
Kenya               6 9 7 2 0 -0.002 -0.001 -0.39        -0.07
Kuwait              5 14 14 0 0 0.013 0.013 1.36        0.04
Malaysia    1 3 3 0 0 0.002 0.006 1.06        0.27
Norway              6 21 15 6 0 -0.014 -0.014 0.47        1.34
Oman                3 12 12 0 0 0.004 0.005 0.05        0.65
Pakistan    5 20 20 0 0 -0.005 -0.005 0.82        -0.47
Palistinia  1 2 2 0 0 0.018 0.019 NA        -1.12
Philippines 1 4 4 0 0 0.018 0.018 0.95        -0.05
Portugal 2 6 0 6 6 0.035 0.034 -0.24  Bank-based 1.12
Qatar               5 20 20 0 0 -0.014 -0.015 NA        0.66
Russia              3 12 12 0 0 -0.009 -0.019 0.99        -0.56
Saudi Arabia 7 28 24 4 0 -0.016 -0.014 1.24        0.17
South Africa 1 4 0 4 4 0.032 0.027 1.62  Market-based 0.63
Spain               5 20 4 16 0 0.027 0.014 0.85        1.27
Sweden              4 15 3 12 8 -0.005 -0.018 1.68  Market-based 1.68
Switzerland 4 16 4 12 12 0.000 -0.010 1.36  Market-based 1.66
Turkey              1 4 4 0 0 0.018 0.008 1.57 0.22
UAE                 5 19 12 7 0 -0.001 0.000 NA        0.56
UK                  8 26 5 21 21 0.010 -0.010 1.16  Market-based 1.79
Total (Average) 151 506 328 178 109 (-.003) (-.007) 0.69 0.78
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Panel C: Pearson Correlation
ar_exNA_3 ar_banks_3 POS
CUM
OCR
cum
ocr
size roa p/b lev Tier 1 chs CL std spread regulatory 
quality
Abnormal returns:
 ar_exna_3         1.000 0.903 0.002 -0.051 0.080 -0.005 0.051 0.096 -0.053 -0.025 0.065 -0.095 -0.137 0.060
 ar_banks_3        0.925 1.000 -0.075 -0.073 -0.010 0.030 0.092 -0.003 0.033 -0.006 -0.022 -0.244 -0.139 -0.019
Fair value option:
 POS CUM OCR       -0.004 -0.128 1.000 0.622 0.127 -0.434 -0.365 0.223 -0.257 0.279 0.167 0.141 0.024 0.095
 cum ocr           -0.077 -0.106 0.262 1.000 0.070 -0.356 -0.301 0.128 -0.211 0.117 0.124 0.062 -0.050 0.064
Firm characteristics:
 size                      0.132 0.023 0.132 -0.057 1.000 -0.226 -0.169 0.553 -0.278 -0.215 0.713 0.249 -0.653 0.231
 roa                       -0.028 0.006 -0.389 -0.172 -0.096 1.000 0.478 -0.561 0.347 -0.049 -0.240 -0.346 0.168 -0.381
 p/b                       0.009 0.070 -0.315 -0.198 -0.154 0.148 1.000 -0.288 0.268 0.082 -0.225 -0.361 -0.013 -0.382
 lev                       0.120 -0.007 0.207 0.131 0.518 -0.431 -0.200 1.000 -0.462 -0.228 0.531 0.369 -0.354 0.512
 TIER 1            -0.064 0.025 -0.257 -0.174 -0.254 0.307 0.165 -0.369 1.000 0.151 -0.271 -0.212 0.090 -0.179
Stock characteristics:
chs -0.032 -0.014 0.267 -0.031 -0.267 -0.169 0.132 -0.187 0.141 1.000 -0.188 -0.040 0.162 -0.131
 CL                        0.109 0.016 0.167 -0.050 0.746 -0.168 -0.205 0.467 -0.271 -0.219 1.000 0.243 -0.561 0.321
 std                       -0.078 -0.123 0.160 0.180 0.062 -0.405 0.262 0.202 -0.163 0.120 0.066 1.000 0.061 0.191
 spread            -0.180 -0.170 -0.082 0.216 -0.438 0.055 -0.022 -0.148 0.008 0.072 -0.330 0.040 1.000 -0.143
Environment characteristics:
 regulatory quality 0.063 -0.007 0.179 0.027 0.246 -0.260 -0.358 0.375 -0.173 -0.147 0.313 0.066 -0.001 1.000
The global sample comprises of 506 firm-event observations from 151 banks in 35 countries between 2008 and 2010. The initial sample of IFRS-banks and data on U.S. cross listings is from Bankscope, financial data from Thomson Reuters Eikon, data on country-
specific regulatory quality from the index by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009), and hand-collected data on FVOL including OCR gains and losses from annual reports. Panel A shows distributional statistics for the variables used in the cross-sectional analysis, 
Panel B shows the distribution of IFRS-banks and firm-year observations by country for the global sample and for three different subsamples, and Panel C shows Pearson's correlations below the diagonal and Spearman's rank correlations above the diagonal for the 
variables used in the cross-sectional analysis. The subsample Non-FVOL users  comprises of firm-events without FVOL, FVOL users  comprises of firm-events with FVOL, and OCR recognizers  comprises of firm-events with disclosure of OCR gains or losses. OCR 
recognizers is a subsample of the FVOL user sample. Indicator variables are labeled in capital letters. ar_exna_3  and ar_banks_3  are the cumulative abnormal returns of the IFRS-banks, estimated using a market model during the (-1,0,+1) event window around the 
four event dates related to the new regulations on financial liabilities under IFRS 9. Abnormal returns are estimated over the period from 11 to 250 days prior to the first event on March 19, 2008 using returns from the STOXX Global 1800 ex North America index for the 
ar_exna_3  variable and the STOXX Global 3000 Banks index for the ar_banks_3  variable. FVOL  is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank has FVOL and zero otherwise. OCR  is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank discloses OCR gains or losses and 
zero otherwise. POS CUM OCR  is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank has accumulated an OCR net gain since 2006 and zero otherwise. cum ocr  is the amount of accumulated OCR net gains or losses that a firm has accumulated since 2006 scaled by total 
liabilities times 1'000. size  is the natural logarithm of total assets. roa  is the return on assets calculated as income after tax divided by average of total assets. p/b  is the price-to-book ratio calculated as market capitalization divided by total book value of equity. lev  is the 
leverage ratio calculated as total liabilities divided by total book value of equity. TIER 1  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the core equity capital divided by total risk-weighted assets is above the median and zero otherwise. chs  is the percentage of closely held shares 
calculated as one minus free floating shares divided by total shares outstanding. CL  is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank's shares are cross listed in the USA and zero otherwise. std  is the standard deviation of the stock returns during the calendar year for each 
bank. spread  is the yearly median bid-ask spread calculated as the difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-point and measured at the end of each trading day. regulatory quality  is the regulatory quality index by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
(2009) for the year 2008. Information environment  is a measure for the financial market structure in a certain country (Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas, 2017). Financial structure  is a dichotomous variable equal to market-based (bank-based) if the countries have at least 
one bank that discloses OCR gains and losses and Information environment  is above (below) median. 
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Table 1.4: Overall Market Reactions 
  
Variables
        Raw
        returns
        Model
         (1)
        Model
         (2)
        Raw
        returns
         Model
          (3)
         Model
          (4)
        Raw
        returns
         Model
          (5)
         Model
          (6)
Intercept 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.62) (0.13) (0.61) (0.12) (0.07) (0.42)
sg3000b 0.645 *** 0.645 *** 0.645 ***
(16.56) (16.30) (15.92)
sg1800exna 0.772 *** 0.772 *** 0.772 ***
(30.85) (30.36) (29.66)
by Event:
Event #1 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.012 -0.040 *** -0.009 0.042 -0.019 * -0.001
 (-0.72) (-0.62)  (-5.00) (-1.21)  (-1.65) (-0.10)
Event #2 0.006 -0.002 0.009 ** -0.013 -0.017 ** -0.011 -0.023 -0.015 -0.013
                       (-0.53) (2.13)                               (-2.09) (-1.57)              (-1.36) (-1.26)
Event #3 -0.012 -0.011 ** -0.011 *** 0.067 0.014 * 0.031 *** 0.027 -0.005 0.004
 (-2.32) (-2.60)  (1.76) (4.32)  (-0.46) (0.36)
Event #4 -0.004 0.001 -0.002 -0.007 0.005 -0.005 -0.006 0.005 0.008
(0.22) (-0.42)  (0.56) (-0.63)  (0.43) (0.76)
Aggregated:
Events #1-4 -0.011 -0.015 * -0.006 0.059 -0.038 ** 0.007 0.039 -0.034 -0.002
(-1.68) (-0.75) (-2.38) (0.46) (-1.52) (-0.12)
R² (by Event) 0.7106 0.8043 0.7862 0.8554 0.8131 0.8736
Adj-R² (by Event) 0.7045 0.8001 0.7746 0.8475 0.7935 0.8603
N 244 244 252 252 264 264
1-Day Window (t=0) 3-Day Window (t=-1,0,+1) 6-Day Window (t=-4,-3,-2,-1,0,+1)
This tables presents results from estimating the market reactions during four events related to the changes in accounting regulations for FVOL under IFRS 9. I present cumulative portfolio raw returns and 
cumulative portfolio abnormal returns for the event windows t=(0), t=(-1,0,+1), and t=(-4,-3,-2,-1,0,+1). The portfolio is an equally-weighted representation of all the banks in my sample that apply IFRS. 
Cumulative abnormal portfolio returns are calculated using the STOXX GLOBAL 3000 Banks index (sg3000b ) and the STOXX GLOBAL 1800 ex North America index (sg1800exna). Cumulative portfolio 
abnormal returns are estimated using a single-factor market model. The market model parameters are estimated over the period from 11 to 250 days prior to the first event on March 19, 2008. I present all results 
for each of the four events separately and aggregated over all events. T-statistics in parentheses are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels (two-tailed). 
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Table 1.5: Descriptive Abnormal Returns 
 
 
Non-
Disclosure
Pos Cum 
OCR
Neg Cum 
OCR Diff
Non-
Disclosure
Pos Cum 
OCR
Neg Cum 
OCR Diff
(1) (2) (3) (2) - (3) (4) (5) (6) (5) - (6)
Mean -0.012 0.001 0.009 -0.008 -0.017 -0.013 ** 0.002 -0.015 *
(-1.10) (0.20) (1.28) (-0.90) (-1.46) (-2.51) (0.40) (-1.88)
N 7 67 42 109 7 67 42 109
This table presents mean abnormal returns for banks in countries in which at least one bank discloses OCR gains or losses (12 countries) and that use the fair value option for financial liabilities. 
Abnormal returns are calculated using the STOXX Global 1800 ex North America index and the STOXX Global 3000 Banks index and a 3-day event windows t=(-1,0,+1). Mean abnormal 
returns are calculated by three different groups: bank-events without disclosure of OCR gains or losses (Non-Disclosure ); bank-events that accumulated an OCR net gain (Pos Cum OCR ); and 
bank-events that accumulated an OCR net loss (Neg Cum OCR ). In addition, the difference in abnormal returns between Pos Cum OCR  and Neg Cum OCR is calculated. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
Abnormal Return
Ex North America
t = (-1,0,+1)
Abnormal Return
Banks
t = (-1,0,+1)
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Table 1.6: Cross-Sectional Regression 
Variables
          Model
          (1a)
          Model
          (1b)
         Model
         (1c)
       Model
       (1d)
          Model
          (2a)
          Model
          (2b)
          Model
          (2c)
          Model
          (2d)
Intercept -0.026 -0.026 -0.023 -0.059 0.010 0.010 -0.007 -0.077
(-0.43) (-0.90) (-0.27) (-0.23) (0.17) (0.28) (-0.09) (-0.26)
POS CUM OCR -0.019 ** -0.019 *** -0.016 ** -0.015 * -0.020 *** -0.020 *** -0.016 ** -0.015 *
(-2.55) (-3.16) (-2.19) (-1.90) (-2.67) (-2.86) (-2.08) (-1.77)
size 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.000
(0.35) (0.61) (0.06) (-0.26) (-0.88) (-1.40) (-0.96) (-0.05)
roa -0.242 -0.242 -0.547 -0.356 -0.091 -0.091 -0.380 -0.303
(-0.54) (-0.32) (-1.34) (-0.83) (-0.21) (-0.11) (-0.95) (-0.72)
p/b 0.012 0.012 0.027 * 0.031 ** 0.012 0.012 0.035 ** 0.035 **
(1.61) (1.54) (1.91) (2.04) (1.50) (1.55) (2.34) (2.22)
TIER 1 -0.014 ** -0.014 *** -0.022 ** -0.022 * -0.014 ** -0.014 *** -0.021 * -0.019 *
(-2.29) (-2.66) (-2.05) (-1.93) (-2.06) (-2.71) (-1.92) (-1.69)
std 0.625 ** 0.625 * 0.861 * 0.954 ** 0.442 * 0.442 0.792 * 0.776 *
(2.31) (1.84) (1.74) (2.16) (1.79) (1.46) (1.70) (1.66)
lev       0.001   0.000
      (1.27)   (0.33)
chs         0.004 -0.000
        (0.31) (-0.01)
CL         -0.008 -0.012
        (-0.38) (-0.54)
spread         -2.222 0.276
        (-0.81) (0.10)
regulatory quality         0.039 0.009
        (0.26) (0.05)
Event-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors No Country No No No Country No No
R² 0.44 0.44 0.54 0.56 0.41 0.41 0.51 0.51
Adj-R² 0.39 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.35 0.35 0.40 0.37
N 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
This table presents OLS coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, t-statistics from a regression of abnormal returns during four 3-day event windows t=(-1,0,+1) calculated using the STOXX 
Global 1800 ex North America index and the STOXX Global 3000 Bank index on an indicator variable for bank-events that accumulated an OCR net gain since 2006 (POS CUM OCR ) and 
control variables. size  is the natural logarithm of total assets. roa  is the return on assets. p/b  is the price-to-book ratio. TIER 1  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the core equity capital 
divided by total risk-weighted assets is above median and zero otherwise. std  is the standard deviation of the daily stock returns for each year. lev  is the leverage ratio defined as total liabilities 
divided by total equity. chs  is the percentage of closely held shares calculated as one minus free floating shares divided by total shares outstanding. CL  is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the bank's shares are cross listed in the USA and zero otherwise. spread  is the yearly median quoted spread, i.e., the difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-point and 
measured at the end of each trading day. regulatory quality  is the regulatory quality index by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009) for the year 2008. T-statistics are calculated using 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered by country in model b). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
Abnormal Return
Ex North America
t = (-1,0,+1)
Abnormal Return
Banks
t = (-1,0,+1)
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Table 1.7: Cross-Sectional Differences by Information Environments 
 
Variables
        Market-
        based
        Bank-
       based
       Market-
       based
       Bank-
       based
       High
       Analysts
       Low
       Analysts
       High
       Analysts
       Low
       Analysts
Intercept -0.519 * -0.148 -0.578 * -0.163 0.530 * -0.124 0.505 -0.008
(-1.89) (-0.51) (-1.72) (-0.56) (-1.65) (-0.69) (-1.61) (-0.04)
POS CUM OCR -0.001 -0.031 ** 0.001 -0.032 ** -0.020 -0.024 ** -0.015 -0.023 **
(-0.07) (-2.10) (0.13) (-2.05) (-0.87) (-2.32) (-0.63) (-2.17)
size -0.009 0.005 -0.007 0.004 -0.029 * 0.012 -0.027 * 0.010
(-1.08) (0.39) (-0.75) (0.35) (-1.91) (1.18) (-1.67) (0.95)
roa -0.540 -0.942 -0.533 -0.902 -3.041 -0.671 -2.679 -0.676
(-1.20) (-0.34) (-1.19) (-0.31) (-0.92) (-1.12) (-0.80) (-1.14)
p/b 0.030 0.021 0.030 0.033 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.004
(1.46) (0.51) (1.37) (0.72) (0.08) (0.01) (0.03) (0.12)
TIER 1 -0.009 -0.051 -0.008 -0.056 -0.038 * -0.015 -0.033 -0.019
(-0.84) (-0.73) (-0.69) (-0.75) (-1.73) (-0.85) (-1.31) (-1.00)
std 1.040 ** 0.569 0.998 * 0.125 0.457 0.521 0.386 0.179
(2.20) (0.76) (1.92) (0.16) (0.77) (0.73) (0.60) (0.22)
lev 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 *
(1.16) (0.02) (0.06) (0.45) (1.09) (-1.45) (0.34) (-1.78)
chs -0.034 0.025 -0.044 * 0.015 -0.068 0.007 -0.071 0.007
(-1.64) (0.89) (-1.91) (0.54) (-1.09) (0.47) (-1.09) (0.43)
CL 0.011 -0.022 0.007 -0.017 0.006 -0.050 * -0.026 -0.043
(0.36) (-0.62) (0.20) (-0.48) (0.11) (-1.69) (-0.43) (-1.41)
spread 0.121 -4.119 2.667 -1.469 -22.393 * -0.862 -24.196 * 1.442
(0.09) (-0.83) (1.44) (-0.27) (-1.70) (-0.34) (-1.74) (0.54)
regulatory quality 0.400 ** 0.024 0.386 * 0.024 0.176 -0.072 0.158 -0.130
(2.31) (0.49) (1.84) (0.43) (0.82) (-0.93) (0.65) (-1.47)
Event-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors No No No No No No No No
R² 0.67 0.65 0.56 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.59 0.62
Adj-R² 0.52 0.45 0.35 0.45 0.39 0.45 0.29 0.42
N 57 48 57 48 44 65 44 65
Abnormal Return
Banks
t = (-1,0,+1)
Country-specific Company-specific
This table presents OLS coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, t-statistics from a regression of abnormal returns during four 3-day event windows t=(-1,0,+1) calculated using the STOXX 
Global 1800 ex North America index and the STOXX Global 3000 Bank index on an indicator variable for bank-events that accumulated an OCR net gain since 2006 (POS CUM OCR ) and 
control variables. The first four column present regression results, splitting the sample into market-based and bank-based economies depending on the country of the bank's headquarters. 
Following Beck and Levine (2002) and Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2017), I categorize countries with above (below) median values of the first principal component of two variables that 
measure the comparative activity and size of the banking industry relative to the stock markets as market-based (bank-based) economies. The last four column present regression results 
separately for banks with above-median and below-median analyst following. size  is the natural logarithm of total assets. roa  is the return on assets. p/b  is the price-to-book ratio. TIER 1  is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the core equity capital divided by total risk-weighted assets is above median and zero otherwise. std  is the standard deviation of the daily stock returns during 
for each year. lev  is the leverage ratio defined here as total liabilities divided by total equity. chs is the percentage of closely held shares calculated as one minus free floating shares divided by 
total shares outstanding. CL is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank's shares are cross listed in the USA and zero otherwise. spread  is the yearly median quoted spread, i.e., the 
difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-point and measured at the end of each trading day. regulatory quality  is the regulatory quality index by Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2009) for the year 2008. T-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered by country in model b). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
Abnormal Return
Ex North America
t = (-1,0,+1)
Abnormal Return
Banks
t = (-1,0,+1)
Abnormal Return
Ex North America
t = (-1,0,+1)
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Table 1.8: Monte Carlo Simulations 
Variables
Regression
β
Monte Carlo
E[β]
Regression
β
Monte Carlo
E[β]
Intercept -0.023 0.023 -0.007 0.019
(-0.54) (-0.32)
POS CUM OCR -0.016 ** 0.003 -0.016 ** 0.003
(-2.58) *** (-2.61) ***
size -0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.000
(-0.02) (-0.82)
roa -0.547 -0.025 -0.380 0.006
(-1.28) (-0.97)
p/b 0.027 * -0.011 0.035 ** -0.007
(2.68) *** (2.82) ***
TIER 1 -0.022 ** -0.011 -0.021 * -0.008
(-1.02) (-1.19)
std 0.861 * -0.159 -0.792 * -0.096
(2.06) ** (1.91) *
Abnormal Return
Ex North America
t = (-1,0,+1)
Abnormal Return
Banks
t = (-1,0,+1)
This table presents results from a Monte Carlo analysis. The simulation process is as follows. First, I estimate abnormal returns using the STOXX Global 
1800 ex North America index and the STOXX Global 3000 Banks index. Second, I randomly select four 3-day windows that do not overlap with the event 
windows during a period from January 2008 to December 2010. Third, I regress abnormal returns during the selected four event windows on an indicator 
variable for bank-events that accumulated an OCR net gain since 2006 (POS CUM OCR ) and control variables. I repeat the second and third step one 
thousand times retaining coefficient estimates for each iteration. Fourth, I test whether the average of the one thousand estimated coefficients on non-event 
days (E[β]) are significantly different from the estimated coefficients on event days (β). T-statistics for the test E[β]=β appear in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 1.9: Continuous Accumulated OCR Gains and Losses 
 
  
Variables
       Model
       (1a)
       Model
       (1b)
       Model
       (1c)
       Model
       (1d)
       Model
       (2a)
       Model
       (2b)
       Model
       (2c)
       Model
       (2d)
Intercept -0.036 -0.036 -0.047 -0.158 -0.014 -0.014 -0.038 -0.172
(-0.61) (-1.03) (-0.58) (-0.63) (-0.24) (-0.34) (-0.48) (-0.61)
cum ocr -0.002 * -0.002 *** -0.002 ** -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 * -0.001 -0.002
(-1.78) (-3.61) (-1.98) (-1.49) (-1.10) (-1.78) (-1.28) (-1.31)
size 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
(0.28) (0.43) (-0.21) (-0.38) (-0.74) (-1.00) (-1.01) (-0.18)
roa -0.027 -0.027 -0.296 -0.133 0.171 0.171 -0.126 -0.091
(-0.06) (-0.04) (-0.65) (-0.29) (0.37) (0.20) (-0.30) (-0.21)
p/b 0.013 0.013 0.035 *** 0.036 ** 0.014 * 0.014 0.044 *** 0.040 ***
(1.63) (1.29) (2.58) (2.50) (1.67) (1.41) (3.11) (2.68)
TIER 1 -0.013 * -0.013 ** -0.028 ** -0.023 * -0.012 * -0.012 ** -0.024 ** -0.021 *
(-1.91) (-2.15) (-2.34) (-1.90) (-1.72) (-2.06) (-2.03) (-1.69)
std 0.637 ** 0.637 ** 1.071 ** 1.060 ** 0.415 * 0.415 0.951 ** 0.879 *
(2.58) (2.07) (2.48) (2.41) (1.75) (1.43) (2.14) (1.89)
lev   0.001 0.000
  (1.42) (-0.45)
chs   -0.006 -0.010
  (-0.40) (-0.67)
CL   -0.006 -0.010
  (-0.30) (-0.45)
spread   -0.290 2.179
  (-0.13) (0.91)
regulatory quality   0.095 0.064
          (0.67) (0.40)
Event-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors No Country No No No Country No No
R² 0.43 0.43 0.54 0.56 0.37 0.37 0.50 0.51
Adj-R² 0.37 0.37 0.44 0.44 0.31 0.31 0.39 0.38
N 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Abnormal Return
Ex North America
t = (-1,0,+1)
Abnormal Return
Banks
t = (-1,0,+1)
This table presents OLS coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, t-statistics from a regression of abnormal returns during four 3-day event windows t=(-1,0,+1) calculated using the STOXX 
Global 1800 ex North America index and the STOXX Global 3000 Bank index on a continuous measure of accumulated OCR gains and losses (cum ocr ) and control variables. size  is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. roa  is the return on assets. p/b  is the price-to-book ratio. TIER 1  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the core equity capital divided by total risk-weighted 
assets is above median and zero otherwise. std  is the standard deviation of the daily stock returns during for each year. lev  is the leverage ratio defined here as total liabilities divided by total 
equity. chs  is the percentage of closely held shares calculated as one minus free floating shares divided by total shares outstanding. CL  is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank's shares 
are cross listed in the USA and zero otherwise. spread  is the yearly median quoted spread, i.e., the difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-point and measured at the end 
of each trading day. regulatory quality  is the regulatory quality index by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009) for the year 2008. T-statistics in parentheses are calculated using 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered by country in model b). ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 1.10: Small Sample Cross-Sectional Regression (ITA, UK, CH, and GER) 
Variables
       Model
       (1a)
       Model
       (1b)
       Model
       (1c)
       Model
       (1d)
       Model
       (2a)
       Model
       (2b)
       Model
       (2c)
       Model
       (2d)
Intercept -0.048 -0.048 -0.015 0.137 -0.009 -0.009 0.010 0.066
(-0.68) (-1.38) (-0.17) (0.80) (-0.13) (-0.22) (0.12) (0.37)
POS CUM OCR -0.018 -0.018 ** -0.018 * -0.022 * -0.020 * -0.020 * -0.019 * -0.019
(-1.63) (-2.02) (-1.76) (-1.74) (-1.78) (-1.88) (-1.85) (-1.45)
size 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000
(0.41) (0.52) (0.09) (-0.46) (-0.68) (-0.94) (-0.81) (-0.05)
roa -0.695 -0.695 -0.796 * -0.572 -0.577 -0.577 -0.647 -0.538
(-1.54) (-1.19) (-1.91) (-1.32) (-1.37) (-0.97) (-1.64) (-1.29)
p/b 0.025 * 0.025 0.030 * 0.035 * 0.025 * 0.025 * 0.037 ** 0.039 **
(1.85) (1.64) (1.73) (1.95) (1.81) (1.73) (2.04) (2.06)
TIER 1 -0.018 ** -0.018 -0.028 * -0.032 * -0.019 * -0.019 -0.025 -0.028
(-1.97) (-1.37) (-1.80) (-1.85) (-1.86) (-1.52) (-1.61) (-1.61)
std 0.847 ** 0.847 0.851 1.077 ** 0.630 * 0.630 0.821 0.943 *
(2.28) (1.38) (1.51) (2.23) (1.90) (1.15) (1.55) (1.85)
lev           0.001 0.000
          (1.39) (0.34)
chs           0.013 0.004
          (0.81) (0.20)
CL           -0.008 -0.017
          (-0.31) (-0.61)
spread           -5.348 ** -2.831
          (-2.20) (-1.00)
regulatory quality           -0.043 -0.067
          (-0.71) (-1.01)
Event-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-fixed effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors No Country No No No Country No No
R² 0.40 40.00 0.43 0.43 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.43
Adj-R² 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.26
N 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
Abnormal Return
Ex North America
t = (-1,0,+1)
Abnormal Return
Banks
t = (-1,0,+1)
This table presents OLS coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, t-statistics from a regression of abnormal returns during four 3-day event windows t=(-1,0,+1) calculated using the STOXX 
Global 1800 ex North America index and the STOXX Global 3000 Bank index on an indicator variable for bank-events that accumulated an OCR net gain since 2006 (POS CUM OCR ) and 
control variables. We use a subsample comprising only of banks located in Italy, Germany, Switzerland, or the U.K. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. roa  is the return on assets. p/b 
is the price-to-book ratio. TIER  1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the core equity capital divided by total risk-weighted assets is above median and zero otherwise. std  is the standard 
deviation of the daily stock returns for each year. lev  is the leverage ratio defined as total liabilities divided by total equity. chs  is the percentage of closely held shares calculated as one minus 
free floating shares divided by total shares outstanding. CL  is an indicator variable equal to one if the bank's shares are cross listed in the USA and zero otherwise. spread  is the yearly median 
quoted spread, i.e., the difference between the bid and ask price divided by the mid-point and measured at the end of each trading day. regulatory quality  is the regulatory quality index by 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009) for the year 2008. T-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (clustered by country in model b). ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Chapter 2: The Market Perception of Own Credit Risk 
(In collaboration with Peter Fiechter) 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This paper examines whether and how recognized own credit risk (OCR) gains and losses 
on financial liabilities designated at fair value through profit or loss (FVOL) are reflected in 
stock-based measures (i.e., stock returns, stock prices, and stock return volatility).12 By 
providing empirical evidence on the market perception of OCR gains and losses, we aim to 
shed light on the long-standing debate regarding the accounting for FVOL (IASB, 2009).  
On the one hand, OCR gains and losses may not be useful because changes in credit risk 
for FVOL are arguably counterintuitive, as an entity reports a gain (loss) from deterioration 
(improvement) in its credit quality. In addition, because FVOL are typically used for funding 
purposes and are difficult to transfer, unrealized OCR gains and losses can rarely be realized. 
In line with these arguments, critics claim that equity analysts and investors ignore OCR gains 
and losses, because they do not reflect economic performance (e.g. JP Morgan Chase, 2009; 
KPMG, 2009; UBS, 2009; and IASB, 2009). On the other hand, OCR gains and losses may 
be useful, because they convey information regarding the effective interest rate of debt and 
loan agreements, refinancing requirements, the wealth transfer that has occurred from 
bondholders to shareholders, and because OCR gains and losses may offset declines in the 
fair value of assets (CFA Institute, 2009 and IASB, 2009).  
The relation between OCR gains and losses and stock-based measures is ex ante unclear. 
First, if OCR gains and losses are not useful or if OCR gains and losses are a noisy measure 
of an entity’s own credit risk changes (e.g. Dong, Doukakis, and Ryan, 2016), we expect an 
insignificant association between OCR gains and losses and stock-based measures. Second, if 
                                                          
12 OCR gains and losses are also referred to as debt valuation adjustments (DVA). 
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investors interpret OCR gains and losses as a normal component of net income, we expect 
OCR gains and losses to be positively associated with stock returns and stock prices. Third, if 
OCR gains and losses reflect changes in the entity-wide credit risk (i.e., the asset-side effect 
dominates the liability-side effect), we expect OCR gains and losses to be negatively 
associated with stock returns and stock prices. In addition, if OCR gains and losses are 
significantly related to stock returns and stock prices—regardless of the sign of the 
association—we expect volatility in OCR gains and losses to be positively associated with 
stock-based risk measures, because volatility in OCR gains and losses likely reflects banks’ 
exposure to credit risk. 
To examine the market perception of OCR gains and losses, we apply different research 
methodologies. We closely follow prior research by using return-relevance (Bhat and Ryan, 
2015), value-relevance (e.g. Barth and Clinch, 1998; Landsman, Peasnell, and Shakespeare, 
2008; and Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas, 2017), and risk-relevance (Hodder, Hopkins, and 
Wahlen, 2006) methodology to analyze whether OCR gains and losses are reflected in stock 
returns, in stock prices, and in different stock-based risk measures, respectively. We use all 
three relevance models to mitigate some of the concerns that come with the use of the 
individual models.13 
Using an international sample of IFRS banks from 2006 to 2015 (2,298 bank-year 
observations), we find that OCR gains and losses are negatively related to stock returns and 
stock prices, respectively, indicating that the market perceives OCR gains (losses) as a 
negative (positive) signal for the bank’s (future) economic performance. In contrast to the 
positive coefficient estimates for interest income, the negative coefficients for OCR gains and 
losses suggest that investors do not perceive them as a normal component of net income. In 
addition, we find that volatility in OCR gains and losses is positively related to volatility in 
                                                          
13 For example, return relevance is more prone to measurement error; value relevance is more prone to omitted 
variable bias; and risk relevance is more prone to autocorrelation (Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 2001; 
Holthausen and Watts, 2001; and Bhat and Ryan 2015).  
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stock returns, indicating that OCR gains and losses are risk relevant. Taken together, these 
findings suggest that recognized OCR gains and losses are useful for assessing the entity-wide 
changes in credit risk, and thus the bank’s economic performance. 
To mitigate concerns that less sophisticated investors interpret OCR gains and losses 
differently (i.e., as a normal income component) than more sophisticated investors, we allow 
for cross-sectional variation in investor sophistication. Related, we also test whether 
differences in the information environment affect investors’ processing of OCR information. 
We do not find that differences in investor sophistication or different information 
environments affect the market perception of OCR gains and losses. In addition, to bolster our 
interpretation that the asset-side effect of changes in credit risk dominates the liability-side 
effect, we compare OCR gains and losses with proxies for credit-related asset write-downs 
(i.e., loan losses and changes in loan loss provisions). Consistent with our inferences from the 
market-based tests, we find that credit-related asset write-downs are positively correlated 
with, and of higher magnitude than, OCR gains and losses. Finally, we find no evidence that 
different levels of bank leverage affect the negative association between OCR gains and 
losses and stock returns.14  
We make several contributions to the literature. First, our empirical evidence suggests 
that—contrary to various claims that OCR should be ignored—OCR gains (losses) signal 
negative (positive) economic performance. This finding further suggests that markets do not 
perceive OCR gains and losses as a normal component of net income. The negative 
association between OCR gains and losses and stock returns and stock prices, respectively, 
also indicates that the asset-side effect of changes in credit risk dominates the liability-side 
effect. We thus shed light on the discussion as to whether OCR gains and losses—if not 
                                                          
14 For example, Barth, Hodder, and Stubben (2008) find that 27 percent of the downgraded firms—which are 
highly leveraged—recognize asset write downs smaller than unrecognized gains from the decrease in overall 
debt value. To mitigate concerns that our results hold only for moderately leveraged firms, we examine 
whether the association between OCR gains and losses and stock return varies with leverage. However, our 
sample consists of banks, which have inherently high leverage ratios (sample median = 0.91). 
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considered in isolation—are counterintuitive (IASB, 2009). Second, we add to Barth, Hodder, 
and Stubben (2008) by directly testing the relation between recognized OCR gains and losses 
on FVOL and stock returns; rather than testing the relation between model-based 
unrecognized OCR gains and losses on total debt and stock returns. Therefore, we can make 
inferences about the usefulness of recognized OCR gains and losses under IFRS. Third, we 
mitigate concerns that investors systematically misinterpret OCR gains and losses when 
assessing an entities economic performance, as indicated by previous experimental studies 
(Gaynor, McDaniel, and Yohn, 2011; Lachmann, Wöhrmann, and Wömpener, 2011; 
Lachmann, Stefani, and Wöhrmann, 2015).  
Understanding the link between OCR gains and losses and stock-based measures is 
important for several reasons. First, banks are highly leveraged compared to non-financial 
firms. Thus, small changes in the value of liabilities may strongly impact comprehensive 
income and book value of equity. Second, banks are highly exposed to credit risk due to their 
business model. Counterparty credit risk translates, among other factors, directly into bank’s 
own credit risk. Hence the assessment of an entity’s risk exposure is crucial to understand 
asset, liability, and earnings fluctuations rooted in credit risk fluctuations. Third, 
understanding the relation between OCR gains and losses and stock-based outcomes may help 
policy makers in assessing whether and how OCR information should be incorporated into 
financial statements. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 explains (a) the accounting 
treatment for financial liabilities under IAS 39 and IFRS 9; (b) reviews the related empirical 
and theoretical literature on the relation between credit risk and equity valuation as well as the 
related experimental literature on the processing of OCR information; and (c) describes the 
hypotheses development. Section 2.3 describes the research design. Section 2.4 describes the 
sample selection process and presents summary statistics. Section 2.5 presents the main 
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results. Section 2.6 presents additional results and discusses robustness tests. Section 2.7 
concludes.  
 
 
2.2. Background and Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1. Accounting Treatment for Financial Liabilities under IAS 39 and IFRS 9 
At initial recognition, financial liabilities are measured at fair value plus, in the case of a 
financial liability measured at amortized cost, transaction costs directly attributable to the 
issuance of the financial liability. Subsequently, financial liabilities are measured at amortized 
cost except for financial liabilities classified as held for trading (HFT) and financial liabilities 
designated at initial recognition at fair value through profit or loss. Financial liabilities 
classify as HFT if they are incurred for short-term profit-taking or if they are derivatives, 
except for financial guarantee contracts and derivatives designated as hedging instruments. 
Upon recognition, financial liabilities measured at amortized cost can be designated at fair 
value through profit or loss if it reduces an accounting mismatch or if the financial liabilities 
are managed by a group on a fair value basis. A measurement inconsistency may be 
eliminated if, for example, a contract contains a substantial derivative component. Instead of 
separating the host contract from the embedded derivative, the fair value option allows the 
entire hybrid contract to be measured at fair value through profit or loss (IASB, 2013).  
Financial liabilities that are typically designated at fair value include structured notes 
such as equity-linked, credit-linked, or rates-linked notes (substantive derivative component), 
non-structured fixed-rate bonds, the market risk of which is economically hedged by 
derivatives (reducing an accounting mismatch), and securities sold under repurchase 
agreements (managed on a fair value basis). The effect of periodical and cumulative changes 
in the entity’s credit risk on FVOL needs to be disclosed (IASB, 2014a). An increase 
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(decrease) in an entity’s own credit risk influences the expectation of future cash flows of the 
underlying financial liability, thereby decreasing (increasing) the value of the financial 
liability, resulting in a gain (loss) recognized in net income. 
As part of the convergence project between IFRS and US GAAP, the IASB and the 
FASB overhauled its regulations on financial instruments. In July 2014, the IASB issued its 
new regulations under IFRS 9 – Financial Instruments to the public. The IASB continues to 
allow designating financial liabilities at fair value (FVOL). However, standard setters 
changed the information location of OCR gains and losses from net income to other 
comprehensive income (OCI)—where it will appear as a separate line item—unless 
presentation in OCI introduces an accounting mismatch (IASB, 2014b). “It does make the 
results more understandable,” said Mark LaMonte, chief credit officer of the financial 
institutions group at Moody’s Investors Service (Rapoport, 2015). The new information 
location does not mean that the IASB believes that information is not useful, as the board 
clearly states that “[OCI items] are relevant gains and losses […] and investors should 
certainly take into account in their analysis the gains and losses that appear there” (Cooper, 
2015). More specifically, the IASB states that they continue to allow the designation of 
financial liabilities, because they still deem OCR gains and losses useful (IASB, 2014c). 
 
2.2.2. Literature Review 
The credit risk component of FVOL is a measure that is available in IFRS financial 
statements, providing investors with information regarding an entity’s own assessment of 
their change in credit risk. Hence our research is closely related to the literature investigating 
the relation between changes in credit risk and changes in market value of equity. In addition, 
we relate to the scarce (experimental) literature on the processing of OCR information.  
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2.2.2.1. Credit Risk and Equity Valuation  
In debt valuation, there are two primary risks that might induce changes to the value of a 
bond price during the time to maturity. First, changes in interest rates inversely affect bond 
prices through opportunity costs of holding a particular bond compared to switching to 
another bond that reflects current interest rates (interest-rate risk). Second, changes in the 
probability of default of a particular bond directly affect the expectation of future cash 
flows—such as coupon and principal—and hence bond prices (credit risk). Credit risk 
changes stem either from unanticipated asset risk changes or from asset value changes (Barth, 
Hodder, and Stubben, 2008). Those two changes that affect the probability of a bond default 
are likely to affect the probability of equity default. Hence, it seems intuitive that increases in 
credit risk should negatively affect the market value equity. However, early studies on this 
association show mixed results (Ederington and Yawitz, 1987).   
Strong (1990) argues that prior studies are unable to consistently find a redistribution 
effect of bond revaluations on stock returns, because they do not control for unanticipated 
changes in inflation. By disaggregating unanticipated inflation from holding gains and losses 
on long-term debt, Strong (1990) shows that both changes in credit risk and changes in 
unanticipated inflation produce significant but opposing effects on market value of debt. In 
addition, changes in credit risk dominate unanticipated inflation effects for investment-grade 
bond contracts.  
More recent studies that put greater effort into the identification of concurrent important 
news at the time around the credit deterioration find more conclusive negative market 
reactions to credit rating downgrades (e.g. Griffin and Sanvicente, 1982; Wansley and 
Clauretie, 1985; Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich, 1992; and 
Goh and Ederington, 1993). They, however, do not find significant market reactions to 
upgrades. Goh and Ederington (1993) point out that not all credit rating downgrades need to 
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be bad news for shareholders. Their identification strategy is to separate downgrades due to a 
reevaluation of the firm’s financial prospects from downgrades due to an anticipated increase 
in leverage (e.g. leveraged buyouts or debt-financed expansion). They argue that only the 
former should trigger negative market reactions, whereas the latter may induce a wealth 
transfer to shareholders, and thus should trigger positive market reactions. Their results then 
show that the former indeed triggers negative market reactions, whereas the latter does not 
trigger any market reactions.  
Kliger and Sarig (2000) investigate Moody’s refinement of its rating systems in 1982, 
which was not accompanied by any fundamental change in issuers’ credit risk. This setting 
allows them to investigate whether the incremental information of the refined system exhibits 
incremental value relevance. They, however, find no evidence that the new rating information 
affects firm value and find mixed evidence on the equity implication of bond rating changes.    
From a theoretical standpoint, Merton (1974) outlines the negative association between 
credit risk and the market value of equity by disentangling two countervailing effects—(1) the 
negative effect of asset value deterioration on market value of equity and (2) the negative 
effect of asset value deterioration on the market value of debt, increasing the market value of 
equity. Merton (1974) further shows that effect (1) dominates effect (2), resulting in a 
negative association between credit risk and the market value of equity.  
To empirically investigate these two distinct effects of changes in credit risk, Barth, 
Hodder, and Stubben (2008) estimate credit ratings by first estimating the relation between 
financial statement variables and credit ratings for firms with credit ratings, and then using 
these coefficient estimates to calculate credit ratings for the remaining firms.15 Barth, Hodder, 
and Stubben (2008) show that the negative relation between changes in market value of equity 
and changes in credit risk is less pronounced for firms with more debt. They interpret this 
                                                          
15 A drawback of this approach is that firms with credit ratings are typically large firms, which are then used to 
estimate credit ratings for small firms. 
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finding as evidence that credit-risk-induced changes in the market value of equity are 
attenuated by unrecognized credit risk changes on debt.  
Additional descriptive results by Barth, Hodder, and Stubben (2008) further suggest that 
if credit risk was only recognized in debt valuation, then firms recognize gains due to credit 
deteriorations. However, the results also reveal that, on average, firms with downgraded credit 
quality show lower net income. Although the indirect effect is, on average, dominated by the 
direct effect of asset value deteriorations, some concern about the counterintuitive effect is 
warranted because a few firms show a dominant indirect effect. Yet, whether those concerns 
can be transferred to a setting with recognized OCR gains and losses is not clear. In addition, 
whether recognized OCR gains and losses on FVOL convey useful information about overall 
changes in credit risk remains an open question.  
 
2.2.2.2. Processing of OCR Information 
Using Boston Chicken for his case study, Lipe (2002) shows how the measurement of 
financial liabilities at fair value can distort important financial ratios such as debt-to-equity, 
return-on-equity, and interest-coverage when facing material credit deterioration. Lipe (2002) 
raises concerns that the measurement asymmetry between assets and financial liabilities may 
produce unwarranted positive signals to investors. More recent experimental studies suggest 
that both professional and non-professional accounting statement users tend to misinterpret 
the relation between OCR gains and losses on FVOL and firms’ overall default risk (Gaynor, 
McDaniel, and Yohn, 2011; Lachmann, Wöhrmann, and Wömpener, 2011; and Lachmann, 
Stefani, and Wöhrmann, 2015).  
Gaynor, McDaniel, and Yohn (2011) find that more than 70% of participants (i.e., 
certified public accountants) incorrectly interpret firms that disclose own credit gains as less 
risky investments. They also find that a relational disclosure significantly improves 
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participants’ ability to properly interpret the OCR gains and losses. Their conclusions that 
knowledgeable financial statement users misinterpret OCR gains and losses, however, are 
based on the implicit assumption that OCR gains (losses) should be interpreted as a negative 
(positive) performance signal, although participants are not provided with information on 
what drives the change in credit risk, how those changes co-affect the asset-side, and whether 
the effect on the asset-side has already been recognized in financial statements.  
Conducting an experiment with knowledgeable non-professional financial statement 
users, Lachmann, Wöhrmann, and Wömpener (2011) confirm previous results by showing 
that participants rely on additional disclosures in the notes and need to exert more cognitive 
effort to process OCR information, although a separate line item for OCR changes in net 
income is provided. In reality, however, a separate line item for OCR gains and losses is 
unlikely to be found in net income statements. Instead, the information has to be obtained 
from the notes to the financial statements, which likely further decreases the information 
processing ability.16 
Lachmann, Stefani, and Wöhrmann (2015) investigate whether the location of the 
information on own credit risk matters. They find that the perceived importance of the 
information is slightly lower if presented in OCI instead of net income, and the risk of 
misinterpreting the directional effect of the information remains unchanged. However, they 
find that participants are less likely to make biased estimation of the value of the firm if OCR 
                                                          
16 While collecting the data for this study, we identified several (more practical) issues regarding the disclosure 
of OCR information: First, isolating the OCR component of a fair value change of FVOL can be difficult, as 
the OCR component is usually not presented as a separate line item in income statements, but as part of trading 
income. Therefore, financial statement users have to screen the notes to the financial statements to obtain the 
appropriate information. Second, disclosures on OCR gains (losses) are heterogeneous across firms. For 
example, some banks present the amount as decrease (increase) in liability, some present the amount as 
increase (decrease) in net income, and others do not elaborate on the sign of the OCR adjustment. Third, many 
banks do not disclose the OCR component of a fair value change of the FVOL or they bypass the disclosure 
requirements by declaring that OCR has not changed substantially. Fourth, banks seem to disagree about the 
definition of cumulative changes in own credit risk. Some banks interpret the term “cumulative” as the sum of 
all periodical OCR gains and losses up to the current financial year end, whereas others interpret “cumulative” 
as the life-to-date change in FVOL due to changes in an entity’s own credit risk.   
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gains and losses are presented in OCI than in net income. They argue that net income is 
inflated by deterioration in credit quality if OCR gains and losses are presented in net income, 
whereas net income is not inflated if OCR gains and losses are presented in OCI. This 
interpretation implicitly assumes that participants should neutralize OCR gains and losses for 
firm valuation, because OCR gains and losses do not provide useful information about the 
entity’s performance. However, whether OCR gains and losses are useful to investors and, if 
so, whether they are positively or negatively associated with stock-based measures, has not 
been addressed by previous research. 
 
2.2.3. Hypotheses Development 
FVOL and OCR gains are losses are subject to controversial discussions among 
academics, regulators, financial statement users, and financial statement preparers, generating 
more comments during the development of IFRS 9 than any other aspect of fair value 
measurement (IASB, 2009). J.P. Morgan Chase CEO James Dimon, called the accounting for 
own credit risk as “one of the more ridiculous concepts that’s ever been invented in 
accounting” (Rapoport, 2015). Generally, opponents of the accounting for OCR argue that 
reporting a profit (loss) from deterioration (improvement) in credit quality is counterintuitive 
and potentially misleading, masking the real economic performance of a company.  
Others express their concern that financial liabilities can seldom be transferred, and thus 
OCR gains or losses cannot be realized. Economic restrictions, such as the requirement for 
permission by the counterparty, may prevent entities from prematurely exiting non-structured 
fixed rate bonds. In addition, as an entity with decreased credit standing likely has difficulties 
to find the means to close-out those bonds, realization is more hypothetical than actual. 
Consistent with this view, some entities claim in the comment letters to the Discussion Paper 
– Credit Risk in Liability Measurement that equity analysts and investors ignore OCR gains 
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and losses because OCR fluctuations do not reflect economic performance (e.g. JP Morgan 
Chase, 2009; KPMG, 2009; and UBS, 2009). Although it is difficult to prematurely close-out 
bonds—especially during economic downturns—financial institutions such as Canary Wharf, 
Bank of Ireland, and Lloyd’s of London were able to take advantage of deteriorated financial 
liabilities by retiring outstanding debt early at a significant discount during the financial crisis 
(Guider, 2009; Steiner, 2009; and Essen, 2009).  
Proponents argue that consideration of changes in financial liabilities due to changes in a 
company’s own credit risk is consistent with the initial measurement of financial liabilities, 
i.e., promised future proceeds are discounted by a rate that reflects the probability that 
borrowers will fail to pay (some of) the proceeds. Thus, OCR gains and losses convey 
information regarding the effective interest rate of debt and loan agreements, about 
refinancing requirements, and hedging costs (CFA Institute, 2009). In addition, the so-called 
counterintuitive effect of changes in credit risk on net income reflects the wealth transfer 
between debtholders and shareholders, i.e., the indirect effect in the Merton’s model that 
attenuates the direct effect on the asset side (if measured at fair value) (Merton, 1974). 
Overall, proponents emphasize investors’ need to assess asset, liability, and earnings quality 
for gains rooted in credit deterioration, allowing them to understand signals given by credit 
markets about an entity’s future creditworthiness (CFA Institute, 2009). 
Both opponents and proponents argue that changes in credit quality do not happen in a 
vacuum but signal a change in the value of the asset-side and that accounting mismatches 
should be reduced to a minimum. Opponents argue that accounting mismatches occur because 
assets may not be measured on a current basis (e.g. tangible assets, intangible assets, and 
goodwill) or may be unrecognized on the balance sheet (e.g. unrecognized intangible assets 
such as employee skills or internally generated brands) (Cedergren, Chen, and Chen, 2015). 
Proponents emphasize that the accounting mismatch can be amplified if assets are measured 
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at fair value and financial liabilities are not. HSBC (2009) highlights that one of the main 
reasons for the use of FVOL is to reduce accounting mismatches that arise due to the complex 
and restrictive rules of hedge accounting. Ultimately, the severity of the accounting mismatch 
depends on whether the measurement approach used for the affected assets corresponds with 
the measurement of the financial liabilities.17  
We examine whether recognized OCR gains and losses are reflected in stock-based 
measures and, in turn, whether OCR gains and losses yield useful information to investors. 
The relation between OCR gains and losses and stock-based measures is ex-ante unclear. If 
the information is not useful or if OCR estimates are too noisy, we expect coefficients for 
OCR gains and losses to be close to zero (i.e., insignificant).18 If, however, investors interpret 
OCR gains and losses as a normal component of trading income, we expect OCR gains and 
losses to be positively associated with stock prices and stock returns. On the contrary, if OCR 
gains and losses reflect changes in the entity-wide credit risk (i.e., the asset-side effect of 
changes in credit risk dominates the liability-side effect), we expect OCR gains and losses to 
be negatively associated with stock prices and stock returns.  
Regardless whether OCR gains and losses are positively or negatively associated with 
stock returns and stock prices, we expect volatility in OCR gains and losses to be positively 
associated with stock-based risk measures (i.e., risk relevant), as volatility in OCR gains and 
losses captures bank’s exposure to credit risk. To the extent that we find OCR gains and 
losses to be risk relevant, this finding also supports the interpretation that OCR information is 
useful for investors.  
 
                                                          
17 See IASB (2009) for a more detailed discussion about the controversies surrounding OCR.  
18 For example, Dong, Doukakis, and Ryan (2016) predict and find that banks measure their OCR adjustments 
with discretion.  
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2.3. Research Design 
To examine investors’ perception of OCR gains and losses, and in turn, whether such 
information is useful, we analyze the association between OCR gains and losses and capital-
market outcomes. This approach assumes that capital markets are reasonably efficient, so that 
they can process financial statement information among other information into a single share 
price (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). Under this assumption, we should be able to detect 
whether OCR gains and losses are useful in equity valuation models. 
Because there is no clear-cut choice for an empirical model, we use different research 
methodologies. We use return-relevance, value-relevance, and risk-relevance methodology to 
analyze whether OCR gains and losses are reflected in stock returns, in market value of 
equity, and in different stock-based risk measures, respectively. We use both return relevance 
and value relevance as both approaches have their advantages—return relevance is more 
subjective to measurement error (e.g., Bhat and Ryan 2015), whereas value relevance is more 
prone to omitted variable bias (e.g., Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 2001 and Holthausen and 
Watts, 2001). Our risk-relevance tests complement the return- and value-relevance tests, 
providing more insights on whether OCR information is useful.  
 
2.3.1. Return relevance 
We start by examining the return relevance of OCR gains and losses. We closely follow 
Bhat and Ryan (2015), regressing share returns for the 12 months ending three months after 
the fiscal year end (RET) on net income (NI), other comprehensive income (OCI), and control 
variables.19 We then disaggregate total net income into OCR gains and losses (OCRGL) and 
net income excluding OCR gains and losses (NIBOCR) (see Eq. (2.1)):  
 
                                                          
19 In contrast to Bhat and Ryan (2015) we use share prices three months (rather than four months) after the 
reporting date because first quarter earnings announcements may already be available to investors in the fourth 
month. However, when we use share prices four months after the reporting date, the results do not change.  
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RETi,t = β0 + β1NIBOCRi,t + β2OCRGLi,t + β3OCIi,t + ∑  𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑=1 γdControlsd,i,t + εi,t. (2.1) 
 
Subscript i and t denote a bank (i) in a given year (t) between 2006 and 2015. Because 
other comprehensive income (OCI) is unavailable in Datastream, we calculate other 
comprehensive income as comprehensive income minus net income.20 We use control 
variables for differences in bank characteristics (SIZE, LEV, and MTB) and differences in the 
market risk across time (VIX). SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is total 
liabilities divided by total assets; MTB is market value of equity divided by the book value of 
equity; and VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange S&P 500 Volatility Index at each 
calendar year end. 
We scale all regressor variables (right-hand-side variables) in Eq. (2.1) except the control 
variables by beginning-of-year market value of equity (three months after the fiscal year 
begins), and we express all amounts in U.S. Dollars. To mitigate the effects of outliers, we 
winsorize all variables at the 0.5% and 99.5% level, respectively (Bhat and Ryan, 2015). As 
we use panel data consisting of bank-year observations, we consistently use 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by bank throughout this paper (Froot, 1989 
and Rogers, 1993). All our regressions include country-fixed and year-fixed effects to control 
for systematic differences across countries and years, respectively (Petersen, 2009).  
 
2.3.2. Value relevance 
Following prior related research (e.g., Barth and Clinch, 1998; Landsman, Peasnell, and 
Shakespeare 2008; and Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas, 2017), our second set of tests 
investigates the value relevance of reported balance sheet items and net income positions. 
More specifically, we regress market value of equity three month after the financial year end 
                                                          
20 Comprehensive income is approximated by the change in equity from year t-1 to year t plus cash dividends 
paid in year t plus decreases in outstanding common and preferred stock in year t minus the amount received 
from the sale of common and preferred stock in year t.  
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(P) on assets, liabilities, and net income. To examine whether own credit risk is reflected in 
the market value of equity, we then disaggregate net income into OCR gains and losses 
(OCRGL) and net income excluding OCR gains and losses (NIBOCR) (see Eq. (2.2)):  
Pi,t = β0 + β1 HFTAi,t + β2 FVOAi,t + β3 AFSi,t + β4 OAi,t + β5 HFTLi,t +  
β6 FVOLi,t + β7 OLi,t + β8 NIBOCRi,t + β9 OCRGLi,t + εi,t. (2.2) 
 
We split assets and liabilities into different categories of financial instruments. HFTA 
(HFTL) are held-for-trading assets (liabilities) plus other derivative assets (liabilities). FVOA 
(FVOL) and AFS are fair-value-option assets (liabilities) and available-for-sale assets, 
respectively. OA (OL) are financial assets (liabilities) at amortized cost as well as non-
financial assets (liabilities). We scale all variables by the number of common shares 
outstanding, and we express all amounts in U.S. Dollars.  
Following Landsman, Peasnell, and Shakespeare (2008) we measure the market value of 
equity and the number of common shares outstanding three months after the financial year 
end. The regressor variables are all measured at the financial year end. Accordingly, we 
assume that investors process the information in the annual reports within three months after 
the financial year end. To avoid biased results due to extreme outliers, we follow Belsley, 
Kuh, and Welsch (1980) and Fox (1991), eliminating observations that have absolute value of 
studentized residuals greater than 2 (e.g., Song, Thomas, and Yi, 2010 and Fiechter and 
Novotny-Farkas, 2017).   
 
2.3.3. Risk relevance 
For the risk-relevance analysis, we closely follow Hodder, Hopkins, and Wahlen (2006), 
regressing stock-based risk measures (SMRs) on income-volatility measures. We use three 
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SMRs: total volatility in stock returns (σ(RET)), market model beta (MM_Beta), and the 
absolute values of long-term interest-rate betas (LT_IR_Beta) (see Eq. (2.3)).    
 
SMRi,t = β0 + β1σ(NIBOCR)i,t + β2 σ(OCRGL)i,t + β3 σ(OCI)i,t + 
∑  𝐷𝐷𝑑𝑑=1 γdControlsd,i,t + εi,t. (2.3) 
 
We adopt a five-year measurement period to allow income volatility and SMRs to vary 
over time, relaxing the restriction that risk is stationary for each bank over the 10 sample 
years. To proxy for total market-equity risk, we first compute for each bank the standard 
deviation of raw returns over each of the six 60-month periods ending with the last month of 
each year from 2010 to 2015. Second, we compute for each bank a market-model beta as a 
proxy for market-model risk (Hodder, Hopkins, and Wahlen, 2006). We estimate market-
model betas by regressing bank stock returns on a market-wide index of value-weighted 
returns over each of the six 60-month periods ending with the last month of each year 2010–
2015.21 Third, we estimate interest-rate risk by regressing bank stock returns on monthly 
changes in long-term government bond yields over each of the six 60-month periods ending 
with the last month of each year from 2010 to 2015 (Flannery and James, 1984). If a bank has 
a net fixed-rate asset exposure (net fixed-rate liability exposure) to interest-rate changes, then 
the bank’s share returns should be negatively (positively) associated with changes in interest 
rates, in turn leading to more negative (more positive) interest-rate betas. Hence we calculate 
the absolute value of the interest-rate beta to capture the exposure to interest-rate risk.  
For our income volatility measures, we first separate comprehensive income into other 
comprehensive income, net income excluding OCR gains and losses, and OCR gains and 
losses. Second, we calculate the standard deviations of all three comprehensive income 
                                                          
21 We use the MSCI value-weighted index for our analysis. However, repeating our analysis using the FTSE 
value-weighted index does not alter the results.  
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components over each of the six 60-month periods ending with the last month of each year 
from 2010 to 2015. As in the returns-relevance tests (see Eq. (2.1)), we use control variables 
for differences in bank characteristics (SIZE, LEV, and MTB) and differences in the market 
risk across time (VIX).  
For this analysis, we scale all regressor variables except the control variables by 
beginning-of-year market value of equity and express all amounts in U.S. Dollars. To mitigate 
the effects of outliers, we winsorize all continuous model variables at the 0.5% and 99.5% 
levels of their distributions. 
 
 
2.4. Sample Selection and Summary Statistics 
2.4.1. Sample Selection Process 
The sample selection process is outlined in Table 2.1. We begin our sample selection 
process by extracting all banks that are in the Bankscope database as of February 2016 
(22,666). We restrict our sample to consolidated groups (-18,856) that comply with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (-2,945); are active at the time of the data 
collection (-39); are listed on a stock exchange (-308); and for which we find the ISIN code, 
the market value of equity, and the number of common shares outstanding in at least one year 
between 2006 and 2015 (-229). We complement our sample with consolidated bank groups 
that only appear on Datastream (+377). Again, we restrict the data in Datastream to groups 
that comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (-252) and for which we find 
the ISIN code, the market value of equity, and the number of common shares outstanding in at 
least one year between 2006 and 2015 (-46).22  
                                                          
22 We use the term “banks” to denote bank holding companies. 
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This procedure yields 368 unique banks (3,680 bank-year observations from 2006 to 
2015) before data collection on OCR gains and losses. We drop bank-year observations if 
financial statements are not publicly available (-758); if financial statements are not in 
English, German, or French (-178); if financial statements are (in fact) not in accordance with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (-257); if bank-years exhibit negative book value 
of equity (-8); and if we have missing data in the return-relevance models (i.e., R, NI, OCI, 
SIZE, LEV, MTB, or VIX) (-181). This procedure yields a base sample of 2,298 bank-year 
observations from 44 countries for the return-relevance tests. For our value-relevance models, 
we use a reduced sample of 2,243 observations, because we drop all observations with 
absolute values of studentized residuals larger than 2 (e.g. Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch, 1980 
and Fox, 1991). For our risk-relevance models, we use rolling averages over six 60-month 
periods instead of annual data, resulting in a sample of 1,208 observations. 
 
2.4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.2 shows summary statistics of all variables used in our main regressions. Return-
relevance and value-relevance variables are measured at the year level, whereas risk-
relevance variables are averaged over a 60-month period. The average bank is highly 
leveraged (mean value of 0.83 in the return-relevance model), which is a common feature for 
financial institutions. Consistent with prior literature, HFTA and AFS are the two major types 
of bank assets measured at fair value (e.g. Xie, 2016 and Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas, 2017). 
The amount of HFTA is relatively large because it combines held-for-trading assets with 
derivative assets held for trading and derivative assets held for hedging. We lose some 
observations in our risk-relevance models regarding the long-term interest-rate beta 
(LT_IR_Beta) due to missing country-level data.  
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Table 2.3, Panel A reports bank-years with non-zero OCR gains and losses by country in 
million U.S. Dollars (column A) and scaled with market value of equity (column B). Non-
zero OCR gains and losses are concentrated within Europe with the exception of Australia, 
Canada, Republic of Korea, and South Africa. Panel A further reveals that most non-zero 
OCR observations are from Italy.23 While mean and median OCR gains and losses scaled 
with market value of equity are close to zero, they can substantially differ within and across 
countries.  
Table 2.3, Panel B reports OCR gains and losses by sample year. OCR gains spiked 
during the financial crisis in 2008 and the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011. Both years 
are followed by an inverse OCR trend, leading to large OCR losses in 2009 and 2012. 
Periodical OCR gains and losses range from -7.517bn (Min.) in 2012 to 6.57bn in 2008 
(Max.). 
 
 
2.5. Empirical Results 
2.5.1. Return Relevance 
Table 2.4 reports regression results of Eq. (2.1). To link prior research and to establish a 
benchmark for our main results, column (1) provides regression results of RET on NI, OCI, 
country-fixed and year-fixed effects. Column (2) introduces our variable of interest, OCRGL, 
into the benchmark model. In column (3), we complement our main regression with control 
variables that should capture differences in bank characteristics (SIZE, LEV, and MTB) and 
differences in the market risk across years (VIX). To benchmark OCR gains and losses against 
another income component, we separate in column (4) interest income (INTEREST) from 
NIBOCR. Because interests are an important and stable source of income for banks, we 
                                                          
23 Note that Italian banks prepare highly standardized financial statement notes including a standardized table 
“financial liabilities designated at fair value: breakdown”, which includes information on own credit risk. This 
might foster clear disclosure of OCR results.   
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predict that markets perceive interests as a “normal” income component, and thus we predict a 
positive correlation between INTEREST and R. In column (5), we use a subsample of banks 
with non-zero FVOL, thereby mitigating concerns that the coefficient estimates for OCRGL 
are mainly driven by banks that do not apply the fair value option on liabilities. 
In the benchmark model reported in column (1), the R2 of 41.3% is close to that in Bhat 
and Ryan (2015) of 41.8%. The high R2 is largely due to substantial banking-wide 
performance variation across years, which is captured by the year-fixed effects. The 
coefficients for NI and OCI of 0.059 and 0.043, respectively, are significantly positive at the 
1% level, but substantially lower than one, suggesting considerable noise in these variables.24  
In column (2), the coefficient for the test variable OCRGL of -2.725 is significantly 
negative at the 1% level, suggesting that investors perceive OCR gains (losses) as a negative 
(positive) signal for banks’ economic performance. This result is consistent with the notion 
that investors do not perceive OCR gains and losses as a “normal” component of income. 
Rather, OCR gains and losses reflect changes in the entity-wide credit risk (i.e., the asset-side 
effect dominates the liability-side effect). The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that the 
effect is substantial and that overall changes in an entity’s credit risk is a crucial component of 
bank’s economic performance.  
Including the control variables in column (3) does not alter our findings. In addition, all 
control variables have the expected sign. The positive and significant coefficient for 
INTEREST in column (4) is consistent with investors perceiving interests as a normal income 
component—in contrast to the OCR gains and losses—which increases confidence in our 
inferences. The analysis in column (5) shows that the coefficient for OCRGL remains very 
                                                          
24 Winsorizing the two variables at the 5% (10%) [25%] level rather than at the 0.5% level shows that the 
magnitude of the variables NI and OCI increases to 0.979 (1.743) [3.486] and 0.186 (0.209) [0.548], 
respectively. All variables remain significantly positive at the 1% level. This result indicates that NI is a 
permanent component for non-extreme observations whereas OCI remains a transitory component across all 
levels. However, winsorizing at these higher levels substantially reduces the variation of OCRGL to an extent 
at which we no longer can draw meaningful inferences about the market perception of OCR gains and losses.   
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similar for the subsample of bank-years with non-zero FVOL. Hence the inclusion of bank-
years that do not use the fair value option seem not to drive our results. Across all model 
specifications in column (2) to (5), the coefficients on OCRGL remain in a range between -2 
and -3 and significant at the 1% level.  
 
2.5.2. Value Relevance 
Table 2.5 reports estimation of Eq. (2.2) in column (2). We use the value-relevance 
model to test whether and how OCR gains and losses are reflected in stock prices. Again, to 
link prior research and to establish a benchmark for our main results, we regress stock prices 
on reported balance sheet values in column (1). The coefficient estimates all have the 
expected sign, i.e., positive for asset positions and net income and negative for liability 
positions. All asset fair value positions (HFTA, FVOA, and AFS) are not significantly 
different from the theoretical value of 1 (untabulated F-stat = 0.33, 0.06, and 0.52, 
respectively) and all liability fair value positions (untabulated HFTL and FVOL) are not 
significantly different from the theoretical value of -1 (F-stat = 0.06 and 0.16, respectively). 
Overall, the estimation coefficients are close to those in Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2017) 
except for the coefficient estimates for FVOA (1.064 compared to 0.709).25  
In column (2), we distinguish between OCR gains and losses (OCRGL) and net income 
excluding OCR gains and losses (NIBOCR). Regression results show that both NIBOCR and 
OCRGL are significantly different from zero (t-stats = 2.15 and -2.19, respectively). The 
negative coefficient of -8.599 for OCRGL is in line with our return-relevance findings, 
suggesting that OCR gains (losses) is a negative (positive) sign for the economic 
performance. We interpret this finding as evidence that OCR gains and losses reflect changes 
                                                          
25 The difference between our findings and the findings in Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2017) related to FVOA 
are likely because of different sample periods: we use a sample period from 2006 to 2015, whereas Fiechter 
and Novotny-Farkas (2017) use a shorter period (2006–2009). In addition, Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2017) 
argue that fair value experience improves the value relevance of FVO assets, which is consistent with our 
finding.  
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in the entity-wide credit risk, i.e., the asset-side effect of changes in credit risk dominates the 
liability-side effect. 
 
2.5.3. Risk Relevance 
Table 2.6 reports estimation of Eq. (2.3), testing the association between stock-based risk 
measures and the variation in OCR gains and losses. First, we separately regress return 
volatility (σ(RET)) on volatility of net income excluding the effect of own credit risk 
(σ(NIBOCR)) in column (1), on volatility of OCI (σ(OCI)) in column (2), and on volatility of 
OCR gains and losses (σ(OCRGL)) in column (3), respectively. In all specifications, we 
include control variables that should capture differences in bank characteristics (SIZE, LEV, 
and MTB) and differences in the market risk across years (VIX).  
Column (4) combines the three explanatory variables from the first three columns. 
Regression results show a positive relation between stock-return volatility and volatility of 
OCR gains and losses (σ(OCRGL)), significant at the 5% level. In column (3), the magnitude 
of the coefficient for the test variable (σ(OCRGL)) of 0.222 is larger than the coefficient for 
σ(NIBOCR) in column (1). In column (4), we find that σ(OCRGL) remains significant (t-stats 
= 2.01) and relatively stable across columns (3) and (4): 0.222 and 0.229, respectively. This 
finding suggests that OCR gains and losses are risk relevant.  
We repeat the regression in column (5) by using MM_Beta as our dependent variable. 
Similar to Hodder, Hopkins, and Wahlen (2006), our results do not support reliable inference 
that any of the three comprehensive-income-volatility measures are associated with 
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MM_Beta. In column (6), we use LT_IR_Beta as dependent variable. The regression 
coefficient for σ(OCRGL) of 0.810 is only marginally significant (t-stat = 1.57).26 
 
 
2.6. Additional Analysis 
2.6.1. Institutional Differences in OCR Information Processing 
Prior experimental literature argues that financial statement users are likely to 
misinterpret OCR gains (losses) as a signal that an entity’s credit risk is improving 
(deteriorating) (Gaynor, McDaniel, and Yohn, 2011; Lachmann, Wöhrmann, and Wömpener, 
2011; and Lachmann, Stefani, and Wöhrmann, 2015). In addition, Gaynor, McDaniel, and 
Yohn (2011) find that enhanced disclosure improves processing of OCR information. 
Therefore, we test whether the association between OCR gains and losses and our stock-based 
measures varies with different institutional factors, such as investor sophistication or the 
information environment. We create three indicator variables that proxy for different 
institutional factors: First, we create a variable HIGH_ANACOV equal to 1 if an entity with 
non-zero OCR gains and losses has above median analyst coverage, and 0 otherwise. Second, 
we follow Beck and Levine (2002) and Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas (2017) and create a 
variable MARKET_BASED equal to 1 if an entity operates in a market-based economy, and 0 
if it operates in a bank-based economy. Third, we create a variable IO equal to 1 if an entity 
with non-zero OCR gains and losses has above median percentage of institutional investors, 
and 0 otherwise. We then interact all three variables with our main variable OCRGL.  
                                                          
26 In contrast to Hodder, Hopkins, and Wahlen (2006), our regression includes control variables for SIZE, LEV, 
MTB, and VIX; country-fixed effects; year-fixed effects; and standard errors clustered by firms. However, we 
do not control for total exposure arising from derivatives held (EXP) and absolute value of the excess of fixed-
rate assets over fixed-rate liabilities subject to repricing within one year (GAP) due to missing data availability. 
Removing our control variables from the model results in a significant σ(OCRGL) of 0.978 (t-stat = 1.95). 
Removing the fixed-effects increases the significance of σ(OCRGL) even further (t-stat = 3.09), which is more 
consistent with the findings of Hodder, Hopkins, and Wahlen (2006). 
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Table 2.7 shows the baseline return-relevance result in column (1) and all three 
extensions with the three institutional variables. We find that all interaction terms 
(OCRGL*institutional factors) are not statistically significant from zero and that the main 
variable OCRGL remains significantly negative. This finding suggests that different levels of 
investor sophistication and/or different information environments do not alter the information 
processing of OCR gains and losses. These results mitigate concerns that investors 
systematically misinterpret OCR gains and losses. Untabulated findings also reveal that 
investor sophistication does neither affect the value-relevance nor the risk-relevance results.  
 
2.6.2. Asset Write-Downs due to Changes in Credit Risk 
To bolster our interpretation that OCR gains and losses are linked to and dominated by 
credit risk changes on the asset-side, we compare OCR gains and losses with asset-write 
downs induced by changes in credit risk. We use loan losses (WC01273) and changes in loan 
loss provisions (WC01271) as proxies for credit-related asset write-downs.27 To investigate 
whether asset-side losses (gains) are linked with liability-side gains (losses), we first 
investigate correlations between OCR gains and losses and credit-related asset write-downs. 
Second, to test whether asset-side losses (gains) dominate liability-side gains (losses), we 
compare the magnitude of OCR gains and losses with that of credit-related asset write-downs. 
We find that OCR gains and losses are positively correlated with loan losses (0.110) and 
changes in loan loss provisions (0.188), respectively, with correlation coefficients being 
significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that banks reporting OCR gains also increase 
their loan loss provisions and report higher loan losses. In addition, net income excluding 
OCR gains and losses is significantly and negatively correlated with OCR gains and losses (-
0.127), loan losses (-0.165), and changes in loan loss provisions (-0.104), respectively. This 
                                                          
27 We retrieve loan losses and changes in loan loss provisions from Datastream. Due to missing values, our 
sample is reduced to 918 observations. We scale all variables by beginning-of-year market value of equity. 
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result suggests that OCR gains (losses) are associated with weaker (better) economic 
performance.  
Second, untabulated summary statistics reveal that mean (median) loan losses of 5.52% 
(2.24%) and changes in loan loss provisions of 1.66% (0.14%) dominate OCR gains and 
losses of 0.12% (0.00%). In addition, the upper (lower) 5 percentile reveals that large OCR 
gains (losses) of 0.97% (-0.62%) are dominated by even larger changes in loan loss provisions 
of 12.93% (-7.65%) and loan losses of 22.81% (0.05%), respectively.28  
Overall, these additional analyses support our inferences that OCR gains and losses on 
the liability-side are linked to and dominated by changes on the asset-side. This finding 
further suggests that OCR gains and losses should not be interpreted in “isolation”. 
Interpreting OCR gains and losses on the liability side together with credit-related changes on 
the asset side is no longer “counterintuitive”, but rather reflects entity-wide changes in credit 
risk. 
 
2.6.3. Leverage 
Barth, Hodder, and Stubben (2008) find that 27 percent of the downgraded firms 
recognize asset write downs that are smaller than unrecognized gains from decreases in debt 
value. We presume that such a result is most likely to occur for highly leveraged banks. 
Hence we investigate whether the association between OCR gains and losses and stock 
returns varies with leverage. We create three indicator variables for different percentiles of 
leverage (i.e., p25, p50, and p75). We then interact all three indicator variables with our main 
variable OCRGL.  
While none of the untabulated interaction terms is significantly different from zero, the 
coefficients for OCRGL remain significantly negative at the 1% level. This finding does not 
                                                          
28 Note that loan losses, by definition, cannot be negative. Therefore, the minimum for loan losses is 0.00%. 
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suggest that the negative association between OCR gains and losses and stock returns 
becomes positive at different levels of leverage. We, however, note that the median leverage 
of our sample bank is relatively high (0.91) and even higher for the subsample of banks with 
non-zero OCR gains and losses (0.94). Therefore, our findings might not be generalizable to 
non-financial firms. 
2.7. Conclusion 
Against the backdrop of the intense debate on whether and how OCR gains and losses 
should be reflected in the value of FVOL, a better understanding of the usefulness of OCR 
gains and losses is important for several reasons: First, understanding the relation between 
OCR gains and losses and stock-based measures can help guide future standard setting. 
Second, as banks have high leverage compared to non-financial firms, small fluctuations in 
the amount of liabilities may strongly impact comprehensive income and book value of 
equity. Third, banks are highly exposed to credit risk due to their business model. 
Counterparty credit risk translates, amongst other factors, directly into bank’s own credit risk. 
Hence the assessment of entity’s risk exposure is crucial to understand asset, liability, and 
earnings fluctuations rooted in credit risk fluctuations.  
Using a global sample of IFRS banks, we investigate whether OCR gains and losses are 
reflected in stock-based measures such as stock prices, stock returns, and stock-based risk 
measures from 2006 to 2015. We find that OCR gains and losses are negatively associated 
with stock returns and stock prices, respectively, indicating that the market perceives OCR 
gains (losses) as a negative (positive) signal for the bank’s (future) economic performance. In 
addition, we find that the volatility in OCR gains and losses is positively associated with 
stock-based risk measures, i.e., OCR gains and losses are risk relevant. These results are in 
line with the notion that OCR gains and losses reflect the entity-wide change in credit risk, 
i.e., the asset-side effect of changes in credit risk dominates the liability-side effect.  
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We acknowledge that our results should be interpreted with some caveats in mind. First, 
because we focus on banks, which are highly exposed to credit risk, results may not be 
generalizable to non-financial institutions. Second, the low frequency with which banks 
choose the fair value option for financial liabilities and the even lower frequency of banks that 
disclose OCR gains and losses may also limit the results’ generalizability.  
Despite these limitations, this study makes several contributions to the literature. First, we 
show that OCR gains and losses are reflected in stock-based measures. Second, we provide 
empirical evidence that OCR gains and losses are not counterintuitive when considered 
together with asset-side changes in credit risk. Third, we mitigate concerns that investors 
systematically misinterpret OCR gains and losses when assessing an entities economic 
performance.  
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Tables 
Table 2.1: Sample Selection Process 
 
Change Remaining
All banks in Bankscope 22,666
Ultimate owners only -18,856 3,810
Accounting standard: IFRS and IAS -2,945 865
Active banks only -39 826
Listed banks only -308 518
ISIN, MV and CSO available from 2006 to 2015 -229 289
Additional active listed banks in Datastream +377 666
Accounting standard: IFRS and IAS -252 414
ISIN, MV and CSO available from 2006 to 2015 -46 368
Banks before OCR data collection 368
Start (Firm-year observations) 3,680
Financial statements publicly available -758 2,922
Financial statements not in English, German, or French -178 2,744
Financial statement not in accordance with IFRS or equivalent -257 2,487
Negative equity -8 2,479
Missing data in the return-relevance models -181 2,298
Base sample 2,298
Sample for return relevance (winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5%) 0 2,298
Sample for value relevance (elimination of absolute value of studentized residuals >2) -55 2,243
Sample for risk relevance (winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5%; rolling averages over 60-months) -1,090 1,208
This table presents the sample selection process. We begin our sample selection process by extracting all banks that are in the 
Bankscope database as of February 2016 (22,666). We restrict our sample to consolidated groups (-18,856) that comply with 
International Financial Reporting Standards (-2,945); are active at the time of the data collection (-39); are listed on a stock exchange 
(-308); and for which we find the ISIN code, the market value of equity, and the number of common shares outstanding in at least one 
year between 2006 and 2015 (-229). We complement our sample with consolidated bank groups that only appear on Datastream 
(+377). Again, we restrict the data in Datastream to groups that comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (-252) and 
for which we find the ISIN code, the market value of equity, and the number of common shares outstanding in at least one year 
between 2006 and 2015 (-46). This procedure yields 368 unique banks. 
For each bank we gather data from 2006 until 2015 leading to 3,680 bank-year observations. We lose some bank-year observations if 
financial statements are not publicly available (-758); if financial statements are not in English, German, or French (-178); if 
financial statements are (in fact) not in accordance with IFRS or equivalent accounting standards (-257); if bank-years exhibit 
negative book value of equity (-8); and if we have missing data in the return-relevance models (-181). Eventually, this procedure 
yields a base sample of 2,298 bank-year observations. For our value relevance models, we use a reduced sample of 2,243 
observations, because we drop all observations with absolute values of studentized residuals larger than 2. For our risk relevance 
models, we use rolling averages over six 60-month periods instead of annual data, resulting in a sample of 1,208 observations. 
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max
Return relevance
RET 2298 0.05 0.51 -0.99 -0.22 -0.02 0.22 3.96
NI 2298 0.15 1.09 -3.60 0.05 0.09 0.13 15.12
NIBOCR 2298 0.15 1.10 -3.60 0.05 0.09 0.13 15.12
NIBOCRBINT 2298 -0.71 2.43 -27.93 -0.69 -0.27 -0.04 8.05
INTEREST 2298 0.77 2.12 0.00 0.06 0.33 0.74 27.53
OCRGL 2298 0.00 0.01 -0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
OCI 2298 -0.13 1.54 -20.49 -0.07 0.00 0.05 1.56
SIZE 2298 9.94 2.45 4.07 8.20 9.85 11.56 15.05
LEV 2298 0.83 0.21 0.02 0.84 0.91 0.94 0.99
MTB 2298 1.38 1.33 0.00 0.61 1.02 1.67 9.27
VIX 2298 20.38 6.89 11.56 17.75 18.21 22.50 40.00
Value relevance
P 2243 25.03 151.60 0.03 2.37 7.36 21.08 5,949.35
HFTA 2243 38.38 165.99 0.00 0.05 1.10 14.02 3,193.49
FVOA 2243 28.54 388.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.30 12,218.22
AFS 2243 37.94 579.94 0.00 0.16 2.20 15.33 27,069.75
OA 2243 349.83 3,314.25 0.04 9.70 51.52 171.33 145,241.90
HFTL 2243 26.06 125.63 0.00 0.00 0.34 7.09 2,958.37
FVOL 2243 42.03 753.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.85 28,816.35
OL 2243 356.31 3,027.31 0.00 8.77 53.36 188.36 131,077.80
NI 2243 2.86 46.60 -165.02 0.10 0.54 1.74 2,147.08
NIBOCR 2243 2.85 46.59 -165.02 0.10 0.54 1.73 2,147.08
OCR 2243 0.01 0.68 -3.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 30.11
Risk relevance
σ(R) 1208 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.39
MM_Beta 1208 0.99 0.48 0.00 0.65 0.92 1.29 2.99
LT_IR_Beta 1070 0.42 0.32 0.00 0.16 0.37 0.62 1.40
σ(NI) 1208 0.38 2.47 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.12 29.31
σ(NIBOCR) 1208 0.29 1.62 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.14 18.00
σ(OCRGL) 1208 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14
σ(OCI) 1208 0.41 2.17 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.18 25.09
SIZE 1208 9.79 2.44 3.96 7.98 9.71 11.36 14.68
LEV 1208 0.66 0.16 0.03 0.67 0.73 0.75 0.78
MTB 1208 1.07 0.95 0.00 0.50 0.82 1.30 7.24
VIX 1208 22.16 3.12 17.70 19.00 22.85 25.52 25.85
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Table 2.3: Non-Zero OCR Gains and Losses by Country and Year 
Panel A: OCR gains and losses by country
Country N Mean Std. dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max N Mean Std. dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max
Australia 30 -3.27 83.89 -204.75 -36.52 -0.27 41.14 154.61 30 0.000 0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.007
Austria 14 26.60 128.97 -190.70 -3.75 4.45 61.92 322.58 14 0.004 0.021 -0.029 -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.049
Belgium 7 -34.51 461.31 -934.74 -85.43 18.47 71.10 628.30 7 0.001 0.040 -0.069 -0.003 0.001 0.005 0.070
Canada 18 14.78 94.20 -68.30 -21.10 0.39 5.03 366.87 18 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005
Denmark 8 106.90 1,088.09 -1,156.91 -811.17 80.72 709.37 2,054.29 8 0.036 0.133 -0.067 -0.038 0.002 0.040 0.349
France 26 -59.82 953.59 -2,196.44 -464.07 77.81 519.38 1,544.79 26 0.006 0.046 -0.064 -0.012 0.002 0.026 0.187
Germany 19 136.71 1,427.70 -3,591.16 -84.73 26.32 280.82 4,688.63 19 0.008 0.050 -0.075 -0.004 0.001 0.012 0.184
Greece 13 18.30 183.54 -325.19 -20.68 -4.73 21.73 382.21 13 -0.027 0.122 -0.403 -0.022 -0.002 0.008 0.101
Ireland 9 8.76 236.21 -391.56 -12.10 11.95 72.70 482.96 9 0.029 0.102 -0.066 -0.004 0.001 0.015 0.292
Italy 75 9.68 174.38 -626.29 -9.60 -0.32 26.87 602.58 75 0.006 0.063 -0.281 -0.003 0.000 0.006 0.355
Korea, Rep. 12 1.40 5.52 -8.19 -0.52 -0.10 4.12 13.31 12 -0.001 0.005 -0.015 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
Netherlands 20 0.25 242.89 -489.40 -33.40 -1.05 2.09 834.54 20 0.000 0.012 -0.020 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.031
Norway 15 11.29 47.14 -47.60 -1.28 2.58 7.23 171.83 15 0.024 0.321 -0.689 -0.007 0.000 0.030 0.986
Portugal 17 8.46 88.28 -152.21 -32.75 -4.85 66.08 167.33 17 0.005 0.024 -0.032 -0.011 -0.001 0.023 0.056
South Africa 23 1.81 14.71 -37.32 -2.41 1.53 8.16 48.82 23 0.000 0.002 -0.009 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005
Sweden 22 6.14 259.46 -874.69 -12.05 0.37 9.61 734.59 22 0.000 0.006 -0.020 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.018
Switzerland 18 -16.75 1,006.92 -2,405.64 -162.03 -6.96 293.87 1,909.15 18 0.006 0.056 -0.084 -0.009 -0.003 0.010 0.167
United Kingdom 49 -100.24 2,449.31 -7,516.57 -88.37 15.93 457.91 6,570.00 49 -0.001 0.056 -0.294 -0.006 0.000 0.008 0.134
Total 395 -3.70 984.16 -7,516.57 -23.05 0.06 63.13 6,570.00 395 0.004 0.079 -0.689 -0.003 0.000 0.005 0.986
Panel B:OCR gains and losses by year
Country N Mean Std. dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max N Mean Std. dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max
2006 10 -44.00 121.39 -388.00 -14.51 -3.19 -1.28 6.32 10 -0.002 0.005 -0.016 -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001
2007 24 229.67 431.78 -29.24 -0.63 16.08 290.73 1,619.00 24 0.005 0.009 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.035
2008 33 628.59 1,464.90 -471.54 -1.25 84.97 299.83 6,570.00 33 0.072 0.183 -0.032 0.000 0.007 0.067 0.986
2009 38 -463.62 1,316.03 -6,533.00 -204.75 -9.69 11.91 734.59 38 -0.030 0.114 -0.689 -0.022 -0.001 0.001 0.046
2010 41 39.60 295.96 -874.69 -0.32 8.16 119.40 720.09 41 0.015 0.049 -0.020 0.000 0.001 0.011 0.292
2011 42 475.14 990.98 -489.40 3.67 69.39 380.36 4,186.77 42 0.026 0.093 -0.403 0.000 0.011 0.047 0.355
2012 47 -645.00 1,719.82 -7,516.57 -437.71 -20.01 -0.29 834.54 47 -0.031 0.064 -0.294 -0.047 -0.005 0.000 0.047
2013 53 -127.62 369.71 -2,196.44 -101.00 -3.49 1.92 177.76 53 -0.004 0.011 -0.045 -0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.038
2014 52 -1.59 163.11 -406.26 -33.50 -3.09 2.05 753.86 52 -0.002 0.010 -0.034 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.049
2015 55 107.67 238.43 -177.07 -1.60 7.23 108.63 1,002.00 55 0.004 0.010 -0.015 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.040
Total 395 -3.70 984.16 -7,516.57 -23.05 0.06 63.13 6,570.00 395 0.004 0.079 -0.689 -0.003 0.000 0.005 0.986
OCR gains and losses (column A) OCR gains and losses scaled by market value of equity (column B)
OCR gains and losses (column A) OCR gains and losses scaled by market value of equity (column B)
This table reports descriptive statistics of absolute OCR gains and losses (column A) and OCR gains and losses scaled by market value of equity (column B) for bank-years with non-zero OCR gains and losses by countries (Panel A) and by years (Panel B). OCR gains and losses are expressed in million U.S. 
Dollars. 
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Table 2.4: Return Relevance of OCR Gains and Losses 
 
  
Dependent variable:
Variables
Predicted 
sign
NI + 0.059 ***
(2.76)
NIBOCR + 0.058 *** 0.058 *** 0.009
(2.79) (2.89) (0.21)
NIBOCRBINT + 0.025 ***
(4.08)
INTEREST + 0.013 ***
(2.91)
OCRGL ? -2.725 *** -2.787 *** -2.827 *** -2.243 ***
(-3.91) (-4.07) (-4.28) (-3.28)
OCI + 0.043 *** 0.043 *** 0.040 *** 0.013 *** 0.005
(3.19) (3.25) (3.14) (2.80) (0.15)
SIZE ? 0.004 0.004 -0.008
(0.86) (0.91) (-0.95)
LEV - -0.169 *** -0.150 *** 0.029
(-3.64) (-3.19) (0.23)
MTB + 0.069 *** 0.065 *** 0.071 **
(5.56) (5.37) (2.56)
VIX - -0.055 *** -0.056 *** -0.053 ***
(-7.78) (-7.90) (-7.80)
Intercept ? 0.383 *** 0.384 *** 0.936 *** 0.948 *** 0.782 ***
(4.27) (4.28) (4.49) (4.52) (3.85)
Year-fixed effets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-fixed effects No No No No No
Clustered standard errors firm firm firm firm firm
R² 0.4131 0.4168 0.4420 0.4403 0.5927
adjusted-R² 0.3989 0.4025 0.4275 0.4256 0.5686
N 2298 2298 2298 2298 859
# Firms 291 291 291 291 126
# Countries 44 44 44 44 34
# Years 10 10 10 10 10
Base
sample
Base
sample
This table reports coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, t-statistics of Eq. (2.1), which, in column (2), regresses returns for the 12 months 
ending 3 months after the fiscal year end (RET ) on net income excluding OCR gains and losses (NIBOCR ), OCR gains and losses 
(OCRGL ), and other comprehensive income (OCI ). Column (1) shows a benchmark regression of RET  on net income (NI ) and OCI.  
Colum (3) shows regression results of Eq. (2.1) controlling for bank characteristics (SIZE , LEV , and MTB ) and differences in the market 
risk across time (VIX ). In addition, column (4) separates NIBOCR  into  interest income (INTEREST ) and net income excluding own credit 
risk result and excluding interest income (NIBOCRBINT ). Column (5) shows a subsample regression of Eq. (2.1) limiting our sample to 
bank-year that exercise the fair value option for financial liabilities. SIZE  is the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV  is total liabilities 
divided by total assets; MTB  is market value of equity divided by the book value of equity; and VIX  is the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
S&P 500 Volatility Index at each calendar year end. All variables are winsorized at the 0.5% and the 99.5% levels. All variables except the 
four control variables are scaled by beginning-of-year market value of equity. All regressions include year-fixed, country-fixed effects, and 
standard errors are robust and clustered by firms. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
(two-sided). 
Base
sample
Base
sample
RET
(5)
FVOL 
users only
RET RET RET
(4)
RET
(3)(1) (2)
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Table 2.5: Value Relevance of OCR Gains and Losses 
Dependent variable:
Variables Predicted sign
HFTA + 0.856 *** 0.887 ***
(3.40) (3.14)
FVOA + 1.064 *** 1.028 ***
(4.07) (3.88)
AFS + 0.817 *** 0.794 ***
(3.22) (3.14)
OA + 0.636 *** 0.875 ***
(3.09) (3.55)
HFTL - -0.936 *** -0.950 ***
(-3.43) (-3.33)
FVOL - -0.903 *** -0.883 ***
(-3.71) (-3.57)
OL - -0.675 *** -0.877 ***
(-3.12) (-3.34)
NI + 2.162 *
(1.94)
NIBOCR + 0.814 **
(2.15)
OCRGL ? -8.599 **
(-2.19)
Intercept ? 27.860 *** 25.708 ***
(5.11) (5.29)
Year-fixed effets Yes Yes
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes
Firm-fixed effects No No
Clustered standard errors firm firm
R² 0.9387 0.8800
adjusted-R² 0.9370 0.8767
N 2243 2243
# Firms 291 291
# Countries 44 44
# Years 10 10
This table reports coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, t-statistics of Eq. (2.2) in column (2). We regresses market 
value of equity 3 months after the financial year end (P ) on assets, liabilities—both separated into different financial 
instrument categories—and net income. HFTA  (HFTL ) are held-for-trading assets (liabilities) plus other derivative 
assets (liabilities). FVOA  (FVOL ) and AFS  are fair-value-option assets (liabilities) and available-for-sale assets, 
respectively. OA  (OL ) are non-financial assets (liabilities) and financial assets (liabilities) at amortized cost. NI  is total 
net income. NIBOCR  is the net income excluding own credit risk gains and losses. OCRGL  is the own credit risk gains 
and losses. We scale all variables by the number of common shares outstanding and express all amounts in U.S. 
Dollars. To avoid bias from extreme outliers, we eliminate observations that have absolute value of studentized 
residuals greater than 2. All regressions include year-fixed and country-fixed effects, and standard errors are robust and 
clustered by firms. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-sided). 
P P
(1) (2)
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Table 2.6: Risk Relevance of OCR Gains and Losses 
  
Dependent variable:
Variables Predicted sign
σ(NIBOCR) + 0.004 ** 0.001 0.002 0.002
(2.12) (0.49) (0.18) (0.32)
σ(OCRGL) ? 0.222 ** 0.229 ** 1.594 0.810
(1.97) (2.01) (1.43) (1.57)
σ(OCI) + 0.004 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 0.004
(6.84) (4.45) (0.42) (0.93)
SIZE + 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.080 *** 0.013 **
(0.39) (0.51) (0.08) (0.06) (6.91) (2.32)
LEV + -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.271 * -0.166 *
(-0.27) (-0.35) (-0.29) (-0.36) (-1.92) (-1.89)
MTB - -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.005 ** -0.003 0.006
(-2.46) (-2.37) (-2.53) (-2.19) (-0.20) (0.67)
VIX + 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** -0.010 0.050 ***
(6.65) (6.96) (6.60) (6.89) (-1.62) (9.11)
Intercept ? -0.006 -0.009 0.000 -0.002 0.499 *** -0.622 ***
(-0.28) (-0.42) (0.01) (-0.09) (2.97) (-5.25)
Year-fixed effets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-fixed effects No No No No No No
Clustered standard errors firm firm firm firm firm firm
R² 0.5518 0.5593 0.5455 0.5656 0.6337 0.5245
adjusted-R² 0.5320 0.5399 0.5254 0.5456 0.6169 0.5046
N 1208 1208 1208 1208 1208 1070
# Firms 252 252 252 252 252 222
# Countries 43 43 43 43 43 33
# Years 6 6 6 6 6 6
This table reports coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, t-statistics of Eq. (2.3) in different specifications. We regresses one of three stock-market-based risk measures (SMR) on income 
volatility measures and control variables. We use standard deviation of raw returns (σ(RET) ); market model beta (MM_Beta ); and the absolute value of long-term interest rate betas (LT_IR_Beta ) 
as our stock-market-based risk measures. All three risk measures are calculated over each of the six 60-month periods ending with the last month of each year 2010–2015. For our income volatility 
measures we, first, separate comprehensive income into other comprehensive income, net income excluding periodical OCR results, and periodical OCR results. Second, we calculate the standard 
deviation of all three comprehensive income components over each of the six 60-month periods ending with the last month of each year 2010–2015 (σ(NIBOCR) , σ(OCRGL)  and σ(OCI) ).  We use 
control variables for differences in bank characteristics (SIZE , LEV , and MTB ) and differences in the market risk across time (VIX ). SIZE  is the natural logarithm of total assets; LEV  is total 
liabilities divided by total assets; MTB  is market value of equity divided by the book value of equity; and VIX  is the Chicago Board Options Exchange S&P 500 Volatility Index at each calendar 
year end. All variables are winsorized at the 0.5% and the 99.5% levels of their distribution. All income volatility variables are scaled by beginning-of-year market value of equity. All regressions 
include year-fixed and country-fixed effects, and standard errors are robust and clustered by firms. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-
sided). 
σ(RET) MM_Beta LT_IR_Beta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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Table 2.7: Return Relevance and Institutional Factors 
 
  
Dependent variable:
Variables Predicted sign
NIBOCR + 0.058 *** 0.058 *** 0.058 *** 0.057 ***
(2.89) (2.89) (2.89) (2.85)
OCRGL ? -2.787 *** -2.324 ** -2.977 *** -2.568 ***
(-4.07) (-1.98) (-3.29) (-3.45)
HIGH_ANACOV ? -0.028 *
(-1.66)
HIGH_ANACOV*OCRGL ? -0.782
(-0.56)
MARKET_BASED ? 0.108
(1.57)
MARKET_BASED*OCRGL ? 0.542
(0.44)
IO ? -0.032 *
(-1.73)
IO * OCRGL ? -1.081
(-0.73)
OCI + 0.040 *** 0.039 *** 0.040 *** 0.040 ***
(3.14) (3.13) (3.14) (3.08)
SIZE ? 0.004 0.007 0.004 0.004
(0.86) (1.28) (0.86) (0.75)
LEV - -0.169 *** -0.183 *** -0.169 *** -0.165 ***
(-3.64) (-4.03) (-3.63) (-3.53)
MTB + 0.069 *** 0.069 *** 0.069 *** 0.069 ***
(5.56) (5.61) (5.56) (5.56)
VIX - -0.055 *** -0.054 *** -0.055 *** -0.055 ***
(-7.78) (-7.46) (-7.77) (-7.74)
Intercept ? 0.936 *** 0.914 *** 0.828 *** 0.935 ***
(4.49) (4.28) (4.81) (4.50)
Year-fixed effets Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-fixed effects No No No No
Clustered standard errors firm firm firm firm
R² 0.4420 0.4425 0.4420 0.4426
adjusted-R² 0.4275 0.4275 0.4273 0.4277
N 2298 2298 2298 2298
# Firms 291 291 291 291
# Countries 44 44 44 44
# Years 10 10 10 10
This table reports coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, t-statistics of an extended version of Eq. (2.1), which regresses returns for the 12-month period ending 3 months after 
the fiscal year end (RET ) on net income excluding own credit risk gains and losses (NIBOCR ), own credit risk gains and losses (OCRGL ) different interaction terms that capture 
differences in investor sophistication, other comprehensive income (OCI ), and control variables (SIZE , LEV , MTB , and VIX ). Investor sophistication is captured by 
HIGH_ANACOV, MARKET_BASED , IO , and all their respective interaction terms with OCRGL . HIGH_ANACOV  is an indicator variable equal to one if analyst coverage is 
above median of all sample observations with non-zero OCRGL; MARKET_BASED  is an indicator variable equal to one if the first principal component of two variables that 
measure the comparative activity and size of stock markets relative to banks is above median of all sample observations with non-zero OCRGL  (Beck and Levine,2002 and 
Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas, 2017); and IO is an indicator variable equal to one if firms have non-zero shares held by investment firms. SIZE  is the natural logarithm of total 
assets; LEV  is total liabilities divided by total assets; MTB  is market value of equity divided by the book value of equity; and VIX  is the Chicago Board Options Exchange S&P 
500 Volatility Index at each calendar year end. All variables except for the investor sophistication variables (HIGH_ANACOV, MARKET_BASED, IO ) are winsorized at the 
0.5% and the 99.5% levels of their distribution. NIBOCR , OCRGL , and OCI are scaled by beginning-of-year market value of equity. All regressions include year-fixed and 
country-fixed effects, and standard errors are robust and clustered by firms. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (two-sided). 
RET RET RET RET
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
 
 
90 
 
Appendix 2 
Appendix 2.A: Variable Definition 
Variables
Indicator/
Continous Definition
Return relevance
RET Cont. Share return for the 12 months ending three months after the fiscal year end.
NI Cont. Net income scaled by the market value of equity three months after the fiscal year begins.
NIBOCR Cont. Net income scaled by the market value of equity three months after the fiscal year begins minus OCRGL .
NIBOCRBINT Cont. Net income scaled by the market value of equity three months after the fiscal year begins minus OCRGL  and 
      INTEREST .
INTEREST Cont. Interest income scaled by the market value of equity three months after the fiscal year begins.
OCRGL Cont. Periodical profit or loss due to changes in an entity's own credit risk scaled by the market value of equity three 
      months after the fiscal year begins.
OCI Cont. Other comprehensive income is comprehensive income minus net income. Comprehensive income is approximated by 
      the change in equity from year t-1 to year t plus cash dividends paid in year t plus decreases in outstanding 
      common and preferred stock in year t minus the amount received from the sale of common and preferred stock in 
      year t. Other comprehensive income is scaled by the market value of equity three months after the fiscal year 
      begins.
Value relevance
P Cont. The market value of equity three months after the financial year end scaled by the number of outstanding shares.
HFTA Cont. Held-for-trading assets and other derivative assets scaled by the number of outstanding shares.
FVOA Cont. Fair-value-option assets scaled by the number of outstanding shares.
AFS Cont. Available-for-sale assets scaled by the number of outstanding shares.
OA Cont. Total assets minus HFTA , FVOA , and AFS scaled by the number of outstanding shares. OA  consist of financial
      assets not measured at fair value and non-financial assets.
HFTL Cont. Held-for-trading liabilities and other derivative liabilities scaled by the number of outstanding shares.
FVOL Cont. Fair-value-option liabilities scaled by the number of outstanding shares.
OL Cont. Total liabilities minus HFTL  and FVOL scaled by the number of outstanding shares. OL  consist of financial liabilities 
      not measured at fair value and non-financial liabilities.
NI Cont. Net income scaled by the number of outstanding shares.
NIBOCR Cont. Net income scaled by the number of outstanding shares minus OCRGL .
OCRGL Cont. Periodical profit or loss due to changes in an entity’s own credit risk scaled by the number of outstanding 
      shares. It is expressed as a profit or loss.
Risk relevance
σ(RET) Cont. Standard deviation of raw returns over each of the six 60-month periods.
MM_BETA Cont. Market-model betas estimated by regressing bank stock returns on a market-wide index of value-weighted returns 
      over each of the six 60-month periods.
LT_IR_BETA Cont. Interest-rate beta estimated by regressing stock returns on monthly changes in long-term government bond 
      yields over each of the six 60-month periods (Flannery and James, 1984)
σ(NI) Cont. Standard deviation of net income over each of the six 60-month periods scaled by beginning-of-year market value of 
      equity.
σ(NIBOCR) Cont. Standard deviation of net income minus OCRGL  over each of the six 60-month periods scaled by beginning-of-year 
      market value of equity.
σ(OCRGL) Cont. Standard deviation of OCRGL  over each of the six 60-month periods scaled by beginning-of-year market value of 
      equity.
σ(OCI) Cont. Standard deviation of OCI  over each of the six 60-month periods scaled by beginning-of-year market value of equity.
Fundamentals
SIZE Cont. Natural logarithm of total assets at the financial year end.
LEV Cont. Total liabilities divided by total assets at the financial year end.
MTB Cont. Market value of equity divided by the book value of equity at the financial year end.
VIX Cont. The Chicago Board Options Exchange S&P 500 Volatility Index at each calendar year end.
Additional analysis
HIGH_ANACOV Ind. An indicator variable equal to one if analyst coverage is above median of all sample observations with non-zero 
      pOCR, and zero otherwise.
MARKET_BASED Ind. An indicator variable equal to one if the first principal component of two variables that measure the comparative 
      activity and size of stock markets relative to banks is above median of all sample observations with non-zero 
      pOCR (Beck and Levine,2002 and Fiechter and Novotny-Farkas, 2017).
IO Ind. An indicator variable equal to one if firms have non-zero shares held by investment firms.
FVOLBOCR Cont. Fair-value-option liabilities scaled by the number of outstanding shares minus OCR_CUM .
OCR_CUM Cont. The cumulative adjustements of fair-value-option liabilities due to changes in an entity’s own credit risk scaled
       by the number of outstanding shares. It is expressed as a change in the amount of liability.
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Chapter 3: Beyond IFRS:  
How Firms Benefit from Industry-Specific Reporting Guidance 
(In collaboration with Jérôme Halberkann) 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The worldwide establishment of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is 
one of the most important developments in the history of accounting. Over 100 jurisdictions 
currently require application of IFRS for listed entities. The objectives underlying IFRS are to 
enhance comparability among financial statements and improve financial transparency with a 
uniform global set of standards directed towards the common information needs of a wide 
range of users (EC Regulation No. 1606/2002). This one-size-fits-all approach has limitations 
if investors demand industry-specific accounting information. IFRS figures may not cover all 
important financial aspects in an industry or may allow leeway that leads to unnecessary 
variation detrimental to transparency. To address these issues and to bridge the gap between 
IFRS figures and investors’ information needs, the European Public Real Estate Association 
(EPRA) develops and issues Best Practice Recommendations (BPR). The EPRA BPR are 
intended to improve transparency, comparability, and relevance of published results to attract 
investments into listed European real estate companies (EPRA, 2014). EPRA-BPR-consistent 
information is based on IFRS figures and is complementary to IFRS financial statements, 
rather than substitutional. 
In this paper, we seek to examine the usefulness, the economic effects, and the 
determinants of EPRA BPR compliance. More specifically, we investigate whether EPRA 
BPR disclosures are able to convey useful information that is incorporated into stock prices; 
whether EPRA BPR disclosures can be associated with positive capital market effects such as 
higher liquidity, lower cost of capital, and higher analyst following that go beyond the effects 
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of applying IFRS; and whether certain factors favor an EPRA BPR adoption. Positive capital 
market outcomes are not an obvious result of additional disclosure, as additional disclosure 
can consist of boilerplate language, repetitions, or immaterial information that may reduce 
transparency and increase complexity (Lang and Stice-Lawrence, 2015). In addition, previous 
literature finds evidence that voluntary non-standardized disclosure exhibits positive capital 
market effects only for firms in weak information environments (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 
1993; Botosan, 1997; and Hail, 2002). We, however, focus on an arguably ex-ante rich 
information environment of listed European real estate companies that all apply IFRS. In 
addition, our study separates itself from previous research by focusing on voluntary 
standardized disclosure. We consider the information standardized because EPRA does not 
only issue recommendations on what information should be provided (e.g. performance 
measures, rental data, and valuation data) but also on how performance measures have to be 
calculated and how complementary information should be presented. The high level of detail 
in these recommendations is intended to increase consistency, and therefore transparency and 
comparability among listed European real estate firms. Capital market effects may, however, 
not be born out because application of EPRA BPR is voluntary and disclosure in accordance 
with EPRA BPR is neither enforced nor audited. 
We choose to investigate EPRA BPR because this setting provides several unique 
advantages. First, companies within the real estate sector have similar operating activities and 
homogeneous financial statement structures, where investment properties represent a major 
part of total assets. Second, listed European listed real estate companies have the opportunity 
to follow voluntary industry-specific BPR. Compared to country-specific BPR, industry-
specific BPR minimize unrelated cross-industry variation. Third, the staggered adoption of 
EPRA BPR by many European listed real estate companies and the continuous improvements 
in compliance by already EPRA-BPR-applying companies provide a strong setting to isolate 
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potential effects of EPRA BPR adoption from concurrent events. Finally, the sample of 
European listed real estate companies is economically material as our sample consists of more 
than 100 companies with an aggregate market capitalization of over €190 billion. 
Our research design is structured as follows: First, we investigate whether information in 
accordance with EPRA BPR is able to bridge the gap between IFRS figures and investors’ 
information needs. More specifically, we investigate whether three EPRA performance 
measures (EPRA EPS, EPRA NAV, and EPRA NNNAV) are relatively and incrementally 
relevant in explaining variation in stock prices compared to pure IFRS figures (EPS and book 
value of equity).  
Second, we investigate whether voluntary application of EPRA BPR is associated with 
positive capital market outcomes such as higher liquidity (bid-ask spread), lower refinancing 
costs (cost of capital), and better information environment (analyst coverage). We use three 
measures to capture the degree of compliance with EPRA BPR: (1) We count the number of 
disclosed EPRA performance measures in an annual report (EPRA Performance Measures); 
(2) we create a score that captures to which extent firms comply with all the EPRA BPR, 
including not only EPRA performance measures but also general recommendations and 
investment property reporting (EPRA overall score); and (3) we define an indicator variable 
equal to one if a firm’s annual report was awarded a medal in the Annual Report Survey 
conducted by Deloitte and the EPRA (medal).  
A central issue we encounter in our analysis is that some firms have been complying with 
the EPRA BPR before our sample period starts in 2009 whereas other firms have never 
started complying with EPRA BPR to any degree until the end of the sample period in 2013. 
Hence any association between the degree of compliance with EPRA BPR and capital market 
outcomes primarily sheds light on the characteristics of EPRA complying firms. To tackle this 
issue, we proceed with our analysis by restricting our sample to firms that have become 
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compliant to EPRA BPR during the sample period, i.e., firms for which we have observations 
before and after EPRA BPR adoption. That way we are able to measure whether changes in 
EPRA BPR adoption are associated with changes capital market outcomes. In a second step, 
we restrict our overall sample to firms that switched back from being compliant to being non-
compliant during the sample period. We conjecture that if there is a positive relation between 
the degree of EPRA BPR compliance and positive capital market outcomes, we should also 
be able to detect negative capital market effects if firms switch back from EPRA BPR 
compliance to non-compliance.  
Third, we investigate whether there are certain conditions under which EPRA BPR 
adoption is favorable. Firms that consider EPRA BPR adoption face the question whether the 
benefits of an adoption outweigh the costs. If the costs outweigh the benefits, firms do not 
voluntarily adopt EPRA BPR. Those net benefits may vary across time and settings. 
Based on a sample of 528 firm-year observations between the financial year 2009 and 
2013, we find that net asset value (EPRA NAV) and triple net asset value (EPRA NNNAV) 
are relatively and incrementally value relevant. However, earnings per share based on EPRA 
BPR are neither relatively nor incrementally value relevant. Hence EPRA NAV and EPRA 
NNNAV seem to provide information that more closely reflect market capitalization than the 
traditional IFRS book value of equity.  
In terms of capital market outcomes, firms committing to EPRA BPR are associated with 
increased liquidity, lower refinancing costs, and greater analyst coverage. By restricting our 
sample to firms that went from non-application (no medal) or low-level application (bronze 
medal) to application (silver or gold medal) within our sample period, we find that the 
staggered adoption of EPRA BPR is associated with an increase in liquidity and an increase in 
analyst coverage but fail to find any effect on the cost of capital. In addition, we find that the 
switch back—from application to non-application or low-level application—is associated 
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with a decrease in liquidity and a decrease in analyst coverage but, again, fail to find any 
effect on the cost of capital.  
Lastly, we find that an upcoming debt offering provides incentives for real estate firms to 
adopt EPRA BPR. In addition, firms with upcoming debt offerings, firms in countries with 
better legal quality, firms with lower stock volatility, and firms with weaker stock price 
performance tend to more strongly comply with EPRA BPR. The negative association 
between stock price performance and the degree of compliance with EPR BPR mitigates 
concerns that positive capital market outcomes would only be a result of better firm 
performance that might be positively correlated with higher EPRA BPR compliance.   
Our study contributes to the literature at least in the following three aspects. First, we 
extend the current disclosure literature, which has largely focused on capital market effects of 
IFRS adoption in Europe, to industry-specific financial disclosure beyond IFRS. Second, 
whereas prior literature on voluntary disclosure beyond IFRS focused on non-standardized 
disclosure, which may introduce boilerplate language, repetitions, immaterial information, 
and inconsistencies into annual reports that can reduce transparency and increase complexity, 
we investigate a stronger setting where voluntary disclosures are standardized by the EPRA. 
Third, we focus on a sample of firms in an arguably ex-ante strong information environment 
with ex-ante high liquidity, low cost of capital, and high analyst coverage. Previous literature 
has detected significantly positive capital market outcomes only for voluntary financial 
disclosures in week information environments.  
The remainder of the study is as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related empirical and 
theoretical literature on the relation between disclosures and capital market outcomes. Section 
3.3 outlines the EPRA BPR. Section 3.4 develops the hypotheses. Section 3.5 describes the 
sample selection process, the disclosure scores, and presents summary statistics. Section 3.6 
describes the research design and presents the results. Section 3.7 concludes. 
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3.2. Prior Literature 
3.2.1. Voluntary Non-Standardized Disclosure  
Before the mandatory IFRS adoption in the European Union in 2005, extensive academic 
research had been conducted to determine whether complementary voluntary disclosure leads 
to positive capital market effects.  Theoretical models suggest that additional disclosure may 
alleviate information asymmetries between investors, resulting in a smaller premium 
(discount) at which they are willing to sell (buy) shares to protect themselves from better 
informed investors acting on private information (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). In addition, 
higher level of disclosure may also reduce a firm’s cost of capital by attracting increased 
demand from large investors due to increased liquidity (e.g. Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991 
and Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996). Lang and Lundholm (1996) investigate the determinants 
of voluntary disclosure and find that larger firms, firms with higher stock returns, and firms 
undertaking equity or debt offerings have higher level of disclosure than their counterparts. 
Welker (1995) adds that simultaneity may well exist between the firm’s choice of disclosure 
policy and investors’ assessments of the information asymmetry. He finds that firms with 
disclosure rankings in the bottom third of the empirical distribution have spreads that are 
approximately 50% higher than firms in the top third. Healy, Hutton, and Palepu (1999) 
extend the analysis of Welker (1995) and find that, in addition to stock liquidity, voluntary 
disclosure is accompanied by improved stock performance, increased institutional ownership, 
and more analysts following. Sengupta (1998) investigates the link between disclosure quality 
and the firm’s cost of debt financing and finds a negative association between the two. The 
aforementioned empirical results are all based on analyst ratings of the firm’s overall 
disclosure policy by the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR). The 
AIMR metric measures disclosure quantity through a broad range of channels including 
analyst meetings and conference calls. However, the metric has several limitations: The 
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rankings are only available for a subset of large U.S. firms during the 1980s and 1990s. Since 
the disclosure levels are positively correlated with firm size (Lang and Lundholm, 1993), 
AIMR firms are unlikely to display sufficient cross-sectional variation in disclosure levels to 
make strong and generally applicable inferences (Botosan, 1997). In addition, it is unclear 
how frequent and at which point in time the AIMR metric is reassessed. For example, Healy, 
Palepu, and Sweeney (1995) are able to identify only 90 large and sustained increases in 
AIMR disclosure rankings in a sample of 595 firms in 23 countries over the period 1980 to 
1990. It is also unclear whether analysts on the AIMR panels take the ratings seriously, how 
they select firms to be included in the ratings, and what bias they bring to the rating (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001). Due to those concerns, Botosan (1997) constructs an own disclosure index 
to measure the association between disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. She focuses 
on the year 1990 and a relatively small sample of 122 observations from the machinery 
industry to measure within-industry variation. She finds a negative association between 
disclosure levels and the cost of equity capital for firms with low analyst following. However, 
the results do not extend to firms with high analyst following. Similarly, Hail (2002) 
investigates the association between voluntary disclosures and the cost of equity capital in an 
environment where firms had considerable reporting discretion and mandated level of 
disclosure was low.  His sample comprises 73 non-financial Swiss companies. Mitigating 
self-selection bias by using a 2SLS approach, he generally finds a negative association 
between voluntary disclosures and the cost of capital. Francis, Nanda, and Olsson (2008) 
point out that it is not obvious that greater voluntary disclosure should lead to lower 
information asymmetry. Earlier theoretical research had shown that additional voluntary 
disclosure may lead to a more asymmetric information environment than would exist in their 
absence (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994 and Zhang, 2001). Francis, Nanda, and Olsson (2008) 
argue that the association between voluntary disclosures and cost of capital may be largely 
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driven by omission of correlated earnings quality. They use a self-constructed disclosure 
index, based on the disclosure index by Botosan (1997) and increase the sample size from 122 
observations to 677 sample firms in one year (2001). They find that the relation between 
voluntary disclosures and the cost of capital is substantially reduced when they control for 
earnings quality. However, it remains unclear whether earnings quality drives voluntary 
disclosure, vice versa, or whether the proxy for voluntary disclosure just measures the same as 
the proxy for earnings quality. Overall, both the AIMR and the self-constructed disclosure 
score by Botosan (1997) are weak proxies for complementary financial measures as the 
AIMR score lacks cross-sectional variation in disclosure levels and is skewed towards large 
companies (Botosan, 1997).  
More recent literature tries to address the selection problem when investigating the 
economic outcomes of voluntary disclosure. Balakrishnan et al. (2014) is a recent study that 
sheds light on the causality of voluntary disclosure—in the presence of IFRS—on liquidity. 
They exploit a natural experiment that uses 43 closings of brokers during 2000 and 2008 as an 
exogenous shock to analyst coverage. Measuring voluntary disclosure in the form of guidance 
regarding their quarterly EPS numbers, they find that the reduced liquidity after a coverage 
shock can recover faster if firms have a history of providing increased disclosure. They also 
show that the benefit of voluntary disclosure is economically significant and that failure to 
control for endogeneity of voluntary disclosure seriously biases estimate of the beneficial 
effect of disclosure on liquidity downwards. Similarly, Guay, Samuels, and Taylor (2016) 
find that managers respond to exogenous increases in financial statement complexity—
measured by the readability and length of 10-K fillings—by increasing voluntary disclosure. 
Schoenfeld (2017) uses the inclusion in the S&P 500 index as an exogenous shock to 
disclosure and stock liquidity where managers can hardly influence the ownership level 
assumed by the index fund—as it is a function of assets under management—and where 
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managers cannot influence the timing of the inclusion. Schoenfeld (2017) finds that voluntary 
disclosure increases with the level of index fund ownership. Using a recursive structural 
equation model, he finds that part of the increase in liquidity can be explained by the increase 
in voluntary disclosure.        
 
3.2.2. Disclosure in Accordance with IFRS 
Instead of measuring the relationship between voluntary disclosure and potential capital 
market outcomes directly, another stream of literature focuses on the association between 
voluntary IFRS adoption and capital market outcomes. Although IFRS prescribes not only the 
content of information that have to be disclosed but also the recognition and measurement of 
financial statement items, the effect of voluntary IFRS adoption on capital market outcomes 
may partly be driven by the disclosure component. The strength of the IFRS setting is that 
switching from a local standard to IFRS cannot easily be reversed and, thus, represent a 
strong commitment device to disclosure in the future (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000) focus on Germany, a country with a relatively low disclosure level within 
the sample period, and investigate firms that had switched from German GAAP to either 
IFRS or U.S. GAAP. They find that voluntary IFRS or U.S. GAAP adoption leads to lower 
information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread and share turnover compared to 
compliance with German GAAP. In addition, Leuz (2003) finds that the bid-ask spread and 
the share turnover of German firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS are not significantly different 
from those that voluntarily adopt U.S. GAAP.  Daske (2006) extends the analysis in Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2000) to the cost of capital and analyzes this association for a German sample in 
the period between 1993 and 2002. He finds no significant relation between the cost of capital 
and the adoption of either IFRS or U.S. GAAP. Similarly, Cuijpers and Buijink (2005) also 
fail to find a relation between the cost of capital and the adoption of either IFRS or U.S. 
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GAAP for a broader European sample. However, they find a positive association between 
analysts following and the adoption. Daske et al. (2013) partition voluntary IFRS adopters 
into serious and label adopters.29 They conclude that IFRS reporting does not constitute a 
commitment to increase transparency per se and that, on average, association between 
voluntary IAS adoption and market liquidity or the cost of capital is either insignificant or 
points in the wrong direction. In addition, they find that serious adopters—experiencing 
substantial changes in their reporting incentives around IFRS adoption—show a significant 
increase in market liquidity and a decrease in cost of capital relative to label adopters.  
When IFRS became mandatory for listed firms in the European Union, it attracted much 
attention by academics. A large set of literature documents positive capital market effects 
such as higher stock liquidity (e.g. Daske et al., 2008), lower cost of capital (e.g. Daske et al., 
2008 and Li, 2010), lower forecast errors and forecast dispersion (e.g. Byard, Li, and Yu, 
2011), and higher foreign investments (DeFond et al., 2011 and Khurana and Michas, 2011). 
However, Daske et al. (2008), Byard, Li, and Yu (2011), and Shima and Gordon (2011) note 
that the positive capital market effects are conditional on countries with strict enforcement 
regimes or strong incentives to be transparent. These findings raise concerns whether the 
results are driven by concurrent reporting and enforcement changes or are indeed the result of 
mandatory IFRS adoption. In addition, Daske et al. (2008) document an increase in market 
liquidity for voluntary IFRS adopters in the year when IFRS became mandatory in the 
European Union. They argue that one potential explanation for this capital market effect is 
that voluntary adopters benefit from an increased set of comparable firms, which in turn could 
lead to improved risk sharing across a large set of investors. However, they find no significant 
results that would underline this theory. They, however, find evidence that the effect stems 
from concurrent institutional changes. Voluntary adopters likely have better reporting 
                                                          
29 Serious adopters change their reporting policy as a result of adopting IFRS whereas label adopters make no 
material change to their reporting policy. 
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incentives to begin with and, hence, should be more responsive to institutional changes like 
the mandatory IFRS adoption. Christensen, Hail, and Leuz (2013) extend the analysis of 
Daske et al. (2008) and find that mandatory IFRS reporting, on average, had little impact on 
liquidity. Their analysis shows that observed liquidity effects are unrelated to the enforcement 
level and legal quality of the countries but are concentrated in EU countries only. Overall, 
they suggest that that enforcement changes in a few EU countries play a critical role for the 
previously documented liquidity effects but they do not rule out that IFRS still plays a critical 
role in combination with those changes in enforcement regulations. 
Overall, using (voluntary) IFRS adoption as a shock to (voluntary) disclosure initially 
seemed like a strong setting to identify potential capital market effects. However, concurrent 
enforcement changes in the EU made it difficult for researchers to disentangle the 
enforcement effect from the IFRS effect. Even if we assumed that (voluntary) IFRS adoption 
affects capital market outcomes, we still cannot assign the effect exclusively to increased 
disclosure because IFRS provides rules that do not only mandate the disclosure of certain 
information but also the recognition and measurement of financial statement positions. 
Furthermore, we have no information whether the capital market effects can be generalized to 
all industries or whether IFRS is better suited to some industries than to others. 
 
 
3.3. EPRA and the Real Estate Industry 
The EPRA was founded in 1999 to represent the interests of the European public real 
estate sector. More specifically, the association is intended to foster investments into the real 
estate sector by issuing and frequently updating BPR. Those EPRA BPR were originally 
developed to provide real estate companies with “additional guidance on how to interpret and 
apply IFRS accounting consistently across Europe” (EPRA, 2010). With the establishment of 
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IFRS, the focus moved to the disclosure of key performance indicators that were seen to be of 
most relevance to investors. These EPRA performance measures form an industry-wide set of 
financial reporting key performance indicators (KPIs) that are building on the reporting 
figures published in IFRS reports. As such, they are intended to be a complement to IFRS 
rather than a substitute. They share a goal similar to IFRS by striving to make the financial 
statements of public real estate companies “clearer, more transparent, and comparable across 
Europe” (EPRA, 2010).  EPRA BPR state that these additional disclosures are useful because 
financial statements under IFRS do not provide stakeholders with the most relevant 
information to assess the firm’s operating performance (EPRA, 2014). 
EPRA BPR define six performance measures. (i) EPRA Earnings are intended to provide 
a measure of the performance of the property portfolio. They exclude, among others, changes 
in the values of investment properties as well as profits and losses on disposal thereof. These 
profits and losses are considered not to be relevant to the recurring performance of the 
portfolio and should therefore not affect EPRA EPS. Instead, EPRA EPS focuses on recurring 
items such as rental income, property expenses, and personnel expenses.  
(ii) The EPRA Net Asset Value (NAV) is a measure for the fair value of the property 
portfolio. Compared to the NAV per the financial statements, which firms usually 
approximate by the book value of equity, the EPRA NAV incorporates all revaluations of 
investment properties, tenant leases, and trading properties that are held at amortized cost on 
the balance sheet. It, thus, accounts for differences in the valuation models applied across 
firms and provides an industry-wide more comparable measure of the property portfolio. In 
addition, EPRA NAV excludes the fair value of financial instruments, deferred taxes, and 
goodwill related to deferred taxes.  
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To provide information on the fair value of all assets and liabilities of the firm, (iii) the 
EPRA Triple Net Asset Value (NNNAV) also includes the fair value of financial instruments, 
the fair value of debt, and deferred taxes. 
EPRA BPR define furthermore (iv) the EPRA Net Initial Yield (NIY) and (v) the EPRA 
Vacancy Rate, two KPIs that show considerable variation and inconsistencies across real 
estate firms if they do not comply with EPRA BPR. In July 2013, EPRA BPR added (vi) the 
cost ratio as a sixth measure, which is intended to provide a base-line from which further, 
more detailed information on costs can be disclosed. 
To further improve the usefulness of disclosed figures, EPRA BPR advise the use of an 
external appraiser on at least an annual basis who values the firm’s properties in accordance 
with the International Valuation Standards. The names of the valuation firms as well as the 
basis of the fees are also recommended to be disclosed. Additional recommended disclosures 
include a list of the major properties owned, information on the development program, and 
like-for-like rental growth measures. The EPRA BPR are updated almost on a yearly basis 
where small changes and additions are made, tailored to investors’ needs and demands. 
Once a year, Deloitte and the EPRA issue gold, silver, and bronze accreditations in their 
EPRA Annual Report Survey to companies implementing EPRA BPR. In 2014, 50% of the 
companies in the survey received an award. 25 companies received a gold award, 9 a silver 
award, and 8 a bronze award (Deloitte and EPRA, 2014). According to the Deloitte and 
EPRA (2014), 81% disclosed at least one EPRA performance measure and 33% disclosed all 
6 performance measures. EPRA BPR has gained considerable momentum in the last years and 
can be considered well established in the European real estate sector as of mid-2015. 
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3.4. Hypothesis Development 
Prior literature finds evidence indicating that serious voluntary and mandatory IFRS 
adoption is associated with higher liquidity and lower cost of capital when combined with a 
high enforcement environment. Although previous research trying to establish a causal 
relation between IFRS reporting and positive economic outcomes face major challenges (e.g. 
self-selection bias for voluntary adoption or concurrent events during mandatory IFRS 
adoption around Europe), the findings still empirically underpin the general consensus that 
financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS provide information that is valuable to 
investors. The value of IFRS figures may vary from industry to industry though, as the types 
of measures relevant for equity valuation are context dependent (e.g., Daske et al., 2008; 
Armstrong et al., 2010; Byard, Li, and Yu, 2011; and Horton, Serafeim, Serafeim, 2013). For 
some sectors, IFRS may not provide measures specific enough to fully cover investors’ 
information needs. IFRS figures may either offer measurement leeway that impairs 
comparability across firms, may be computed in a way that is not directly useful to investors, 
or may be missing. In these sectors, voluntarily disclosing additional information cannot 
completely solve the problem because unstandardized figures may still show considerable 
variation and inconsistency across firms and, hence, lack comparability. This issue might 
explain the mixed results in empirical studies on the benefits of voluntary unstandardized 
disclosure (e.g., Botosan, 1997 and Francis, Nanda, and Olsson, 2008). 
Standardization of voluntary information can be achieved by sector guidance on 
voluntary disclosures. In the European real estate sector, such guidance has been developed 
by the EPRA. Those sector guidance (i.e., EPRA BPR) aim to bridge the gap between IFRS 
figures and investor’s information needs to attract investments in the real estate sector through 
consistent and relevant complementary information. This objective leads us to our first 
hypothesis: 
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H1:  EPRA BPR figures provide information useful to investors. 
We investigate the economic consequences of EPRA BPR adoption. Specifically, we are 
interested in the association between EPRA BPR disclosures and capital market outcomes 
such as stock liquidity, cost of capital, and analyst following. Better disclosure can decrease 
information asymmetry between holders and potential buyers of firm shares and, thus, reduce 
adverse selection. The reduction in adverse selection decreases the bid-ask spread, as buyers 
demand a lower premium to trade with potentially better informed sellers (Kim and 
Verrecchia, 1994 and Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). Similarly, better disclosure can reduce a 
firm’s cost of capital by attracting investors and, hence, increasing the liquidity of its 
securities. Put differently, to attract investors into less liquid securities, issuers must issue 
capital at a discount (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991 and Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). The 
theoretical relation between amount of disclosure and the number of analysts following, 
however, is ambiguous. Assuming analysts act primarily as information intermediaries, their 
job consists in collecting public information through different channels, processing them into 
a more concise and easier-to-absorb form, and transmitting them to the capital market. In such 
a system, an increase in the amount of information will increase the demand for analyst 
services and eventually increase the equilibrium number of analysts (Bhushan, 1989). 
However, if analysts act primarily as information providers, who distribute ex-ante private 
information to the capital market, an increase in firm-provided information will substitute for 
the analyst report (Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Empirically, Lang and Lundholm (1996) find 
evidence that analysts follow firms with higher disclosure quality. Dhaliwal et al. (2011) and 
Gao et al. (2016) document that analyst following increase with the initiation of CSR reports. 
We, thus, hypothesize: 
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H2:  Complying with EPRA BPR is associated with higher stock liquidity, lower cost of 
capital, and more analysts following. 
Implementation costs are relatively high compared to future costs of maintaining EPRA-
BPR compliance. Still the implementation costs of EPRA BPR are relatively low compared to 
IFRS adoption, as most of the information used for the EPRA BPR is already created in the 
process of preparing IFRS statements. Firms voluntarily adopt EPRA BPR only if they 
believe that benefits outweigh the costs. Moreover, the extent to which firms decide to 
comply with EPRA BPR may also vary.  
For firms to clear the hurdle of the implementation costs, they need to face a situation 
where the EPRA BPR benefits seem particularly important. We conjecture that such a 
situation exists when firms need external financing. Thus, firms raising capital may choose to 
adopt EPRA BPR to improve the quality of their disclosure in an effort to reduce the cost of 
capital (Dhaliwal et al., 2011 and Gao et al., 2016).  In addition, managers may provide more 
information to investors to explain poor performance (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016).  
H3A:  Firms expanding or planning to expand their investor basis are more likely to adopt 
 EPRA BPR. 
H3B:  Firms expanding or planning to expand their investor basis comply to a greater 
extent with the EPRA BPR. 
 
 
3.5. Sample Selection, Disclosure Score, and Summary Statistics 
3.5.1. Sample Selection Process 
Table 3.1 outlines the sample selection process. We construct our sample from the 
constituent list of the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Developed Europe index as of November 19, 
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2014 (95).30 Constituents of the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Developed Europe index all disclose a 
full set of English Annual Accounts and derive at least 75% of their total EBITDA from 
ownership, trading, and development of income-producing real estate (EPRA, 2015). To 
increase the number of EPRA BPR adopters, we also include all European real estate 
companies from the list of EPRA Members as of December 20, 2014 (+26). We exclude firms 
for which annual reports are unavailable through the sample period (-9). This procedure 
results in 112 potential sample firms. The sample period spans five fiscal years starting in 
2009 and ending in 2013 yielding 560 potential firm-year observations.31 We eliminate firm-
years in which firms are not publicly traded (-32), which might be the case if firms were 
inexistent at that time, merged with another company, or ceased their existence. Eventually, 
our sample comprises 528 firm-years. Depending on the regression models, additional 
observations were dropped from the sample because of missing values.32   
To examine the effect of EPRA disclosure on capital market outcomes, we first hand-
collect data from 528 annual reports on the degree of compliance with EPRA BPR. We use 
this data to construct our disclosure scores (EPRA Overall Score and EPRA Performance 
Measures). To complement these two scores, we examine the EPRA Annual Report Surveys 
as issued by Deloitte and the EPRA to gather information on a third-party disclosure score 
(Medal).  
We draw data on forecast biases and analyst coverage from the Thompson Reuters 
I/B/E/S; data on debt and equity offerings from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum; data on 
                                                          
30 The FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Global Real Estate Index Series is the most widely used global benchmark for 
listed real estate companies. 
31 EPRA issued a significant revision of its BPR in July 2009 in which they extended the set of EPRA 
performance measures from three (EPRA EPS, EPRA NAV, and EPRA NNNAV) to six adding the EPRA Net 
Initial Yield, the EPRA ‘topped-up’ NIY, and the EPRA Vacancy Rate. In addition, they changed their 
approach in the EPRA Annual Report Survey in 2009. Rather than recognizing only a handful of best-in-class 
annual reports, they started awarding virtual medals to investment property companies that comply to a certain 
degree with the BPR.   
32 Our sample selection process leads to a sample that is closely related to the sample in Muller, Riedl, and 
Sellhorn (2011). We work with a sample of 121 firms that were active as of 2009 whereas Muller, Riedl, and 
Sellhorn (2011) identify 112 European real estate firms active as of 2006.    
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countries’ legal quality from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010); and financial data from 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. All variable definitions are presented in Appendix 3.A. 
 
3.5.2. Disclosure Statistics and Score Construction 
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics on the disclosure quality relating to investment 
property transactions. On average, we observe that firms spend 40.56 pages or 26% (40.56 ÷ 
155.84) of their annual reports on financial statement notes. We count, on average, 23.97 
occurrences of the word “EPRA” and 3.36 EPRA figures in the annual reports. The amount of 
EPRA figures disclosed increased significantly and gradually from 1.29 to 4.92 in our sample 
period. Firms use external appraisers, who assess the value of the assets at least once a year, 
in about 90% of the annual reports. The EPRA BPR endorse five tables in each annual report, 
disclosing certain information in a specific structure. However, only 0.25 tables are disclosed, 
on average, and untabulated statistics show that only 8% of the annual reports show at least 
one table. In comparison, untabulated statistics show that 65% of all annual reports disclose at 
least one EPRA performance figure suggesting that the tables are far less widespread across 
our sample than the disclosure of EPRA performance figures. 92% use a fair value approach 
for the measurement of investment property assets. 
To measure the disclosure effort for a given real estate firm in a year, we compute three 
proxies. First, EPRA performance measures analyzes the number of EPRA performance 
measures a company reports in their annual reports. The EPRA figures consist of EPRA EPS, 
EPRA NAV, EPRA NNNAV, EPRA NIY, EPRA NIY ‘topped up’, EPRA vacancy rate, 
EPRA cost ratio including vacancy costs, and the EPRA cost ratio excluding vacancy costs. 
The former three figures should be disclosed on a per-share as well as on an absolute basis. 
As a result, there are 11 figures to be disclosed. Firms receive 1 point for each EPRA 
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performance figure except for the vacancy rates, which is awarded 2 points (12P).33 The total 
number of points is divided by 12 to scale the score between 0 and 1.  
Second, we propose a broader proxy EPRA overall score. EPRA overall score can be 
separated into two parts: The number of EPRA performance measures a company reports in 
their annual reports—equal to EPRA performance measures—and the degree of additional 
disclosure in compliance with the EPRA BPR. Again, firms receive up to 12 points for the 
first part. In the second part regarding additional disclosure, we allocate 1 point for each of 
the following valuation techniques or disclosures in the annual report: a separate chapter in 
the annual report for the information in accordance with the EPRA BPR (1P),  a list of the 
major properties owned (1P), a list of all development and redevelopment properties (1P), the 
standardized tables (5P; 1P for each table), the fair value change due to the new fair-value 
definition for non-financial assets in 2013 (1P), investment property assets valued by external 
appraisers within the last year (1P), report available in English (1P), and investment property 
assets recognized at fair value (1P).34 In total, each company can reach up to 12 points for the 
first part and 12 points for the second part. The total number of points is divided by 24 to 
scale our score between 0 and 1. Table 3.2 summarizes the items that were considered with 
the corresponding weights.   
To complement our results with a third-party disclosure score, we consider the virtual 
medals that are awarded each year by Deloitte and the EPRA based on a review of the firms’ 
financial statements. Gold, silver, and bronze medals are awarded for reports scoring 
“exceptionally”, “highly”, and “well”, respectively, based on compliance with EPRA BPR 
(Deloitte and EPRA, 2014). We observe that 30% of our firm-year observations have received 
                                                          
33 Basically, there are six individual figures (EPRA EPS, EPRA NAV, EPRA NNNAV, EPRA NIY, EPRA 
vacancy rate, and EPRA cost ratio) that should be calculated in two different ways except for the EPRA 
vacancy rate. We award 2 points to each of those six individual figures. 
34 IFRS 13 – Fair Value Measurement is effective since 1 January 2013. It adopts a highest-and-best-use 
approach to the measurement of non-financial assets. The new definition affected investment property values. 
However, only a limited number of firms disclosed those changes that stem from the change in the definition. 
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an award in the EPRA Annual Report Survey for their disclosure. Firms that received a gold 
medal reported all six EPRA performance measures in a separate EPRA BPR section 
including calculations. However, a complete list of criteria that shaped Deloitte’s and the 
EPRA’s assessment of whether a firm should receive either a gold, silver, or bronze medal is 
not publicly available.  
We define a binary variable EPRA Application equal to one for years in which the firm 
receives a silver or gold medal and 0 otherwise. We exclude bronze medals as these are the 
lowest awards and may not indicate compliance on a level high enough to lead to observable 
market reactions. Table 3.3 reports Spearman’s rank (upper right corner) and Pearson’s 
product-moment correlation (lower left corner) of market outcome variables and disclosure 
proxies. We find that our three main market outcome variables (i.e., Log(Spread), Log(COC), 
and AnaCov) are all significantly correlated with our main disclosure proxies (i.e., Medal, 
EPRA Overall Score, EPRA Performance Measures and EPRA application) and that all the 
correlation coefficients exhibit the expected signs. The correlation between Log(COC) and the 
disclosure proxies is noticeably smaller than for the other two main market outcome variables, 
which is in line with the fact that our proxy for cost of capital is a noisier and less direct 
measure than the proxy for liquidity and analyst coverage. 
 
3.5.3. Summary and Distributional Statistics 
Table 3.4 reports summary statistics on the 528 firm-year observations for all test 
variables (definitions of all variables are presented in Appendix 3.A). We observe that firms 
within our sample exhibit, on average, narrow spreads (0.47%), low cost of capital (7.65%), 
and a high number of analysts following (6.41).35 Also, Size exhibits that the market 
                                                          
35 Charoenwong, Chong, and Yang (2014), for example, find an average spread of 0.87% for a broad sample of 
international firms from 1996 to 2010 compared to 0.47% in our sample. Hail and Leuz (2006) calculate a cost 
of capital of 12.49% for the period between 1992 and 2001 for a broad sample of international firms compared 
to 7.65% in our sample.  
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capitalization of the sample firms is, on average, large (EUR 0.63 billion) and LegalQuality 
exhibits that the legal system is, on average, strong (1.49).36 Hence we focus on an ex-ante 
strong legal environment and a sample of firms that all comply with IFRS. We apply log-
transformation to spread, cost of capital, returns, and size to make the positively skewed 
distributions more normal. 
Table 3.5 reports distributional statistics for the measurement of investment property 
assets and three different disclosure scores. 92% (488 ÷ 528) of all firm-years apply the fair 
value approach for the measurement of investment properties while only 8% (40 ÷ 528) use 
the amortized cost approach. Disclosure is measured using the number of EPRA figures 
disclosed in the firm-year’s annual report (EPRA Performance measures); a self-constructed 
overall score that measures the degree to which firms comply with the EPRA BPR (EPRA 
overall score); and an indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm received an award in form of a 
virtual medal in the firm-year’s corresponding EPRA Annual Report Survey as issued by 
Deloitte and the EPRA, and zero otherwise (Medal).  
Table 3.5, Panel A shows that firms are located in 16 different countries whereof 69% of 
all observations stem from the United Kingdom (31%), Germany (13%), France (10%), 
Sweden (8%), or Belgium (7%). The amortized cost approach is used only in five countries 
(Germany, France, Turkey, Spain, and Sweden).37 Examining the average number of EPRA 
figures disclosed in an annual report, the average EPRA overall score, and the density of total 
medals per total observations, Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom can clearly be considered as above average. Hence 61% of the firm-year 
observations stem from high disclosure countries.    
                                                          
36 In comparison, legal quality within the United States in the same time frame was 1.36. Overall, Hong Kong 
(1.89) exhibits the highest coefficient whereas North Korea (-2.47) exhibit the lowest coefficient. Only eight 
out of 215 countries outside from our sample exhibit larger coefficients. 
37 Sometimes local laws and local exchange rules prohibit firms from using the amortized cost approach for the 
measurement of investment property assets.   
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Table 3.5, Panel B shows how the measurement of investment property assets and the 
three disclosure scores evolve over time. Whereas the percentage of firms that apply the 
amortized cost approach remains relatively constant, almost all three disclosure scores 
increase gradually over time. Untabulated descriptive statistics show that Pearson correlations 
between the three disclosure scores are all positive and significant at the 0.001 significance 
level.38  
 
 
3.6. Empirical Analysis 
3.6.1. Value Relevance 
We begin our empirical analysis by investigating the relative and incremental value 
relevance of EPRA NAV per share, EPRA NNNAV per share, and EPRA EPS compared to 
IFRS book value of equity per share and IFRS EPS.39 The significance of the relationship 
between disclosed accounting figures and share prices captures whether figures provide both 
relevant and reliable information to investors (Barth, Beaver, and Landsman, 2001). By 
regressing share prices on a set of different performance measures, we are able to evaluate the 
value relevance, and thus the decision usefulness of the information (Easton, Eddey, and 
Harris, 1993).  
Following the approach by Barth and Clinch (1998), we regress price per share (PPS) on a 
measure of book value of equity per share (IFRS book value of equity, EPRA NAV, or EPRA 
NNNAV) and periodical performance per share (IFRS EPS or EPRA EPS). We use two 
specification of this model to measure relative and incremental value relevance. First, we 
investigate whether each of the different measures of book value of equity per share together 
                                                          
38 Correlation between EPRA Figures and EPRA Overall Score is 0.9420; correlation between EPRA Overall 
Score and Medal is 0.6323; and correlation between EPRA Figures and Medal is 0.6605.  
39 Both IFRS EPS and EPRA EPS are on the basis of basic number of shares, i.e. not diluted.  
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with the measures of periodical performance per share are relatively value relevant. Therefore 
we specify the following model: 
PPSi,t = β0 + β1 EQUITY_VALUE,i,t + β2 PERIODICAL_PERFORMANCEi,t + εi,t ,    (3.1A) 
where EQUITY_VALUE is either IFRS book value of equity per share (BVE_PS), EPRA 
NAV per share (EPRA_NAV_PS), or EPRA NNNAV per share (EPRA_NNNAV_PS) and 
PERIDICAL_PERFORMANCE is either IFRS EPS (EPS) or EPRA EPS (EPRA_EPS).  
Second, we extend the base model—as specified in Equation (3.1A) using BVE_PS and 
EPS—by adding the difference between EPRA NAV per share and IFRS book value of equity 
per share (EPRA_NAV_PS – BVE_PS) (Table 3.6, model 7) and the difference between EPRA 
NNNAV per share and book value of equity per share (EPRA_NNNAV_PS – BVE_PS) (Table 
3.6, model 8), respectively. At the same time, we add the difference between IFRS EPS and 
EPRA EPS (EPRA_EPS - EPS) (Table 3.6, model 7 and 8). That way we are able to 
investigate whether the three EPRA figures provide incremental value-relevant information to 
investors.  
To measure the incremental effects of all three EPRA figures, we specify the following 
model: 
PPSi,t = β0 + β1 BVE_PSi,t + β2 (EPRA_[NN]NAV_PSi,t – BVE_PSi,t) + 
 β3 EPSi,t + β4 (EPRA_EPSi,t – EPSi,t ) + εi,t .              (3.1B) 
Table 3.6 reports regression results based on Equation (3.1A) and (3.1B). In our base 
model (1) we regress price per share on IFRS book value of equity per share and IFRS EPS. 
The coefficients estimates of 0.791 for BVE_PS and 2.564 for EPS are both statistically 
significant at the one-percent level and similar to other papers that use value-relevance 
methodology (e.g. Barth and Clinch, 1998; Landsman, Peasnell, and Shakespeare, 2008; and 
Goh et al., 2015).  
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Next, we replace IFRS book value of equity per share with the EPRA book value of 
equity per share, i.e. EPRA_NAV_PS and EPRA_NNNAV_PS. Model (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) show 
that both EPRA NAV and EPRA NNNAV are statistically significant at the one-percent level, 
therefore EPRA NAV and EPRA NNNAV are relatively value relevant. Replacing IFRS EPS 
with the EPRA EPS in models (4)-(6) leads to coefficient estimates with similar magnitude as 
the EPS. However, they are not statistically significant, except for model (5). 
In addition, we find that EPRA_NAV_PS – BVE_PS and EPRA_NNNAV_PS – BVE_PS 
are statistically significant at the one-percent level in model (7) and (8), respectively, 
therefore EPRA NAV and EPRA NNNAV are incrementally value relevant. Investigating 
EPRA EPS, we find no evidence that EPRA EPS has incremental value relevance over EPS in 
model (7) or (8). Taken together, the relative and incremental value relevance results suggest 
that investors take investment properties revaluations into account when evaluating a real 
estate firm’s market value of equity. These results are consistent with Muller, Riedl, and 
Sellhorn (2011) who find that fair value measurement compared to amortized cost 
measurement for investment properties mitigates information asymmetry. The results are also 
consistent with Liang and Riedl (2014) who provide anecdotal evidence that both EPS and 
NAV figures and their corresponding forecasts are primary inputs into analyst’s target price 
estimates.  
All value relevance regressions produce high adjusted R2 above 94%. Although this 
seems high, Barth and Clinch (1998) also find adjusted R2 of over 94% for a sample of 
Australian financial firms in the period between 1991 and 1995. The high R2 may reflect the 
fact that, on average, more than 80% of the asset side of firms in our sample consists of 
investment properties measured in more than 90% at fair value. Nevertheless, we winsorize 
our sample at the 10th and 90th percentile to check whether the high R2 is driven by outliers. 
Untabulated statistics show no reduction in R2 from the procedure and no changes in the 
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significance of the coefficients, except that EPRA_EPS becomes insignificant in model (5). In 
addition, we calculate studentized residuals from all regressions and repeat the regressions 
using only observations with absolute studentized residuals smaller than 2. Untabulated 
statistics show that the R2 remains basically unchanged and that the significance level changes 
in model (5) where EPRA_EPS again becomes insignificant and in model (7) where 
EPRA_EPS - EPS becomes statistically significant (t-statistics of 2.26). However, EPRA_EPS 
- EPS becomes statistically insignificant again if we move the studentized residual threshold 
to 3, 2.5 or 1.5. Due to the sensitivity of the significance levels of EPRA_EPS - EPS to 
variations in studentized residual thresholds and due to the results in model (7)-(8), we 
conclude that we find no compelling evidence that EPRA EPS is value relevant. 
 
3.6.2. Effects on Liquidity, Cost of Capital, and Analyst Following 
We estimate the effects of EPRA BPR compliance on liquidity, cost of capital, and 
analyst following. We compute liquidity as the median logarithmic proportional weekly bid-
ask spread measured three months after the reporting date (Log(Spread)). The spread is 
measured as the difference between the closing bid and ask price of the trading day divided by 
the midpoint. Following Hail and Leuz (2006), we estimate the ex-ante cost of capital implied 
in contemporaneous stock price and analyst forecast data according to four different models 
suggested in Claus and Thomas (2001), Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), Ohlson and 
Juettner-Nauroth (2005), and Easton (2004). For some firm-quarters, estimates cannot be 
computed for all four models. The reason is that the underlying equation of the model does 
not always have an economically meaningful solution. To compensate the missing estimates, 
as well as to reduce a possible estimation bias, we compute the average value of the available 
cost of capital estimates. Cost of capital have—similar to the proportional bid-ask spread—a 
log-normal distribution. We therefore use the logarithm of the ex-ante cost of capital in our 
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regressions (Log(COC)). We estimate the number of analysts following by counting the 
number of firm’s annual earnings forecasts three months after the fiscal year end (AnaCov). 
We take earnings forecasts for the determination of analyst coverage because they are more 
frequent than NAV forecasts, which leads to more variation and eventually stronger 
inferences.  
First, we analyze the effect of EPRA BPR compliance on liquidity by estimating the 
following regression: 
Log(Spread)i,t = β0 + β1EPRAi,t + β2Voli,t + β3Turnoveri,t + β4Sizei,t + β5Chsi,t 
+ β6LegalQualityi,t + εi,t ,               (3.2) 
where EPRA is one of three measures—Medal, EPRA Overall Score, or EPRA 
Performance Measures—described in Section 3.5.2. We consistently use year-fixed effects 
and robust standard errors clustered by firms. Following the current literature on the effects of 
disclosure on liquidity, we include stock volatility (Vol), share turnover (Turnover), and the 
logarithmic transformation of the market capitalization (Size) as control variables for effects 
unrelated to disclosure quality. In addition, we include inside ownership (Chs) into the 
regression because prior literature has shown that the association between disclosure quality 
and cost of capital can be separated into two separate effects: a direct effect in which 
disclosure reduces parameter uncertainty regarding the estimate of expected returns and an 
indirect effect in which disclosure reduces the need for inside ownership to align the 
entrepreneur and the reduced inside ownership increases cost of capital (Core, Hail, and 
Verdi, 2015). Core, Hail, and Verdi (2015) show that without controlling for inside 
ownership, the indirect effect abates the negative relation between disclosure quality and cost 
of capital. We also include legal quality (LegalQuality) because prior research has identified 
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an association between disclosure quality and legal systems (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
La Porta et al., 2000; and Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003). 
Table 3.7 reports the regression results of Equation (3.2). All three EPRA measures are 
significantly negative at the one-, five-, or ten-percent level for all model specifications. This 
indicates that firms compliant with the EPRA BPR show higher liquidity compared to firms 
that are not or only weakly compliant. The results further show that firms with low stock 
volatility, firms with high share turnover, larger firms, and firms with high proportions of 
closely held shares have higher liquidity, i.e., lower spreads. We, however, don’t find any 
effects for the regulatory environment (LegalQuality). The regressions exhibit R2 between 
60% and 65% for the regression equation including control variable. This result is comparable 
to existing studies on the effects of disclosure on liquidity (e.g. Daske et al., 2013 and 
Christensen, Hail, and Leuz, 2013).  
Second, we analyze the effect of EPRA BPR compliance on cost of capital by estimating 
the following regression: 
Log(COC)i,t = β0 + β1EPRAi,t + β2Voli,t + β3Turnoveri,t + β4Sizei,t + β5Chsi,t +  
β6LegalQualityi,t + β7FcBiasi,t + β8Btmi,t + β9Levi,t + β10Roai,t + εi,t        (3.3) 
 
We include all explanatory variables from Equation (3.2). Following Hail and Leuz 
(2006), we further control for forecast bias (FcBias), book-to-market ratio (Btm), leverage 
ratio (Lev), and return on assets (Roa). 
Table 3.8 reports the regression results of Equation (3.3). The coefficients Medal and 
EPRA Performance Measures are significant either at the one- or five-percent level for all 
variants of the regression. The coefficients EPRA Overall Score is not significant in model 
(4), including control variables. The regressions exhibit R2 between 30% and 35% for the full 
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models, which is at the lower end of what Hail and Leuz (2006) find.40 Further, the R2 is 
considerably lower than what we get from Equation (3.2) and (3.4) using bid-ask spread and 
analyst coverage as outcome variables. We attribute this result to the fact that our proxy for 
the cost of capital is noisier than the other two outcome measures. The control variables 
exhibit signs that are in line with Hail and Leuz (2006) except for share turnover (Turnover). 
The positive association between share turnover and cost of capital may stem from other 
underlying factors that are correlated with turnover such as the concurrent European debt 
crisis that might have struck firms with higher turnover more severely, increasing their cost of 
capital. We, however, gain confidence in our results from the fact that the omission of 
turnover does not change any signs or the significance of the main coefficients. Overall, the 
results show that EPRA BPR compliant firms have lower cost of capital.  
Third, we analyze the effect of EPRA BPR compliance on analyst following by 
estimating the following regression: 
AnaCovi,t = β0 + β1EPRAi,t + β2Voli,t + β3Turnoveri,t + β4Sizei,t + β5Chsi,t +  
β6LegalQualityi,t + β7FcBiasi,t + β8Btmi,t + β9Levi,t + β10Roai,t + εi,t             (3.4) 
 
Table 3.9 reports the regression results of Equation (3.4). All three EPRA measures are 
significantly positive at the one- or five-percent level. This indicates that firms that comply to 
a greater extent with EPRA BPR have greater analyst coverage.   
A central issue related to the results in Table 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 is that some firms already 
complied to a certain extent with EPRA BPR in the first year of our sample period in 2009 
whereas other firms have never started complying to any extent with EPRA BPR until the end 
of the sample period in 2013. That means that the association between capital market 
                                                          
40 Hail and Leuz (2006) have an R2 between 36% and 60% for the regressions of the cost of capital measures. 
Compared to their study, we use the logarithmic transformation of the cost of capital, which reduces our R2 by 
up to 90bp.  
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outcomes and the degree of compliance with EPRA BPR should not be interpreted that 
changes in the degree of compliance are associated with positive changes in market outcomes 
but rather that firms with greater compliance show better market outcome characteristics. This 
finding may very well be driven by other underlying factors such as better skilled managers 
may generate good capital market outcomes through their activities and efforts, which they 
would like to make visible to investors through increased disclosure. Alternatively, larger 
firms have been shown to be associated with better capital market outcomes. At the same 
time, larger firms have greater resources for reporting purposes, which they may use to 
disclose additional information to investors.  
To tackle this issue, we proceed with our analysis by restricting our sample to firms that 
have become compliant to EPRA BPR during the sample period, i.e., firms for which we have 
observations before and after EPRA BPR adoption. This procedure leads to 29 remaining 
firms with 145 firm-year observations. Due to the limited sample size, we try to identify a 
variable for EPRA BPR compliance that best distinguishes between serious adoption and non-
adoption. We conduct a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) on our full sample 
suggesting that Log(Spread), Log(COC), and AnaCov are not equal among gold, silver, and 
bronze medals. Post-hoc pairwise comparison based upon the studentized range distribution 
using the modified least significant difference test by Fisher (1935) and Hayter (1986) further 
indicates that Log(Spread), Log(COC), and AnaCov are significantly different between gold 
and bronze and between silver and bronze but not between gold and silver at the five-percent 
level.41 As a consequence, we construct an dichotomous variable (EPRA Application) equal to 
one in each year that firms received either a silver or gold medal in the EPRA Annual Report 
Survey and zero otherwise. 
                                                          
41 The result that silver and gold is viewed as a serious commitment to disclosure whereas bronze is not, is 
underlined by remarks in Deloitte and EPRA (2015) saying that firms receive bronze accreditation by 
disclosing only three EPRA metrics. However, to receive gold accreditation firms need to disclose, amongst 
others, all six EPRA metrics, detailed information on investment assets, an EPRA performance measure 
summary table, and an analysis of like-for-like rental income growth (Deloitte and EPRA, 2014).  
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Again, we regress Log(Spread), Log(COC), and AnaCov on EPRA Application, control 
variables, and year-fixed effects.  
Table 3.10 outlines the regression results suggesting that firms that became EPRA-BPR-
compliant benefit from an increase in liquidity and an increase in analyst coverage. For the 
firms’ cost of capital we fail to observe a significant effect of EPRA application, which may 
be attributable to the underlying noise of our costs-of-capital proxy. Further, we see that 
overall disclosure (Notes_Pages)—using the number of pages of the financial statement 
notes—is significantly negative associated with Log(Spread). In addition, the association 
between EPRA Application and Log(Spread) and between EPRA Application and AnaCov, 
respectively, is unaffected by the inclusion of the overall disclosure proxy. Untabulated 
statistics show that Pearson’s correlation between overall disclosure and EPRA application is 
close to zero (-0.0257). Hence it is unlikely that the two measures are proxies that capture 
essentially the same underlying economics. 42  
We further conjecture that if EPRA BPR compliance leads to positive capital market 
outcomes, we should also be able to detect negative capital market effects if firms switch back 
from EPRA compliance to non-compliance. Thus, we restrict our overall sample to 12 firms 
with 60 firm-year observations that switched back from compliance to non-compliance during 
the sample period. We regress Log(Spread), Log(COC), and AnaCov on SwitchBack, 
Non_adoption, control variables that might be correlated with the de-adoption of EPRA BPR 
and might influence capital market outcomes, and year-fixed effects. We include 
Non_adoption in order for SwitchBack to reflects the difference in capital market outcomes 
between firm-years after a switch back from compliance to non-compliance for as long as 
                                                          
42 We repeat all three regressions substituting EPRA Application by Medal. The regression results look very 
similar where the main variable Medal is negatively related to Log(Spread), not related to Log(COC), and 
positively related to AnaCov. The signs of the control variables all remain the same but Notes_Pages becomes 
insignificant in model (1) and Log(Returns) becomes significantly negative in model (2). 
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they remain non-compliant and firm-years in which firms comply with EPRA BPR to an 
extent such that they receive at least a silver medal.   
Table 3.11 shows evidence that firms switching back from compliance to non-compliance 
indeed exhibit negative capital market outcomes. In addition, results show that Non_adoption 
tends to be associated with negative capital market outcomes relative to adopters, which is 
what we expect. 
Overall, our findings provide evidence indicating that positive capital market effects are 
associated with higher levels of EPRA disclosure. Moreover, the results also show that 
changes in the level of EPRA disclosure are associated with changes in capital market 
outcomes. It is, however, crucial to emphasize that our research design and our setting does 
not allow for causal inferences. For example, we are unable to identify whether an increase in 
the degree of compliance with EPRA BPR attracts more analysts or whether an increase in the 
number of analysts following increases the demand for EPRA BPR. Nevertheless, the 
association between analyst following and the degree of EPRA BPR compliance suggests that 
analysts deem EPRA information useful.  
 
3.6.3. Factors of EPRA BPR Compliance 
We proceed to investigate the managerial incentives to comply with EPRA BPR. To shed 
light on the determinants of EPRA adoption and the degree of compliance with EPRA, we 
estimate two equations. First, we run probit regressions of the following form: 
EPRA Followingi,t = β0 + β1Sizei,t + β2Btmi,t + β3Voli,t + β4Log(Returns)i,t  + 
β5DebtOfferingi,t + β6SeasonedEquityOfferingi,t +  
β7LegalQualityi,t + β8Number_of_EPRA_adoptersi,t + εi,t ,           (3.5) 
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where EPRA Following is either EPRA Adoption, an indicator variable equal to one when 
firms received their first silver or gold medal in the EPRA Annual Report Survey for the time 
period between 2010 and 2013 and zero otherwise, or EPRA Application, an indicator 
variable equal to one if firms received either a gold or silver medal in the EPRA Annual 
Report Survey in the time period between 2009 and 2013 and zero otherwise.  
Second, we run OLS regressions of the following form: 
EPRA Compliancei,t = β0 + β1Sizei,t + β2Btmi,t + β3Voli,t + β4Log(Returns)i,t  + 
β5DebtOfferingi,t + β6SeasonedEquityOfferingi,t +  
β7LegalQualityi,t + β8Number_of_EPRA_adoptersi,t + εi,t ,         (3.6) 
where EPRA Compliance is either EPRA Overall Score or EPRA Performance Measures, 
as described in Section 3.5.2. 
Table 3.12 presents the regression results of Equation (3.5) and (3.6). We conjecture that 
managers may be willing to disclose additional information if they intend to issue debt or 
equity to the market in order to increase transparency, and thus lower their refinancing costs. 
Model (1) reports positive and significant coefficient estimates for DebtOffering 
demonstrating that issuance of debt is positively associated with EPRA BPR adoption. More 
specifically, firms that issue debt within one year after the financial year end are more likely 
to adopt EPRA BPR to the extent of at least receiving a silver medal in the EPRA Annual 
Report Survey.  
Acknowledging that some of the other effects may not be borne out because we only have 
29 firms that newly adopt EPRA BPR in the time window between 2010 and 2013, we also 
investigate the association between EPRA application and the same potential determinants as 
in model (2). The positive association of debt offerings remains significant. Most 
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interestingly, the marginal effect of a debt offering increases to 12.9%, which speaks to the 
importance of incorporating EPRA BPR in the annual reports if a firm needs debt capital.  
Next we investigate the role of those determinants on the degree of compliance with 
EPRA BPR where we replace the dichotomous variable EPRA Following by continuous 
variables for EPRA Compliance, i.e., EPRA Overall Score and EPRA Performance Measures. 
Again, the coefficients on debt offering remain significant. Interestingly, the logarithmic 
transformation of the annual stock price return (Log(Returns)) becomes significantly 
negatively associated with the degree of compliance, i.e., firms with lower annual stock price 
performance exhibit higher compliance with EPRA BPR. This result seems to stand in 
contrast to the notion that managers choose to opaque their performance during times with 
low stock price performance (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). However, as stock price 
performance can hardly be hidden from investors, managers may be more willing to provide 
additional disclosure to explain poor performance (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016).   
 
 
3.7. Conclusion 
This study provides evidence that voluntary application of standardized industry-specific 
accounting guidance beyond IFRS provides information relevant to investors. We exploit the 
listed European real estate setting to examine the usefulness, the economic effects, and the 
determinants of EPRA BPR disclosures. We start by investigating whether EPRA NAV, 
EPRA NNNAV, and EPRA EPS are value relevant, i.e., whether investors deem the 
information useful. We proceed to examine whether EPRA BPR compliance induces positive 
economic effects such as higher liquidity, lower cost of capital, and more analysts following. 
Lastly, we analyze which factors increase the likelihood of adopting EPRA BPR and which 
factors determine the extent to which firms comply with EPRA BPR.  
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First, we find that EPRA NAV and EPRA NNNAV are relatively and incrementally value 
relevant. Second, we show that firms, complying with EPRA BPR exhibit lower cost of 
capital, higher stock liquidity, and higher analyst following. A central issue, however, is that 
some firms already complied to a certain extent with EPRA BPR in the first year of our 
sample period in 2009 whereas other firms have never started complying to any extent with 
EPRA BPR until the end of the sample period in 2013. To tackle this issue, we proceed with 
our analysis by restricting our sample to firms for which we have observations before and 
after EPRA BPR adoption. The regression results suggest that firms that became EPRA-BPR-
compliant benefit from an increase in liquidity and an increase in analyst coverage. For the 
firms’ cost of capital we fail to observe a significant effect from EPRA application. In 
addition, further analyses provide evidence that firms switching back from compliance to 
non-compliance exhibit negative capital market outcomes. Third, we find that firms’ debt 
offering plans play an important role for the firms’ decision to comply with EPRA BPR.  
It is crucial to emphasize that our research design and our setting does not allow for 
causal inferences. For example, we are unable to identify whether an increase in the degree of 
compliance with EPRA BPR attracts more analysts or whether an increase in the number of 
analysts following increases the demand for EPRA BPR. In addition, the association of cross-
sectional variation in firm’s choice in disclosure levels under the existing environment does 
not need to generalize to the effects of regulation on capital market outcomes. Put differently, 
the insides we gather from this study in the European real estate environment cannot be used 
to justify the desirability or need for mandated disclosure. The reason is that precisely in the 
European real estate industry where benefits of disclosure mostly exceed their costs; we do 
not need regulation (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016).  
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Tables 
Table 3.1: Sample Selection 
 
 
Change Remaining
Constituent of FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Developed Europe Index as of November 19, 2014 95
Real estate firms that are EPRA Members as of December 20, 2014 +26 121
Less firms
not publicly listed 0 121
not reporting under IFRS 0 121
for which no annual reports were found -9 112
Potential firm-year observations (112 firms times 5 fiscal years) 560
Less firm-years:
in which firm is not publicly traded (e.g. inexistent, merged, bankrupt) -32 528
This table presents the sample selection process. We begin with all firms that are constituents of the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT 
Developed Europe index as of November 19, 2014 (95). We additionally include real estate firms that are members of the EPRA as 
of December 20, 2014 (+26). Our base sample comprises of 121 investment property firms, of which all firms apply IFRS and are 
publicly traded.  We exclude firms for which annual reports are unavailable (-9). This leaves 112 potential sample firms. Our 
sample period spans five fiscal years starting in 2009 when the EPRA Best Practice Recommendations were revised extensively up 
to 2013. This leads to 560 potential firm-year observations (112 firms times 5 fiscal years). We eliminate firm-years, in which firms 
are no publicly traded (-32), which might be the case because firms where inexistent at that time, merged with another company, or 
ceased their existence. Eventually, we are left with a sample that comprise of 528 firm-years. The firm-year observations are 
distributed over time as follows:  97 (2009); 103 (2010); 108 (2011); 110 (2012); and 110 (2013). 
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Table 3.2: Disclosure Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max Score
Annual reports statistics
Number of pages 525 155.84 91.89 29.00 100.00 137.00 184.00 704.00
Number of pages for notes 521 40.56 23.34 0.00 24.00 35.00 52.00 160.00
EPRA count 527 23.97 32.84 0.00 1.00 12.00 33.00 199.00
Number of EPRA figures 528 3.36 3.48 0.00 0.00 2.00 6.00 11.00
Separate EPRA Part 526 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1/24
External valuation for IP 484 0.90 0.30 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1/24
Frequency of IP valuations (# per year) 459 1.25 0.74 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 4.00
Lists major properties 528 0.66 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1/24
Lists of (re-)development properties 526 0.25 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1/24
Number of EPRA tables 528 0.25 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5/24
English version available 528 0.97 0.17 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1/24
Investment property measurement (in mio. EUR except stated otherwise)
Valuation at fair value (1 or 0) 526 0.92 0.26 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1/24
Fair value 490 2,464.05 3,472.92 2.84 594.96 1,266.23 2,767.50 28,852.60
Fair value in notes 43 4,309.95 4,494.60 307.94 688.74 2,566.60 6,260.80 15,738.64
Historical costs 38 3,621.04 3,404.18 115.83 1,423.46 2,460.94 4,820.40 11,301.04
Fair value adjustments 483 34.68 197.77 -2,192.10 -9.60 6.61 53.00 1,702.30
Adjustment on highest and best use 26 2.96 8.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 35.19 1/24
EPRA Performance Measures (in mio. EUR (earnings, NAV, NNAV) and percent)
EPRA earnings 187 84.06 150.06 -739.00 17.53 36.61 103.51 985.80 2/24
EPRA NAV 261 1,848.91 2,458.53 1.30 395.84 786.31 2,273.84 15,477.00 2/24
EPRA NNAV 190 2,300.21 2,651.07 1.16 401.33 1,336.96 3,148.21 14,640.00 2/24
EPRA net initial yield 113 5.77 1.12 0.51 5.20 5.74 6.30 8.30 1/24
EPRA net initial yield topped up 94 5.83 0.91 2.10 5.30 5.80 6.40 7.70 1/24
EPRA vacancy rate 175 7.31 5.97 0.40 3.40 5.70 10.00 41.40 2/24
EPRA cost ratio incl. direct vacancy costs 29 18.93 5.95 0.33 17.24 20.30 22.90 28.98 1/24
EPRA cost ratio excl. direct vacancy costs 28 17.74 5.48 2.60 15.19 18.35 20.85 28.29 1/24
The global sample comprises of 528 firm-year observations from 112 real estate firms in 16 countries between 2009 and 2013. All data provided in this table are hand-collected from annual reports. 
The Number of pages corresponds to the total number of pages of the annual report. Number of pages for notes is the number of the pages of the financial group statement's notes. EPRA count  is 
the count of the word "EPRA" in the annual report. Number of EPRA figures is the number of EPRA performance measures disclosed. Separate EPRA Part is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the annual report has a separate part for their EPRA information and zero otherwise. External valuation for IP  is an indicator equal to one if their investment properties are based on the 
assessment of external appraisers and zero otherwise. Frequency of IP valuations counts how many times the external appraisers assess the value of the investment properties per financial year. 
Lists major property is an indicator variable equal to one if the annual report includes a list of their ten-most-valuable properties and zero otherwise. Lists of (re-)development properties is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the annual report includes a list of all development and redevelopment properties. Number of EPRA tables  is the number of EPRA-specified tables in the annual 
report. English version available  is an indicator variable equal to one if the annual report is publicly available in English language. Valuation at fair value is an indicator variable equal to one if 
investment properties are recognized at fair value. Fair value is the fair value amount of all investment properties measured at fair value. Fair value in the notes is the disclosed fair value amount 
of all investment properties recognized at historical cost. Historical cost  is the historical cost amount of all investment properties measured at historical cost. Fair value adjustments is the total fair 
value change in investment properties during a financial year. Adjustment on highest and best use  is the change in investment properties that is due to the new fair value definition (highest and 
best use) in IFRS 13, which is to be applied for annual periods beginning on or after 1 January 2013. EPRA Performance measures is the amount that is disclosed in the annual report for each of 
the eight performance figures. The last column "Score" defines how the EPRA overall score was constructed and defines their respective weights.
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Table 3.3: Spearman and Pearson Correlations 
Variables Log(Spread) Log(COC) AnaCov Turnover FcBias Medal
EPRA
Overall
Score
EPRA
Performance
Measures
EPRA
Application Gold Silver Bronze
Separate
EPRA
Part
Market Outcomes
Log(Spread) 0.339 *** -0.627 *** -0.613 *** 0.110 ** -0.425 *** -0.362 *** -0.336 *** -0.421 *** -0.355 *** -0.193 *** -0.081 * -0.172 ***
Log(COC) 0.305 *** -0.244 *** 0.030 0.046 -0.211 *** -0.169 *** -0.198 *** -0.255 *** -0.203 *** -0.128 *** 0.028 -0.101
AnaCov -0.620 *** -0.2397 *** 0.428 *** -0.045 0.476 *** 0.279 *** 0.322 *** 0.4541 *** 0.3752 *** 0.2171 *** 0.115 *** 0.1245 ***
Turnover -0.3073 *** 0.3122 *** 0.238 *** -0.031 0.299 *** 0.234 *** 0.183 *** 0.282 *** 0.207 *** 0.166 *** 0.076 * 0.070
FcBias 0.1128 ** 0.0174 -0.113 ** 0.008 0.006 0.039 0.051 -0.072 -0.075 * -0.015 0.112 ** -0.043
Disclosure Proxies
Medal -0.4331 *** -0.1982 *** 0.500 *** 0.103 ** -0.027 0.595 *** 0.624 *** 0.7906 *** 0.5816 *** 0.464 *** 0.475 *** 0.456 ***
EPRA Overall Score -0.3453 *** -0.1317 *** 0.285 *** 0.032 -0.018 0.628 *** 0.940 *** 0.5631 *** 0.4923 *** 0.237 *** 0.150 *** 0.618 ***
EPRA Performance Measures -0.3525 *** -0.1939 *** 0.334 *** -0.013 -0.030 0.657 *** 0.941 *** 0.580 *** 0.512 *** 0.238 *** 0.172 *** 0.608 ***
EPRA Application -0.432 *** -0.2251 *** 0.492 *** 0.102 ** -0.107 ** 0.791 *** 0.640 *** 0.643 *** 0.736 *** 0.587 *** -0.163 *** 0.531 ***
Gold -0.3663 *** -0.1729 *** 0.413 *** 0.080 * -0.075 * 0.582 *** 0.598 *** 0.597 *** -0.169 *** -0.117 *** -0.120 *** 0.425 ***
Silver -0.1954 *** -0.1204 ** 0.228 *** 0.053 -0.067 0.464 *** 0.224 *** 0.229 *** 0.587 *** -0.117 *** -0.096 ** 0.271 ***
Bronze -0.0769 * 0.0067 0.098 ** 0.020 0.109 ** 0.475 *** 0.092 ** 0.135 *** -0.163 *** -0.120 *** -0.096 *** -0.027
Separate EPRA Part -0.1749 *** -0.0655 0.126 *** -0.011 -0.064 0.456 *** 0.718 *** 0.676 *** 0.531 *** 0.425 *** 0.271 *** -0.027
This table reports pairwise Spearman's rank correlation coefficients in the upper right corner and Pearson's product-moment correlation in the lower left corner. Log(Spread)  is the logarithmic transformation of the weekly median quoted bid-ask 
spread (i.e., difference between the bid and ask price divided by the midpoint and measured at the end of each trading day) measured four month after the financial year end. Following Hail and Leuz (2006), Log(COC)  is the logarithmic 
transformation of the mean cost of capital calculated in accordance with four different model specifications suggested in (1) Claus and Thomas (2001), (2) Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), (3) Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), and (4) 
Easton (2004). AnaCov  is the number of analysts following a firm three months after the financial year end. Turnover  is the yearly turnover volume in the financial year divided by the average number of common shares outstanding. FcBias  is  the 
difference between the mean financial year end earnings forecast eleven month before the financial year end and the actual earnings as stated in the financial statements. Medal  is an indicator variable equal to one if firm's annual statement was 
awarded any medal in the Annual Report Survey conducted by Deloitte and zero otherwise. EPRA Overall Score  is a self-constructed measure to proxy for the extent to which firms comply with EPRA BPR. EPRA Performance Measures  is the 
number of disclosed EPRA performance measures in an annual report. EPRA Application  is an indicator variable equal to one in each year firms received either a silver or gold medal in Deloitte's EPRA Annual Report Survey and zero otherwise. 
Gold  is an indicator variable equal to one if firm's annual statement was awarded a gold medal in the Annual Report Survey conducted by Deloitte and zero otherwise. Silver  is an indicator variable equal to one if firm's annual statement was 
awarded a silver medal in the Annual Report Survey conducted by Deloitte and zero otherwise. Bronze  is an indicator variable equal to one if firm's annual statement was awarded a bronze medal in the Annual Report Survey conducted by Deloitte 
and zero otherwise. Separate EPRA Part  is an indicator variable equal to one if the annual report has a separate part for their EPRA information and zero otherwise. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
ti l
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics  
 
 
Variable N Mean Std. dev. Min p25 Median p75 Max
Disclosure measurement
Medal 528 0.30 0.46 0 0 0 1 1
Gold 528 0.13 0.33 0 0 0 0 1
Silver 528 0.08 0.28 0 0 0 0 1
Bronze 528 0.09 0.28 0 0 0 0 1
EPRA Overall Score 528 0.38 0.21 0.08 0.25 0.33 0.52 1
EPRA Performance Measures 528 0.65 0.48 0 0 1 1 1
EPRA Adoption 418 0.06 0.23 0 0 0 0 1
EPRA Application 528 0.21 0.41 0 0 0 0 1
SwitchBack 52 0.48 0.50 0 0 0 1 1
Mechanisms
Log(Spread ) 521 -5.37 1.15 -8.15 -6.14 -5.36 -4.62 -1.25
Log(COC ) 460 -2.57 0.48 -3.83 -2.83 -2.60 -2.37 -0.43
AnaCov 528 6.41 5.60 0 2 4 10 23
Value Relevance
PPS 111 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.04
BVE_PS 111 0.04 0.05 0 0 0.01 0.06 0.23
EPRA_NAV_PS 111 0.04 0.06 0 0 0.01 0.05 0.36
EPRA_NNNAV_PS 111 0.04 0.05 0 0 0.01 0.05 0.31
EPS 111 0.13 0.22 0 0.02 0.05 0.15 1.45
EPRA_EPS 111 3.33 18.73 0 0.02 0.09 0.36 128.11
Liquidity controls
Vol 521 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.3
Turnover 516 0.43 0.59 0 0.10 0.33 0.53 5.53
Size 521 6.45 1.24 2.51 5.65 6.46 7.24 10.21
Chs 528 0.48 0.50 0 0 0 1 1
LegalQuality 528 1.49 0.35 0.30 1.30 1.59 1.74 1.91
Additional controls
FcBias 513 1.57 9.71 -25.27 -0.14 0.02 0.62 148.25
Btm 520 1.27 0.64 0 0.91 1.12 1.50 5.03
Lev 517 0.53 0.17 0.01 0.44 0.55 0.65 0.95
Roa 522 4.62 5.10 -14.82 2.22 4.27 6.35 39.23
Others
Log(Returns) 513 0.09 0.29 -1.16 -0.04 0.09 0.25 1.1
Number_of_EPRA_adopters 528 69.44 17.43 39 59 74 85 86
SeasonedEquityOffering 394 0.40 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
DebtOffering 261 0.38 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
This table reports summary statistics of the variables used in our regression models. We report number of observations (N ), mean (Mean), standard deviation 
(Std. dev.), minimum (Min), 25th percentile (p25), 50th percentile (Median), 75th percentile (p75), and maximum (Max). For the definitions of the variables 
refer to Appendix 3.A.
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Table 3.5: Sample Distribution  
 
  
  
Panel A: Distributional statistics for the measurement and disclosure scores by country
Country
Total 
observations
# Firm-years 
measuring IP at 
FV
# Firm-years 
measuring IP at 
AC
# Avg Number 
of EPRA 
Figures
Avg EPRA 
Overall Score Gold Silver Bronze Total
Austria 20 20 0 2.55 0.3326 0 1 1 2
Belgium 39 39 0 5.26 0.5477 13 2 1 16
Finland 15 15 0 6.33 0.5045 6 3 2 11
France 53 43 10 4.26 0.4250 8 12 4 24
Germany 67 52 15 2.33 0.2772 4 2 5 11
Greece 14 14 0 0 0.1369 0 0 0 0
Israel 9 9 0 4.11 0.3628 0 0 0 0
Italy 10 10 0 0.7 0.2818 0 0 2 2
Luxembourg 15 15 0 1.87 0.3293 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 25 25 0 5.68 0.5515 6 3 5 14
Norway 5 5 0 0.4 0.1848 0 0 0 0
Spain 9 4 5 1.11 0.2264 0 0 0 0
Sweden 40 38 2 1.08 0.2572 0 0 4 4
Switzerland 25 25 0 4.52 0.5188 4 6 1 11
Turkey 17 9 8 0 0.2059 0 0 0 0
United Kingdom 165 165 0 4.01 0.4172 25 15 21 61
All observations 528 488 40 3.36 0.3825 66 44 46 156
MedalsMeasurement
Panel B: Distributional statistics for the measurement and disclosure scores by year
Year
Total 
observations
# Firm-years 
measuring IP at 
FV
# Firm-years 
measuring IP at 
AC
# Avg Number 
of EPRA 
Figures
Avg EPRA 
Overall Score Gold Silver Bronze Total
2009 97 90 7 1.29 0.2776 7 6 12 25
2010 103 96 7 2.63 0.3443 7 8 8 23
2011 108 100 8 3.46 0.3900 12 9 8 29
2012 110 101 9 4.22 0.4262 16 13 10 39
2013 110 101 9 4.92 0.4595 24 8 8 40
All observations 528 488 40 3.36 0.3825 66 44 46 156
Measurement Medals
The global sample comprises of 528 firm-year observations from 112 real estate firms in 16 countries between 2009 and 2013. Panel A shows distributional statistics for selected information by country. This 
includes (1) total observations; (2-3) the number of firm-years that recognize investment properties at fair value and historical cost, respectively; (4) the average number of EPRA figures disclosed; (5) the 
average EPRA overall score; and (6-9) and the number of medals that were awared by Deloitte in their EPRA annual report survey. Panel B shows the same distributional statistics by year. 
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Table 3.6: Value Relevance 
 
Dependent variable
Variables
Predicted
sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept ? 0.829 6.705 * 4.059 -3.632 3.797 2.621 1.218 0.381
(0.22) (1.85) (1.11) (-0.75) (0.47) (0.32) (0.31) (0.10)
BVE_PS + 0.791 *** 0.821 *** 0.646 *** 0.727 ***
(12.15) (6.29) (9.24) (8.67)
EPRA_NAV_PS + 0.684 *** 0.732 ***
(18.02) (9.54)
EPRA_NNNAV_PS + 0.757 *** 0.839 ***
(16.03) (7.55)
EPRA_NAV_PS - BVE_PS + 0.502 ***
(3.62)
EPRA_NNNAV_PS - BVE_PS + 0.556 ***
(4.69)
EPS + 2.564 *** 3.622 *** 3.768 *** 5.278 *** 4.720 ***
(4.40) (7.81) (8.82) (3.62) (3.02)
EPRA_EPS + 3.501 4.114 ** 3.540
(1.39) (2.06) (1.59)
EPRA_EPS - EPS + 2.134 1.456
(1.61) (1.01)
Year fixed effets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R² 0.9693 0.9829 0.9827 0.9615 0.9587 0.9532 0.9857 0.9846
Adj-R² 0.9652 0.9806 0.9804 0.9563 0.9531 0.9469 0.9834 0.9822
N 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, t-statistics of Equation (1A) and (1B). We regress price per share (PPS ) on different measures of equity value per share and 
periodical performance per share. PPS  is the market capitalization four month after the fiscal year end divided by the number of common shares four months after the financial year end. NAV per 
share is measured using three different proxies: BVE_PS is book value of equity divided the number of common shares and EPRA_[NN]NAV_PS is the EPRA [triple] net asset value divided by the 
number of common shares as specified in EPRA (2010). Periodical performance per share is measured using EPS, defined as IFRS net income divided by the number of common shares, and 
EPRA_EPS  as specified in EPRA (2010). We seek to investigate the relative and incremental value of EPRA_NAV_PS, EPRA_NNNAV_PS, and EPRA_EPS. T-statistics in parentheses are calculated 
using robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
PPS
Relative Value Relevance Incremental Value Relevance
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Table 3.7: Stock Liquidity and EPRA-BPR Compliance   
  
Dependent variable
Variables
Predicted
sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept ? -4.759 *** -1.641 *** -4.640 *** -1.427 *** -4.891 *** -1.521 ***
(-38.73) (-3.43) (-29.71) (-3.07) (-39.12) (-3.10)
Medal - -1.076 *** -0.427 ***
(-6.14) (-3.25)
EPRA Overall Score - -1.847 *** -0.632 *
(-3.89) (-2.09)
EPRA Performance Measures - -0.115 *** -0.039 *
(-4.17) (-2.14)
Vol + 7.903 *** 7.419 *** 7.506 ***
(2.85) (2.63) (2.64)
Turnover - -0.472 ** -0.482 * -0.493 *
(-2.09) (-2.03) (-2.07)
Size - -0.518 *** -0.544 *** -0.543 ***
(-7.93) (-8.34) (-8.27)
Chs - -0.349 *** -0.388 *** -0.368 ***
(-3.11) (-3.27) (-3.15)
LegalQuality - -0.079 -0.060 -0.064
(-0.43) (-0.32) (-0.34)
Year fixed effets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R² 0.2089 0.6474 0.1283 0.6335 0.1333 0.6338
Adj-R² 0.2012 0.6404 0.1198 0.6262 0.1247 0.6265
F-statistic 21.96 48.75 17.06 34.2 16.98 35.51
N 515 515 515 515 515 515
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, t-statistics of Equation (3.2). We regress Log(Spread ) on one of three proxies for EPRA BPR compliance 
(i.e., Medal,  EPRA Overall Score,  or EPRA Performance Measures ) and control variables. Log(Spread)  is the logarithmic transformation of the weekly median quoted bid-
ask spread (i.e., the difference between the bid and ask price divided by the midpoint and measured at the end of each trading day) measured three month after the financial 
year end. We use three proxies for EPRA BPR compliance: In models 1-2, we use Medal , an indicator variable equal to one if firm's annual statement was awarded a medal in 
the EPRA Annual Report Survey and zero otherwise. In model 3-4, we use EPRA Overall Score , a self-constructed measure. In model 5-6, we use EPRA Performance 
Measures , the number of disclosed EPRA performance measures. Control variables include the following: Vol is the standard deviation of all weekly log returns during the 
financial year. Turnover is yearly turnover volume in a financial year divided by the average number of common shares outstanding.  Size  is the logarithmic transformation of 
market capitalization at the end of the financial year. Chs  is an indicator variable equal to one if the number of closely held shares divided by the number of common shares 
outstanding at the financial year end is below the sample mean and zero otherwise. LegalQuality  is the country-specific regulatory quality index by Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2010) for each financial year. T-statistics in parentheses are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firms. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
Log(Spread)
EPRA Overall Score EPRA Performance MeasuresMedal
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Table 3.8: Refinancing Costs and EPRA-BPR Compliance 
 
  
Dependent variable
Variables
Predicted
sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept ? -2.461 *** -2.420 *** -2.460 *** -2.370 *** -2.482 *** -2.404 ***
(-41.62) (-7.29) (-38.76) (-7.20) (-43.51) (-7.28)
Medal - -0.185 *** -0.107 *
(-2.78) (-1.94)
EPRA Overall Score - -0.261 * -0.153
(-1.85) (-1.21)
EPRA Performance Measures - -0.025 *** -0.013 *
(-2.61) (-1.75)
Vol + 0.897 0.510 0.516
(0.50) (0.28) (0.28)
Turnover - 0.274 *** 0.273 ** 0.270 **
(2.62) (2.55) (2.56)
Size - -0.048 -0.054 * -0.051 *
(-1.59) (-1.78) (-1.71)
Chs - -0.112 ** -0.118 ** -0.113 **
(-2.18) (-2.24) (-2.14)
LegalQuality - -0.195 * -0.196 * -0.191 *
(-1.88) (-1.87) (-1.84)
FcBias + 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.08) (0.22) (0.25)
Btm ? 0.196 *** 0.203 *** 0.203 ***
(3.16) (3.32) (3.33)
Lev + 0.201 0.212 0.203
(0.98) (1.00) (0.97)
Roa - -0.010 -0.010 -0.011
(-1.40) (-1.41) (-1.43)
Year fixed effets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R² 0.0421 0.3622 0.0125 0.3558 0.0384 0.3596
Adj-R² 0.0313 0.3416 0.0092 0.3350 0.0275 0.3389
F-statistic 3.71 5.01 2.81 4.88 3.91 5.27
N 449 449 449 449 449 449
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, t-statistics of Equation (3.3). We regress Log(COC ) on one of three proxies for EPRA BPR compliance 
(i.e., Medal,  EPRA Overall Score, or EPRA Performance Measures ) and control variables. Following Hail and Leuz (2006), Log(COC)  is the logarithmic transformation of 
the mean cost of capital calculated in accordance with four different model specifications suggested in (1) Claus and Thomas (2001), (2) Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan 
(2001), (3) Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), and (4) Easton (2004). We use three proxies for EPRA BPR compliance: In models 1-2, we use Medal , an indicator 
variable equal to one if firm's annual statement was awarded a medal in the EPRA Annual Report Survey and zero otherwise. In model 3-4, we use EPRA Overall Score , a 
self-constructed measure. In model 5-6, we use EPRA Performance Measures , the number of disclosed EPRA performance measures. Control variables include the 
following: Vol  is the standard deviation of all weekly log returns during the financial year. Turnover  is the yearly turnover volume in a financial year divided by the average 
number of common shares outstanding. Size  is the logarithmic transformation of the market capitalization at the financial year end. Chs  is an indicator variable equal to one 
if the number of closely held shares divided by the number of common shares outstanding at the financial year end is below the sample mean and zero otherwise. 
LegalQuality  is the country-specific regulatory quality index by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) for each financial year. FcBias  is the difference between the mean 
financial year end earnings forecast eleven months before the financial year end and the actual earnings as stated in the financial statements. Btm  is the book value of equity 
divided by the market value of equity at the financial year end. Lev  is total liabilities divided by total assets at the financial year end. Roa  is the net income divided by the 
average total assets in a financial year. T-statistics in parentheses are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firms. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
Log(COC)
Medal EPRA Overall Score EPRA Performance Measures
 
 
 
138 
Table 3.9: Analysts Coverage and EPRA-BPR Compliance 
 
  
Dependent variable
Variables
Predicted
sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept ? 4.360 *** -15.467 *** 4.076 *** -17.063 *** 5.230 *** -16.123 ***
(8.49) (-6.27) (6.50) (-6.37) (9.95) (-6.01)
Medal + 6.170 *** 3.580 ***
(6.88) (4.92)
EPRA Overall Score + 9.196 *** 4.494 **
(3.89) (2.54)
EPRA Performance Measures + 0.641 *** 0.343 **
(4.69) (3.24)
Vol + 34.990 ** 46.077 *** 45.340 ***
(2.41) (2.63) (2.69)
Turnover + 1.007 ** 1.044 ** 1.121 **
(2.39) (2.09) (2.24)
Size + 2.305 *** 2.525 *** 2.478 ***
(6.47) (6.50) (6.60)
Chs + 1.213 ** 1.458 ** 1.298 *
(1.97) (2.17) (1.94)
LegalQuality + 0.194 1.128 1.080
(1.20) (1.07) (1.03)
FcBias - -0.051 *** -0.058 *** -0.058 ***
(-3.08) (-3.65) (-3.65)
Btm + 1.894 -0.031 -0.005
(0.38) (-0.05) (-0.01)
Lev + 0.042 1.382 1.365
(0.97) (0.62) (0.62)
Roa + 1.121 0.040 0.041
(0.90) (0.74) (0.76)
Year fixed effets Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R² 0.2699 0.5812 0.117 0.5289 0.153 0.5423
Adj-R² 0.2625 0.5690 0.1080 0.5152 0.1444 0.5291
F-statistic 15.38 24.63 11.44 13.77 16.65 15.99
N 497 497 497 497 497 497
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, t-statistics of Equation (3.4). We regress AnaCov  on one of three proxies for EPRA BPR compliance (i.e., 
Medal, EPRA Overall Score, or EPRA Performance Measures ) and control variables. AnaCov  is the number of analysts following a firm three months after the financial year 
end. We use three proxies for EPRA BPR compliance: In models 1-2, we use Medal , an indicator variable equal to one if firm's annual statement was awarded a medal in the 
EPRA Annual Report Survey and zero otherwise. In model 3-4, we use EPRA Overall Score,  a self-constructed measure. In model 5-6, we use EPRA Performance Measures, 
the number of disclosed EPRA performance measures. Control variables include the following: Vol  is the standard deviation of all weekly log returns during the financial year. 
Turnover  is the yearly turnover volume in a financial year divided by the average number of common shares outstanding. Size  is the logarithmic transformation of the market 
capitalization at the financial year end. Chs  is an indicator variable equal to one if the number of closely held shares divided by the number of common shares outstanding at the 
financial year end is below the sample mean and zero otherwise. LegalQuality  is the country-specific regulatory quality index by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) for 
each financial year. FcBias  is the difference between the mean financial year end earnings forecast eleven months before the financial year end and the actual earnings as stated 
in the financial statements. Btm  is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the financial year end. Lev  is total liabilities divided by total assets at the 
financial year end. Roa  is the net income divided by the average total assets in a financial year. T-statistics in parentheses are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by 
firm. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
AnaCov
Medal EPRA Overall Score EPRA Performance Measures
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Table 3.10: Within-Firm Analysis 
 
  
Log(Spread) Log(COC)
Variables Predicted sign (1) (2)
Intercept ? -2.779 ** -1.721 *** -2.521
(-2.05) (-3.75) (-0.40)
EPRA Application -,-,+ -0.402 ** 0.040 3.831 ***
(-2.08) (0.50) (2.78)
Notes_Pages -,-,+ -0.024 ** -0.002 0.041
(-2.06) (-0.61) (0.68)
Vol +,+,? -3.601 3.141 97.058 **
(-0.34) (1.05) (2.20)
LegalQuality -,-,+ -0.838 -0.585 ** 0.045
(-1.42) (-2.45) (0.01)
Log(Returns) -,-,+ -1.596 ** -0.520 10.409 **
(-2.11) (-1.64) (2.56)
Year fixed effets Yes Yes Yes
R² 0.2216 0.2667 0.2668
Adj-R² 0.1632 0.2072 0.2118
F-statistic 6.58 3.31 4.71
N 130 121 130
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, t-statistics. The regressions only include firms that 
became compliant to EPRA BPR during the sample period, i.e., firms for which we have observation before and 
after EPRA BPR adoption. We regress Log(Spread ), Log(COC ), and AnaCov  on EPRA Application  and control 
variables. EPRA Application is an indicator variable equal to one if firms received either a gold or silver medal in 
Deloitte's EPRA Annual Report Survey in the time period between 2009 and 2013 and zero otherwise. For the 
definitions of the dependent variables and control variables refer to Appendix 3.A. T-statistics in parentheses are 
calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firms.***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
AnaCov
(3)
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Table 3.11: Switch-back Analysis 
  
Log(Spread) Log(COC) AnaCov
Variables Predicted sign (1) (2) (3)
Intercept ? -5.948 ** -1.843 *** 19.529
(-2.15) (-3.23) (1.03)
SwitchBack +,+,- 0.816 *** -0.011 -4.195 **
(3.02) (-0.10) (-2.39)
Non_adoption +,+,- 0.782 0.286 -6.734 *
(1.37) (1.35) (-1.86)
Notes_Pages -,-,+ -0.001 -0.003 -0.026
(-0.10) (-0.70) (-0.42)
Vol +,+,? 18.095 3.580 -146.884 *
(1.52) (0.61) (-1.89)
LegalQuality -,-,+ -0.051 -0.438 -2.538
(-0.04) (-1.49) (-0.29)
Log(Returns) -,-,+ -2.024 *** -0.503 11.555 **
(-2.60) (-1.01) (2.50)
Year fixed effets Yes Yes Yes
R² 0.3605 0.3009 0.3344
Adj-R² 0.2046 0.1304 0.1720
F-statistic 16.27 8.31 684.68
N 52 52 52
This table reports OLS coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, t-statistics. The regressions only include firms that 
received a silver or gold accreditation during at least one year in our sample period and lost the silver or gold 
accreditation subsequently. We regress Log(Spread ), Log(COC ), and AnaCov  on SwitchBack , Non_adoption  and 
control variables. SwitchBack  is an indicator variable equal to one for the time period when firms lose their gold or 
silver accreditation until they again receive silver or gold accreditation according to Deloitte's EPRA Annual Report 
Survey and zero otherwise. Non_adoption  is an indicator variable equal to one from the start of the sample period 
(2009) until they first receive gold or silver accreditation according to Deloitte's EPRA Annual Report Survey and 
zero otherwise. For the definitions of the dependent variables and control variables refer to Appendix 3.A. T-
statistics in parentheses are calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firms. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
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Table 3.12: Determinants of EPRA Adoption, Application, and Compliance  
 
  
Dependent variable
Variables Predicted sign
Intercept ? 0.788 -2.277 -0.275 ** -3.704 **
(0.34) (-0.20) (-2.48) (-2.30)
Size + 0.129 0.460 *** 0.036 *** 0.645 ***
(1.46) (6.49) (5.10) (5.23)
Btm ? -0.210 0.035 0.017 0.208
(-0.77) (0.25) (0.98) (0.92)
Vol ? -0.210 *** -4.937 -0.651 * -8.638 *
(-3.00) (-1.27) (-1.89) (-1.70)
Log(Returns) ? -0.951 -0.495 -0.121 *** -1.611 ***
(-1.63) (-1.59) (-3.56) (-3.08)
DebtOffering + 0.554 ** 0.566 *** 0.065 ** 0.759 *
(2.05) (3.45) (2.38) (1.71)
SeasonedEquityOffering + -0.030 0.144 0.015 0.276
(-0.12) (0.96) (0.80) (0.94)
LegalQuality + -0.545 ** 0.252 0.081 *** 1.429 ***
(-1.99) (1.16) (3.44) (3.78)
Number_of_EPRA_adopters + -0.019 -0.049 * 0.005 ** -0.013
(-0.76) (-1.83) (2.11) (-0.52)
Year fixed effets Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo-R² / R² 0.1292 0.2116 0.1871 0.2360
Wald-Chi² / F-statistic 25.19 92.72 14.99 15.34
N 322 512 512 512
This table reports Probit (1-2) and OLS (3-4) coefficient estimates and, in parentheses, t-statistics of Equation (3.5) and (3.6). We regress EPRA 
Adoption , EPRA Application , EPRA Overall Score , and EPRA Performance Measures  on potential determinants. EPRA Adoption  is an indicator 
variable equal to one when firms received their first silver or gold medal in Deloitte's EPRA Annual Report Survey for the time period between 2010 and 
2013 and zero otherwise.  EPRA Application  is an indicator variable equal to one if firms received either a gold or silver medal in Deloitte's EPRA 
Annual Report Survey in the time period between 2009 and 2013 and zero otherwise. EPRA Overall Score  is a self-constructed measure to proxy for the 
extent to which firms comply with EPRA BPR. EPRA Performance Measures  is the number of disclosed EPRA performance measures in their annual 
report. Potential determinants include the following: Size  is the logarithmic transformation of the market capitalization at the financial year end. Btm  is 
the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the financial year end. Vol  is the standard deviation of all weekly log returns during the 
financial year. Log(Returns)  is the logarithmic transformation of the relative share price performance in the financial year. DebtOffering  is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a firm experienced a debt issuance in the following financial year and zero otherwise. SeasonedEquityOfferings  is an indicator 
variable equal to one if a firm experienced an SEO in the following year or zero otherwise.  LegalQuality  is the country-specific regulatory quality index 
by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) for each financial year. Number_of_EPRA_adopters  is the numbers of firms in our sample that disclosed at 
least one EPRA performance measure in that financial year. T-statistics in parentheses are calculated using robust standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
OLS
EPRA
Application
EPRA
Overall Score
EPRA
Performance
Measures
Probit
EPRA 
Adoption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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Appendix 3 
Appendix 3.A: Variable Definition 
 
 
 
Variables
Indicator/
Continous Definition
Disclosure measurement
Medal Ind. An indicator variable equal to one if firm's annual statement was awarded any medal in the Annual Report 
     Survey conducted by Deloitte and zero otherwise.
Gold Ind. An indicator variable equal to one if firm's annual statement was awarded a gold medal in the Annual 
     Report Survey conducted by Deloitte and zero otherwise.
Silver Ind. An indicator variable equal to one if firm's annual statement was awarded a silver medal in the Annual 
     Report Survey conducted by Deloitte and zero otherwise.
Bronze Ind. An indicator variable equal to one if firm's annual statement was awarded a bronze medal in the Annual 
     Report Survey conducted by Deloitte and zero otherwise.
EPRA Overall Score Cont. A self-constructed measure to proxy for the extent to which firms comply with EPRA BPR.
EPRA Performance Measures Cont. The number of disclosed EPRA performance measures in an annual report.
EPRA Adoption Ind. An indicator variable equal to one when firms received their first silver or gold medal in 
     Deloitte's EPRA Annual Report Survey for the time period between 2010 and 2013 and zero otherwise.
EPRA Application Ind. An indicator variable equal to one in each year firms received either a silver or gold 
     medal in Deloitte's EPRA Annual Report Survey and zero otherwise.
SwitchBack Ind. An indicator variable equal to one for the time period when firms lose their gold or silver accreditation until they 
     again receive silver or gold accreditation according to Deloitte's EPRA Annual Report Survey and zero
     otherwise. 
Non_Adoption Ind. An indicator variable equal to from the start of the sample period (2009) until they first receive gold or silver
     accreditation according to Deloitte's EPRA Annual Report Survey and zero otherwise.
Mechanisms
Log(Spread ) Cont. The logarithmic transformation of the weekly median quoted bid-ask spread (i.e., difference between the
     bid and ask price divided by the midpoint and measured at the end of each trading day) measured 
     three month after the financial year end.
Log(COC ) Cont. Following Hail and Leuz (2006), log(COC) is the logarithmic transformation of the mean costs of capital 
     calculated in accordance with four different model specifications suggested in 
    (1) Claus and Thomas (2001), (2) Gebhardt, Lee and Swaminathan (2001), 
    (3) Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005), and (4) Easton (2004).
AnaCov Cont. The number of analysts that follow a firm three months after the financial year end.
Value Relevance
PPS Cont. The market capitalization four months after the financial year end divided by the number of common shares at that time.
BVE_PS Cont. The book value of equity divided by the number of common shares four months after the financial year end.
EPRA_NAV_PS Cont. The EPRA net asset value divided by the number of common shares  four months after the financial year end.
EPRA_NNNAV_PS Cont. The EPRA triple net asset value divided by the number of common shares four months after the financial year end.
EPS Cont. The net income divided by the number of common shares four months after the financial year end.
EPRA_EPS Cont. The EPRA earnings divided by the number of common shares four months after the financial year end.
Liquidity controls
Vol Cont. The standard deviation of the weekly log returns during the financial year.
Turnover Cont. The yearly turnover volume in the financial year divided by the average number of common shares
     outstanding.  
Size Cont. The logarithmic transformation of the market capitalization at the financial year end.
Chs Cont. An indicator variable equal to one if the number of closely held shares divided by the number of common
     shares outstanding at the financial year end is below the sample mean and zero otherwise.
LegalQuality Cont.  The country-specific regulatory quality index by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) for each financial year.
Additional controls
FcBias Cont. The difference between the mean financial year end earnings forecast eleven month before the financial
     year end and the actual earnings as stated in the financial statements.
Btm Cont. The book value of equity divided by the market value of equity at the the financial year end.
Lev Cont. The total liabilities divided by the total assets at the financial year end.
Roa Cont. The net income divided by the average total assets in a financial year.
Others
Log(Returns) Cont. The logarithmic transformation of the relative share price performance plus one in the financial year.
Notes_Pages Cont. The number of pages of the financial statement notes in an annual report.
SeasonedEquityOffering Ind. An indicator variable equal to one if a firm experienced an SEO in the following year and zero otherwise.
DebtOffering Ind. An indicator variable equal to one if a firm experienced a debt issuance in the following financial year and zero 
otherwise.
